Introduction
The rapidly evolving security landscape has necessitated a detailed examination of the contours of global violent extremism, including the various trends, associated threats, and implications. This has become particularly significant when confronted with an unprecedented exploitation of emerging technology, the digital ecosystem, and covert financial channels by non-state actors who espouse violent extremist ideological worldviews, even as state agencies and lawmakers remain challenged in reforming their policies and approaches in ways that mitigate the fallout.
In this context, it becomes important to underline that state actors’ inability to anchor much of their policies and strategies within the context of their existing unique security environments, has often meant that hostile forces worldwide have been able to capitalize on the non-alignment between the threat landscape and the state’s approach to countering the specific threats.
In addition, it is vital to underscore that the shifting contours of violent extremism, constantly redefined by artificial intelligence (AI), democratization of access to technology and social media, as well as youth-centric radicalization, have enabled the endurance of violent extremist ideologies, even in the face of sustained military or law enforcement-led operations.
The Evolution of the Contemporary Landscape
As the security landscape continues to take on a more complex character, it is important to keep in mind that the global landscape today is more uncertain, more fragmented, and more tumultuous than ever before. For example, violent extremism in terms of radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization has become more geographically diffused than it was a decade ago. This has particularly become rampant as decentralization and democratization of access to emerging technologies have enabled the transformation of violent extremism as a low-cost initiative and bottom-up security threat globally.
For example, terror groups like ISIS no longer require centralized command-and-control structures with executive leaders to direct targeted attacks, disseminate propaganda, or to instigate violence. As a result, it has reduced the logistical and operational costs and hurdles associated with acts of violent extremism on a large scale. Today, an individual who has been self-radicalized online and has access to a car or truck, a low-cost IED, or even a knife can inflict considerable damage.
Moreover, today, an individual located in New York City, US, could be consuming propaganda which was shared by someone who is based in Brussels, Belgium. The propaganda itself could have been conceived in Pakistan’s Islamabad. The dissemination of extremist propaganda could be carried out through AI, social media platforms driven by algorithms, discussion boards, and encrypted chat forums, among other avenues. As a result, violent extremism has transformed from only being a border security challenge to now also being a digital, psycho-social, techno-intelligence issue.
Transformative Shifts & Trends in Global Violent Extremism
With the contextual backstory in place, the natural progression is to try to understand some of the fundamental macro-level developments that have occurred or continue to occur on a global platform.
‘Normalization’ of Violent Extremism
At the outset, it is important to take into consideration the ‘normalization’ of violent extremism. Normalization refers to the process by which groups, individuals, or movements that were either operating onthe fringes of society or fighting against internationally-recognized governments to topple them are increasingly being courted, accepted, or at least given space to co-exist within the international system.
One of the most widely-discussed examples is that of the events following Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani)-led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seizing power in Syria in December 2024. Al-Sharaa was once a wanted man with a bounty worth millions of dollars on his head, and his organization, HTS, once an offshoot of ISIS and al-Qaeda, was a proscribed outfit. His journey from a jihadist commander to that of the Syrian President, accompanied by the removal of the US-placed bounty, a reception at the United Nations and Chatham House, as well as gradual diplomatic engagements worldwide, represents what can be termed the HTS or the Idlib model. This transformation represents a strategic recalibration of his image from that of the leader of a militant faction to that of the de facto leader of post-Assad Syria.
In this context, it is necessary to reflect on some key implications of these shifting dynamics.
What emerges as a fundamentally concerning proposition is that non-state actors across Africa, South East and South Asia, as well as West Asia, are taking note of the events closely. The Syrian case study signals to other violent non-state actors that coercion and militant movements could be weaponized as the primary instruments to secure power.
Following the forcible transfer of power in December 2024, the new Syrian leader has championed Syria’s transition into a new era, having replaced his suicide vest for a tailored suit. This has demonstrated to other jihadist groups that they can out-last and out-govern leaders who lack legitimacy and grassroots support, especially in the context of failing or failed states.
Equally important, however, is the question, or rather a dilemma, for traditional state actors – do they engage with individuals and movements that were earlier proscribed, but now wield authority over large or overwhelming sections of a country? Do they offer diplomatic recognition or engage with them in a limited context?
The Enduring Threat of ISIS
While West Asia has long been at the epicenter of overlapping conflicts as one of the most volatile zones globally, it is the enduring threat posed by ISIS worldwide, which must be accounted for equally.
Despite the fall of its physical ‘Caliphate’ in March 2019, ISIS remains the most lethal and connected security challenge to the global security architecture. This is largely because it has significantly shifted its focus from holding territory in 2014 to migrating to the online ecosystem to create a digital ‘Caliphate.’ As a result, today, it is no longer reliant on access to secure facilities to train, recruit, mobilize, and indoctrinate the next generation of jihadists. All of this can happen entirely online.
There are some lone wolf violent extremists, however, who, in the absence of any formal ties to the group, have been entirely self-radicalized by consuming online propaganda and subsequently carrying out acts of violence. One of the more recent examples, at least within the Indian context, is that of the April 2026 stabbing incident near Mumbai, where a lone wolf inspired by ISIS’ ideological worldview, inflicting knife wounds on two security guards after he identified their religious identity and discovered they were unable to recite the Kalma (the Islamic declaration of faith).
Notably, while the use of high-quality propaganda and online chat forums, including applications that cannot be tracked using digital footprints, had remained a key pillar during its formative years, the expansion in terms of their usage, including in localized languages and targeted settings to reach the intended demographic has increased in an unprecedented manner today.
Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) has emerged, including within the online sphere and with the exploitation of AI-enabled propaganda, as one of the most aggressive among all the ISIS affiliates, in terms of sustaining the fear and notoriety that the global audience came to associate with the deadliest terror outfit in recent history. ISKP has also emerged as one of the most lethal ISIS affiliates in terms of physical attacks, ranging from the suicide bombing at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in 2021 to the Crocus City Hall attack in 2024, just to name two major events.
The South Asian Experience
At the same time, South Asia has also confronted some serious security challenges, ranging from online radicalization, digitally enabled violent extremism, and cross-border security threats.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh, for instance, especially since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024, has undergone a tumultuous political shift with seismic undercurrents. Soon after the resignation of the former Prime Minister, the sudden vacuum created a conducive environment for extremist actors to exploit simultaneously. Here, it is important to note that, unlike many case studies, Bangladesh’s experience with extremism-related security crises has not solely been externally-driven. Its engagement with Islamist jihadi worldviews, for example, has its origins in the historical revivalist movements to purify the Bengali society, which had allegedly been corrupted by eccentric and non-Islamic influences. Later, the echoes of the Afghan jihad and the training received by hardliners in the camps eventually gave rise to outfits like Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami and Jamaat-e-Islami.
However, amid the recent political transition, a bludgeoning security threat came to the fore. Several convicted prisoners escaped during two prison breaks in 2024. One of the key concerns that lies here is that such individuals who have a documented history of extremist violence, when armed with established networks, skillsets, and festering grievances, re-enter the mainstream society, the scale of the threat confronting a society swings upwards immediately, as the threat matrix is radically transformed. In the past, as dictated by precedents set in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, prison breaks, especially during periods of crises, have amplified the security threat for decades to come.
Bangladesh’s threat matrix, interestingly, has not only been shaped by the events following the regime change. Even after several years, Cox’s Bazar continues to host more than a million Rohingya refugees who reside there in a protracted state of limbo, with their long-term future and livelihood in a state of absolute flux. Conditions such as these often create a conducive ecosystem which is ripe for exploitation by violent extremist recruiters.
Beyond local militant dynamics, Cox’s Bazar is increasingly emerging as a focal point for the activities of transnational militant groups. The arrest of a 19-year-old Rohingya youth on May 5 highlights indications of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) suspected recruitment efforts in Bangladesh, reinforcing concerns raised by the detention of four individuals in Dhaka on April 29 over alleged links to the Pakistan-based militant organization. While Bangladesh currently shows little evidence of established TTP cells or institutional support networks, these incidents suggest the group’s intent to cultivate relationships with radicalized and vulnerable individuals as part of a broader strategy to expand its covert presence and operational reach in the region. Moreover, the involvement of individuals connected to the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar has prompted investigators to examine the possibility of operational or logistical linkages between the TTP and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), although no conclusive evidence has yet emerged.
There are also some other prominent security concerns brewing in the Eastern sector of South Asia, including the threat posed by ISIS and Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. Bangladesh and its nationals have frequently featured in Bengali propaganda pieces, with many citizens travelling to conflict zones to support their jihadist activities.
At the end of the day, particularly for countries such as India, the implications of the domestic turmoil in Bangladesh have wide-ranging consequences, particularly because of the porous borders.
Nonetheless, it is also important to underscore that the threat matrix is not the same as it was during and the immediate aftermath of the Holy Artisan Bakery terror attack in 2016 or the coordinated bombings carried out by Jamaat Mujahideen Bangladesh in 2005.
India
For South Asian countries like India, the threat matrix is significantly shaped by threats coming from its western front, which to a great extent, has become hybridized. Violent extremists earlier were easily distinguishable based on their attire, the weapons they operated, or by tracking their infiltration across the border and through their participation and positions clearly demarcated in top-down organizational movements. However, the landscape today is fundamentally different in many ways, largely because it has become more diffused and technologically-driven.
At the same time, Pakistan’s deep state operatives and their proxy terror groups are increasingly waging hybrid terrorism by positioning front organizations such as The Resistance Front, against India, more so to avoid scrutiny by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). They have also undertaken the simultaneous use of narco-terrorism, drones, arms trafficking, online radicalization, disinformation and influence-operation campaigns.
Hybridization of terrorism is also reflected in the tactics employed by violent extremist operatives who may not always wear a camouflage uniform or be actively involved in all aspects of violent extremist activities, but may instead be a local student who may carry out a singular incident of violence before retreating to their otherwise mundane lives. The latter, in this case referred to as an overground worker (OGW), with no criminal record whatsoever, could also, having been temporarily activated, simply be involved with renting a room, providing medical or food-based assistance, or even a SIM to active militants.
Another major development along India’s western front is the exploitation of the digital ecosystems, where subversive actors are weaponizing blockchain technology and cryptocurrency platforms, social media, encrypted messaging applications like Telegram, and AI-enabled propaganda. The target may not always be an immediate outburst of violence, but a gradual erosion of socio-political harmony and trust, national security, and pluralism.
These are the key operational realities confronting India’s security landscape today, where non-state and state-backed non-state actors are operating across multiple domains simultaneously, even without engaging in a conventional war against the country.
While the above-mentioned cases are concerning challenges for the global security landscape, it is also arguably true that any discussion regarding contemporary violent extremism would remain incomplete without assessing the financial architecture that sustains it.
Financing & Violent Extremism
Understanding the financial backbone of violent extremism is quintessential to a holistic understanding of the security landscape. At the outset, it is important to point out that disruption of the contemporary financing architecture has become more challenging than it was perhaps a decade ago.
The role of end-to-end cryptocurrency platforms, such as Monero, has become particularly appealing to groups like ISIS, as there is not only a lack of regulation, but funds can be transferred across thousands of miles within a few seconds, while keeping the users’ identities masked. This makes tracing such accounts extremely challenging. At one point, it was reported that about 25,000 USD was transferred to ISKP within the ISIS ecosystem using crypto in the lead-up to the terror attack at the Hamid Karzai International Airport.
Despite the stringent efforts of FATF to regulate virtual currencies, there remains a stark gap between regulatory efforts and the pace of exploitation of virtual currency platforms by non-state actors, leading to an acceleration gap. This means that terror financing avenues are evolving and diversifying at a much faster pace than money transfers via virtual wallets can be regulated.
At the same time, it is important to note that despite the exploitation of technological advancements, the use of hawala networks remains at the epicenter of raising funds by violent extremist groups, even as it is simultaneously used for legitimate uses, including sending remittances. There have been growing debates about the need to regulate the cash flow via hawala transfers. It is, however, a valid criticism that the legalization of hawala in a bid to regulate the transfers could push the subversive actors to go underground to avoid being traced and, therefore, could incentivize them to come up with alternative ways to move their money globally.
A New Security Frontier
In this broader global security landscape however, it is also important to briefly reflect on one of the most urgent and yet understudied dimensions of violent extremism is the systematic targeting of the youth, particularly the minors, leading to the lowering of threshold for radicalization and eventually, violent extremism. There are several factors at play here which explain why this demographic is far more vulnerable and susceptible.
They range from identity diffusion, heightened appetite for risks, appeal of edgy and visually-appealing short-form content, as well as the blurring of lines between mental health-related vulnerabilities and extremism. Extremist recruiters have been able to weaponize through gamification and memification of hate, interactive ecosystems, dark spaces, social media reels, music, and satire; the promise of belongingness, community, kinship, brotherhood, and the desire to have a purpose in an uncertain world.
This has been a growing concern, particularly among those confronting mental health-based vulnerabilities as well as those facing socio-political marginalization and humiliation among peers.
However, it is important to underline that mental health is not the direct causal factor of recruitment into violent extremist movements or networks. However, they certainly carry the potential to act as a catalyst.
Conclusion
To conclude, it is important to reiterate that the changing violent extremist landscape requires a fundamentally different response than was applicable even a decade ago. To be thoroughly sophisticated to deal with the complex threat landscape, it must be anchored in existing realities and technologically-innovative to bridge the existing loopholes.
Ultimately, even as traditional security frameworks and strategies remain critical to address the physical manifestations of extremism, a much-greater focus is required in terms of early-stage initiatives to address psycho-social challenges before the vulnerable demographic can cross the threshold of violent extremism. It is equally crucial to formulate and implement a digital-first, rather than a digital-afterthought agenda, as part of state actors’ forward-looking posture.
