



Sir Syed Center

of

International Relations & Risk Analysis

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE: BALOCH RAAJI AAJOHI SANGAR

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1. Executive Summary

Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) is an umbrella alliance of Baloch ethno-nationalist militant organizations operating primarily in Pakistan's Balochistan province. It was publicly announced in November 2018 after the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) established a cooperative framework; the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) formally joined in 2019. Public reporting has also associated the Baloch Republican Guards (BRG) and, in some accounts, the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army with the broader BRAS network. The alliance was created to improve coordination among otherwise autonomous Baloch militant groups, consolidate messaging, and increase pressure on Pakistani security forces, state institutions, Chinese nationals, and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)-related infrastructure.

2. Quick Facts

Field	Details
Name	Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS)
Approximate English rendering	Baloch National Freedom Movement / Baloch National Liberation Coalition
Established	Publicly announced in November 2018
Core founding organizations	Balochistan Liberation Front, Balochistan Liberation Army, and Baloch Republican Army
Other associated organizations	Baloch Republican Guards; Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army
Country of primary activity	Pakistan
Main province	Balochistan
Ideological category	Baloch ethno-nationalist separatism
Principal objective	Independence of Balochistan or an equivalent political project involving Baloch self-determination

Field	Details
Main adversary	Pakistani state, security apparatus, Chinese nationals and projects
Key strategic concern	Disruption of state authority and CPEC-linked economic, transport, energy, and infrastructure projects
Pakistan designation	Pakistan proscribed BRAS as a banned organization in July 2019
Organizational character	Alliance rather than a fully unified command
Public communications	Statements, videos, posters, social-media releases, and claims distributed through affiliated channels of individual Baloch militant groups

3. Organizational Background

3.1 Origins

BRAS emerged from efforts to overcome fragmentation within the Baloch armed movement. The Baloch militancy has historically consisted of multiple organizations with overlapping objectives but differing leadership lineages, tribal connections, operational practices, and political positions. The formation of BRAS was intended to create a common platform for coordination and collective messaging amongst all Baloch armed groups.

Credible open sources identifies November 2018 as the date of the alliance's formal announcement. The earliest core arrangement involved the BLA and BLF, with the BRA subsequently joining. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reporting similarly describes the alliance as beginning with cooperation between the BLF and BLA in November 2018 and the BRA's formal entry in June 2019.

BRAS appears to have been designed to achieve four broad purposes:

1. Coordinate attacks and pressure across multiple districts.
2. Present Baloch militancy as a unified national movement.
3. Increase the political and economic cost of Pakistani counterinsurgency operations.
4. Concentrate attention on Chinese personnel and CPEC-linked projects.

3.2 Core component groups:

Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)

The BLF was founded in 1964 in Damascus, Syria, by Jumma Khan Marri. Its early formation occurred within the wider Baloch nationalist movement, which opposed the political marginalization and centralization associated with both Iranian and Pakistani rule. The organization first became militarily active during the Balochi revolt in Iran from 1968 to 1973, when it fought alongside other Baloch groups against the Iranian government. After the insurgency in Iran ended in 1973, the BLF redirected its activities toward Pakistan. It participated in the Baloch insurgency of 1973–1977, commonly referred to as the Independent Balochistan Movement. During this conflict, the organization and other Baloch factions demanded independence for Balochistan. BLF emerged publicly in the early 2000s, particularly under the leadership of Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch. Nazar had previously been associated with the Baloch Student Organization–Azad (BSO-Azad), a student-based nationalist organization. His connections with students and young political activists reportedly helped the BLF attract new recruits during its revival.

The BLF has historically operated most prominently in southern and southwestern Balochistan, including areas such as Kech, Awaran, Panjgur, Gwadar, and surrounding districts. It has been associated with guerrilla attacks, ambushes, attacks on security personnel, sabotage, and pressure against infrastructure and state representatives.

The BLF's public narrative tends to emphasize:

- Baloch national independence.
- Opposition to Pakistani military presence.
- Resistance to CPEC and perceived foreign exploitation.
- Local control over land and natural resources.
- Opposition to alleged disappearances, military operations, and settlement policies.

Public sources have described Allah Nazar Baloch as a central figure in the BLF and as an important actor in the creation of BRAS. However, reporting concerning his location, operational control, and current status has periodically been contradictory. BLF reportedly attacks against Pakistani security personnel, foreign workers, journalists, infrastructure, and individuals associated with the Pakistani state. It also reports instances of operational cooperation between the BLF and the BLA, although the two groups remain organizationally distinct.

Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

The BLA is one of the most capable and internationally prominent Baloch militant organizations associated with BRAS. It has operated across multiple areas of Balochistan and has demonstrated an ability to conduct both rural guerrilla operations and high-profile attacks in urban or semi-urban environments.

The BLA has experienced factional divisions. Public reporting distinguishes between a faction associated with Bashir Zeb and other BLA currents, including the faction historically linked to Hyrbyair Marri. The Bashir Zeb faction has been particularly prominent in recent reporting and has been associated with the Majeed Brigade, a specialized suicide and high-impact attack formation.

The BLA's reported capabilities include:

- Attacks on military and paramilitary convoys.
- Raids on checkpoints and security installations.
- Attacks on transport routes and railway infrastructure.
- High-profile attacks designed to generate national and international publicity.
- Use of suicide attackers by specialized subunits.
- Targeting of Chinese nationals and CPEC-associated facilities.

The BLA's evolving capability has increased the overall threat environment. The Combating Terrorism Center identified major attacks in 2025, including the Jaffar Express incident attributed to the BLA-Jeyand faction, as evidence of a more ambitious and sophisticated insurgent campaign.

Baloch Republican Army (BRA)

The BRA is associated historically with Baloch republican and separatist currents linked to the Bugti political lineage. Gulzar Imam, also known as Shari Baloch, was identified in public reporting as a prominent BRA figure and as one of the perceived commanders associated with the BRAS alliance. He was captured by Pakistani authorities in 2023, as per credible sources.

The BRA has historically operated in parts of eastern and central Balochistan and has been associated with attacks against security forces, state infrastructure, and CPEC-related targets. Its organizational weight and command cohesion have changed over time because of arrests, leadership losses, factional competition, and the emergence of successor or splinter formations.

The BRA should not be treated as synonymous with all Baloch militant activity. It has its own historical identity and networks, even where it cooperates with other organizations through BRAS.

Baloch Republican Guards (BRG)

The BRG is generally described as a smaller Baloch armed group associated with the broader BRAS network. It has been linked to attacks against security personnel, infrastructure, electricity transmission systems, transport routes, and state-linked assets.

Open source reporting often merges the BRG with BRA-related networks or describes it as a distinct but affiliated formation. This ambiguity is important for attribution analysis. A claim made by BRG may represent

an independent operation, a local cell acting under a broader umbrella, or a factional structure that has changed names over time.

Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA)

Some sources describe the SRA as connected to or cooperating with the BRAS ecosystem. Its main ideological focus is Sindhudesh nationalism rather than Baloch separatism, but the group has been associated with attacks in Sindh and with opposition to CPEC-linked infrastructure.

The relationship should be treated as operational cooperation rather than proof of complete organizational integration. Cooperation likely involve shared propaganda themes, mutual support, coordination against common state targets, or parallel pressure on transport and infrastructure networks.

3.3 Organizational evolution:

BRAS has evolved through several stages:

- **Pre-2018:** Separate Baloch organizations conducted independent insurgent activity.
- **2018–2019:** Formation of an umbrella alliance and public consolidation of the BLA, BLF, and BRA.
- **2020–2022:** Continued attacks against security forces, Chinese personnel, and CPEC-linked targets; increasing emphasis on symbolic and international-impact operations.
- **2023 onward:** Leadership disruption, factional realignment, arrests, deaths, and possible efforts to consolidate or merge certain Baloch factions.
- **2025–2026:** Intensification of high-impact violence, increased use of coordinated operations, and continued efforts to portray the militancy as a broad national resistance movement.

4. Leadership Structure

The following individuals have been publicly associated with BRAS or its component organizations. Inclusion does not establish current membership, current operational control, criminal liability, or continued life status unless supported by an authoritative and current source.

Individual	Associated organization or role	Assessment
Allah Nazar Baloch	BLF; reported BRAS founder or senior figure	Frequently identified as a principal BLF leader and an important architect of BRAS. Current operational role is difficult to independently verify.

Individual	Associated organization or role	Assessment
Bashir Zeb	BLA faction; particularly BLA-J	Frequently described as a senior BLA figure and leader of a prominent faction. His association with BRAS is reported, but command relationships remain fluid.
Aslam Baloch	Former senior BLA leader; associated with the Majeed Brigade	Historically important in the formation and development of the BLA's high-impact operational model. Reported killed in 2018.
Gulzar Imam, also known as Shari Baloch	BRA	Publicly described as a prominent BRA commander and BRAS-associated figure. Reported captured by Pakistani authorities in 2023.
Akhtar Nadeem	BLF	Identified in earlier reporting as a perceived BRAS commander or representative. Current status and role require verification.
Hyrbyair Marri	BLA-associated political and militant figure in historical reporting	His relationship to the active BRAS structure is contested and should not be assumed to be identical to that of the Bashir Zeb faction.
Brahamdagh Bugti	Baloch Republican political figure	Frequently discussed in connection with the BRA's political lineage, although reported political positions and organizational relationships should be distinguished from direct operational command.
Rahman Gul, also known as Gul Rahman or Ustad Mureed	Majeed Brigade / BLA	Reported by Pakistani media as a senior commander killed in Afghanistan in 2025. The report should be independently corroborated before inclusion in a definitive leadership chart.
Jaafar, also known as Amin or Mulla Amin	BLA-associated specialized unit	Reported by Pakistani media as a commander connected with suicide and urban-warfare

Individual	Associated organization or role	Assessment
		operations and killed in Iran in 2025. Attribution remains source-dependent.

5. Ideology & Objectives

5.1 Core ideology

BRAS's ideological foundation is Baloch ethno-nationalist separatism. Its public messaging portrays the Baloch as a distinct nation whose political, economic, and cultural rights have been denied by the Pakistani state.

The main ideological themes include:

- Baloch national self-determination.
- Independence or political separation from Pakistan.
- Opposition to central government authority.
- Resistance to military deployments and security operations.
- Opposition to perceived exploitation of natural resources.
- Rejection of CPEC and other externally backed development projects that are portrayed as benefiting Islamabad and foreign actors rather than local communities.
- Opposition to demographic changes viewed by militants as weakening Baloch political control.
- Condemnation of alleged enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and collective punishment.
- Use of historical grievances, including the 1948 incorporation of Kalat and later insurgencies, to frame the present conflict.

5.2 Strategic objectives

BRAS's likely strategic objectives include:

1. Undermine the legitimacy of the Pakistani state in Balochistan.
2. Increase the cost of maintaining military and administrative control.
3. Disrupt CPEC-linked projects and Chinese participation.
4. Demonstrate that security forces cannot guarantee safe movement or infrastructure protection.
5. Expand local support or acquiescence through intimidation, nationalist messaging, and grievance mobilization.
6. Internationalize the Baloch issue.
7. Force political concessions, greater autonomy, or eventual independence.

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8. Maintain a long-term militancy despite military pressure.

5.3 Target selection logic

Targeting appears to be driven by a combination of:

- Security value: military and paramilitary personnel.
- Political symbolism: government offices, police stations, intelligence-linked facilities.
- Economic leverage: CPEC infrastructure, mines, energy installations, transport links.
- International visibility: Chinese nationals, foreign contractors, diplomatic or commercial interests.
- Coercive signaling: local contractors, transporters, informants, and state-aligned community figures.
- Psychological impact: railways, highways, communication systems, and public-facing facilities.

The targeting of Chinese nationals and CPEC infrastructure serves a dual purpose: it weakens projects on the ground and attempts to draw international attention to Baloch grievances.

6. Geographic Footprint

Baloch armed groups operate mainly in Pakistan's Balochistan province, with activity extending into Sindh and the border regions of Iran and Afghanistan. Their presence is generally network-based and mobile, not territorial. They rely on remote terrain, local support networks, temporary safe areas, and cross-border mobility rather than sustained control over towns or districts.

Southern and southwestern Balochistan:

The BLF has traditionally operated in Kech, Awaran, Panjgur, Gwadar, and nearby districts. This area is strategically important because it contains:

- The Makran coastal belt.
- Routes connecting Pakistan with Iran.
- Gwadar Port and associated infrastructure.
- CPEC-linked roads and development projects.
- Security installations and foreign personnel.

The BLF's presence in this region is associated primarily with attacks on security forces, state representatives, infrastructure, and foreign or CPEC-linked interests.

Central and eastern Balochistan:

BRA-linked networks have historically operated in parts of **eastern and central Balochistan**, particularly areas connected with Bugti political and tribal networks. Their current geographical influence is more limited and fragmented because of leadership losses, arrests, factional disputes, surrenders, and organisational restructuring.

Northern and northwestern Balochistan:

BLA-linked factions have demonstrated the ability to operate across Nushki, Chagai, Kharan, Kalat, Mastung, and surrounding districts. These areas are significant because they provide access to:

- Major highways and railway routes.
- Border approaches toward Afghanistan and Iran.
- Military and paramilitary positions.
- Mining and resource corridors.
- Movement routes linking northern and southern Balochistan.

The BLA's operational reach is broader than that of most other Baloch factions. It has demonstrated the ability to conduct both rural guerrilla attacks and high-profile operations in urban or semi-urban locations.

These areas are indicative rather than exclusive. Groups may operate outside their traditional zones, cooperate with local cells, or claim attacks whose exact perpetrators and organisational affiliations remain unclear.

Sindh:

Sindh is relevant primarily because of the activity of the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army. SRA has been associated with attacks on state institutions, transport routes, energy infrastructure, and CPEC-linked connectivity.

The province also provides access to Karachi, major ports, railway networks, commercial routes, and energy infrastructure. Disruption in Sindh could therefore generate effects beyond the traditional Baloch militancy zone. Nevertheless, SRA's Sindhi separatist agenda should be distinguished from the Baloch nationalist objectives of the BLA, BLF, and other Baloch factions.

Iran: Sistan and Baluchestan Province:

Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan province forms part of the wider cross-border environment affecting Baloch militancy. Shared ethnic ties, informal trade, smuggling routes, and difficult terrain may facilitate movement and temporary logistical support.

Some reporting has placed BLA- and BLF-associated networks in or near Iranian Baloch areas, including the Saravan region. These reports require cautious treatment. Cross-border presence does not, by itself, establish Iranian state sponsorship. Iran faces its own Baloch militancy and has strong incentives to prevent anti-state militancy from expanding across its territory.

Afghanistan:

Afghanistan has historically provided a permissive environment for militant movement because of its proximity to Balochistan, remote border areas, informal routes, and cross-border communities. Reporting has alleged the presence of Baloch militants, training locations, weapons networks, and logistical links in Afghanistan, although the scale and current status of these activities remain difficult to verify.

The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is important because it connects Baloch armed groups to wider militant and smuggling networks. Alleged contact between Baloch factions and the TTP may create opportunities for limited exchanges of personnel, training, or logistics. However, a formal and unified BLA–TTP command structure has not been conclusively established.



Note: This infographic is AI-generated and intended for illustrative purposes only

7. Operational Capabilities

Guerrilla and hit-and-run operations:

Guerrilla warfare remains the core capability of the Baloch groups. Common methods include:

- Ambushes against military and paramilitary patrols.
- Small-arms and sniper attacks.
- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside mines.
- Rocket and grenade attacks.
- Raids on isolated posts and government facilities.
- Temporary checkpoints and road blockades.

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- Targeted killings of alleged informants and state collaborators.

These tactics exploit Balochistan's difficult terrain, long lines of communication, limited state presence, and the vulnerability of isolated security posts and road convoys. The groups generally retain the initiative at the time and place of contact, while avoiding prolonged conventional engagements.

Coordinated and complex attacks:

The more capable factions have moved beyond isolated attacks toward coordinated operations involving multiple locations, assault teams, explosives, hostage-taking, and temporary seizures of urban or semi-urban areas. The 2024–25 campaigns associated with BLA-J demonstrated this evolution, including attacks designed to disrupt highways, assault security installations, and briefly occupy towns or strategic points.

These operations have three purposes:

- Inflict casualties and seize weapons.
- Exploit weaknesses in Pakistani security deployment.
- Produce political and psychological effects disproportionate to the number of fighters involved.

The Jaffar Express hijacking in March 2025 was particularly significant because it combined sabotage of transport infrastructure, hostage-taking, political demands, media exploitation, and a prolonged security response. The event demonstrated the ability of at least one faction to plan and execute a complex operation against a nationally important transport system, although it also exposed the limits of insurgent capacity when confronted by a concentrated counter-operation.

However, the recent Operation Herof-2 (Storm 2) conducted on January 31 marked a clear departure from the BLA's earlier, more fragmented tactics. Its scale and synchronization point to notable improvements in command-and-control, planning, and communications, reflecting a transition toward a more structured, multi-unit militant organization. The operation reportedly involved approximately 1,000–1,200 fighters conducting around 40 attacks across 12 districts, including the districts of Quetta, Mastung, Kharan, Gwadar, Kech, Chaghi, Nushki, Washak, Panjgur, Kalat, and Turbat. These figures originate partly from militant and media reporting and should therefore be treated as indicative rather than independently verified.

The BLA now appears to operate through specialised components, including the Majeed Brigade for suicide missions, Zephyr Intelligence, Research, and Analysis Bureau (ZIRAB) as an intelligence wing, Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS) for special tactical operations, the Fateh Squad for high-value targeting, and the recently introduced Qazi Aero Hive Rangers (QAHR) for drone operations. This internal differentiation suggests a deliberate effort to professionalise the militancy, streamline command functions, and enhance operational efficiency—features more commonly associated with mature militant organisations than with loosely coordinated insurgent networks.

Herof-2 also demonstrated the growing importance of the BLA's information and technology capabilities. The group's media outlet, Hakkal, reportedly presented the operation as a centrally directed campaign rather than a series of disconnected attacks, helping magnify its psychological and political effect. The subsequent

establishment of QAHR indicates an effort to add an aerial surveillance and strike dimension to the militancy, potentially increasing the vulnerability of isolated security posts, infrastructure, and CPEC-linked facilities. However, the extent, reliability, and battlefield effectiveness of this drone capability remain uncertain, and public descriptions may overstate the unit's maturity.

Suicide and fedayeen operations:

BLA-J developed the most prominent suicide-attack capability among Baloch militant groups, primarily through its Majeed Brigade. The group has complemented this capability with specialized assault units and intelligence elements designed to facilitate complex, high-value operations. The incorporation of female operatives into suicide missions has further expanded the group's operational flexibility, particularly in circumventing conventional security profiling, while also generating substantial propaganda value. BLF and BLA-A have also demonstrated movement toward suicide tactics, suggesting that this capability is gradually diffusing beyond BLA-J.

Although suicide attacks do not constitute the primary source of operational volume among Baloch militant groups, they carry disproportionate strategic significance. Such operations enable relatively small teams to penetrate heavily protected, politically sensitive, or symbolically important targets and can generate substantial psychological and media effects. Likely target categories include:

- Military and paramilitary installations.
- Railway stations and transport hubs.
- Convoys carrying Chinese personnel.
- CPEC-related facilities.
- Political or electoral gatherings.
- Urban targets where security screening is predictable or congested.

A significant evolution in this capability has been the deployment of female suicide attackers. The first recorded use of a female suicide bomber in the contemporary Baloch militancy occurred in April 2022, when BLA-J operative Shari Baloch, a 30-year-old woman, attacked the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi. The attack killed three Chinese instructors and their Pakistani driver and represented a notable departure from the militancy's previous operational patterns.

This development continued on 24 June 2023, when BLA-J operative Sumaiya Qalandrani Baloch conducted a suicide attack targeting a Pakistani military convoy in Turbat, becoming the second known female suicide attacker associated with the Baloch militancy. Sumaiya, aged 25, reportedly held a bachelor's degree in computer science and had been involved with Hakkal, the BLA's media unit. She was reportedly engaged to Rehan Baloch, the son of BLA leader Aslam Baloch. Rehan had himself carried out a suicide attack against Chinese engineers near Dalbandin in 2018. Sumaiya's family had also reportedly been affected by the conflict, with several male relatives allegedly subjected to enforced disappearance during a security operation in Tootak in February 2011.

Hostage-taking and infrastructure disruption:

The groups have demonstrated the ability to use hostages as both operational leverage and a communications tool. Railways, highways, bridges, pipelines, telecommunications infrastructure, ports, and energy installations are particularly attractive because relatively small attacks can impose economic costs and generate national attention. Infrastructure attacks also support the insurgents' political narrative that the state cannot guarantee the security of major development projects. Chinese nationals and CPEC-linked infrastructure remain priority targets across much of the militancy, although the targeting of civilians and ethnic non-locals creates substantial reputational and political risks for the groups.

7. 1 Constraints:

Despite their growing operational sophistication, BRAS-linked groups face major constraints:

- Fragmented command and persistent factional rivalry.
- Limited ability to hold territory against sustained military pressure.
- Dependence on local concealment and support networks.
- Difficulty replacing experienced commanders and specialized operatives.
- Limited access to heavy weapons, protected mobility, air defence, and reliable medical support.
- Vulnerability to intelligence penetration, arrests, defections, and targeted operations.
- Inability to provide governance or sustained public services in areas they temporarily enter.
- Risk of alienating local communities through attacks on civilians, ethnic minorities, transport, and economic infrastructure.
- Dependence on propaganda claims that may be undermined by inflated casualty figures or operational failures.

The groups are therefore more capable of disruption than defense, and more capable of temporary penetration than sustained control. Their most plausible military objective is to impose continuous security and economic costs, not to defeat Pakistani forces in open combat.

8. Funding & Logistics

Baloch militant organizations are generally assessed to use a mixed funding model rather than relying on one clearly documented sponsor. Available open source reporting points to local criminal revenue, diaspora contributions, resource-related income, and alleged external assistance, although the scale and reliability of each source remain disputed.

Main funding sources-

- **Extortion and protection payments:** Groups are reported to obtain money from businesses, contractors, transport operators, mining-related actors, and local communities in areas where

Islamabad's control is limited. CPEC-related projects also provide additional targets for extortion or coercive fundraising.

- **Kidnapping for ransom:** Some credible reports identifies kidnapping and ransom payments as a source of revenue, although publicly available evidence is often difficult to verify independently.
- **Smuggling and illicit commerce:** Analysts and media reports cite fuel, narcotics, arms, and human-smuggling networks as potential sources of income or logistical support. This is especially because Balochistan borders Iran and Afghanistan and contains extensive remote terrain, these networks can also facilitate movement and procurement.
- **Mining and resource-related income:** Some analysts claim that groups have benefited from informal taxation, coercion, or control over economic activity around coal mines and other resource-producing areas. This claim is not uniformly documented across all groups.
- **Diaspora contributions:** Supporters in Europe, North America, and the Middle East are reported to provide donations or other assistance. The available evidence does not establish that all diaspora fundraising is connected to militant activity.
- **Alleged state sponsorship:** Pakistani authorities have repeatedly accused India of financing and supporting Baloch militant groups. India has officially denied such allegations, and such claims largely rely on intelligence briefings or politically interested sources rather than independently verifiable evidence.

Logistics:

Area	Reported logistical pattern
Safe havens and rear areas	Several baloch groups, including the BLA and BLF, have a reported presence in Iran's Sistan-Baluchistan province, which borders Balochistan. BLF's Dr. Allah Nazar, is also allegedly operates from Iran.
Weapons	Weapons are reportedly acquired through illicit markets, cross-border smuggling, battlefield capture, and older stocks circulating in Afghanistan and the region.
Training	Reporting places training in parts of Balochistan and, in some accounts, in Afghanistan or Iran. Claims about foreign-run training require cautious treatment because independent confirmation is limited.
Transport and mobility	Remote terrain, informal border routes, local guides, safe houses, and criminal networks can help move personnel, weapons, and supplies.

Area	Reported logistical pattern
Communications	Groups rely heavily on encrypted messaging, online media outlets, social-media accounts, and video releases for recruitment, propaganda, fundraising, and claims of responsibility. The BLA's Hakkal media is a prominent example.
Medical and welfare support	Some reporting alleges access to informal medical treatment and support networks in border areas, but details are fragmentary and difficult to verify.

9. Recruitment & Propaganda

Group	Magazine / publication	Media wing or channel	Notes
Balochistan Liberation Army	<i>Dhak</i> — an annual activity report/magazine	Hakkal Media; primarily distributed through Telegram and other online platforms	Hakkal is described as the BLA's official media outlet and is used for attack claims, videos, statements, and reports.
Balochistan Liberation Front	<i>Ispār/Asper</i> —monthly publication; <i>Sarmachar</i> reported as a quarterly publication	Aashob led by Akhtar Nadeem Baloch	The publications reportedly appear in Balochi and Urdu and focus on the group's political and military messaging.
Baloch Nationalist Army	No consistently documented magazine identified in the sources reviewed	Baask	Baask was announced as the organization's official channel when the BNA was formed through the merger of the Baloch Republican Army and United Baloch Army.

10. External Relationships

Afghanistan:

Afghanistan has historically been important to Baloch militant groups because of its geographic proximity, porous border, and Baloch communities on both sides of the frontier. During earlier insurgencies, Afghan governments reportedly provided sanctuary and, at times, logistical assistance to Baloch militants.

Pakistan continues to accuse current Taliban administration of allowing Pakistani militants to operate from Afghan territory. These allegations involve both Baloch groups and other militant organizations, but the exact degree of Afghan state involvement with specific Baloch factions remains contested. But Islamabad's claim has been further bolstered following the 36th UN Security Council Monitoring Team Report, 2025, wherein it claims BLA and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) shares the training camps at Afghanistan's Walikot and Shorabak. In recent days, Islamabad's deteriorating relationship with the Taliban administration has intensified these accusations.

Iran

Iran's relationship with Baloch militant groups is complicated by its own Baloch militancy in Sistan and Baluchestan province. Iran faces attacks from anti-Iranian Baloch organizations, including Jaish al-Adl, while Pakistan has accused Iran of hosting Baloch groups operating against Pakistan reportedly based in Iran's Saravan region as evident in Pakistan's strikes targeting seven militant sites on 19 January 2024. Iran, in turn, has accused Pakistan of allowing anti-Iranian Baloch militants to use Pakistani territory, as evident in Iran's targeting of Jaish-al-Adl on 17 January 2024.

The border region is characterized by ethnic and family ties, informal trade, smuggling routes, and limited state control in some areas. These conditions likely facilitate movement and provide opportunities for militant groups, but they do not by themselves prove direct Iranian sponsorship. Tehran generally treats separatist activity as a security threat and has strong incentives to prevent Baloch militancy from spreading across its border.

India

Pakistan has repeatedly alleged that India provides financial, intelligence, training, or logistical assistance to Baloch separatist groups, especially the BLA. India denies supporting terrorism in Balochistan and has generally framed the issue as a matter of human rights and political repression in Pakistan. However, some intelligence analysts based in Pakistan argue that India may have an interest in using Balochistan to pressure Pakistan, particularly because of competition involving China and the CPEC. That said, no credible evidences suggest New Delhi's involvement in supporting Baloch militant groups.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Despite their differing ideological orientations, the TTP and Baloch militant groups have reportedly demonstrated some degree of operational convergence, including exchanges of IED expertise, logistical

support, and tactical coordination against Pakistani state targets, whereas a formal TTP-BLA alliance remains unconfirmed. However, on several occasions, the TTP sought to expand its influence among Baloch militants by encouraging armed militant groups to align with or formally join militancy.

This outreach has included both propaganda appeals and organizational mergers. On February 24, the TTP released a nine-minute Urdu-language video through its central media arm, Umar Media, calling on “disillusioned” Baloch communities to wage jihad against the Pakistani state, framing the campaign as resistance to military repression in Balochistan.

These efforts have also translated into the incorporation of several Baloch militant factions. On June 25, 2022, the TTP announced its first merger with an indigenous Balochistan-based group when militants led by Aslam Baloch from Noshki district pledged allegiance to TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. A second faction, led by Mazar Baloch and based along the Makran coast, joined the TTP on December 23, 2022. This was followed on April 12, 2023, by the merger of groups led by Akram Baloch and Asim Baloch from Qalat and Quetta, respectively. Significantly, these factions comprised ethnic Baloch militants, including groups originating from Baloch-dominated areas such as Noshki and Makran, indicating the TTP’s efforts to extend its organizational reach beyond its traditional Pashtun support base.

Diaspora and international advocacy groups

Baloch diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Middle East have supported political advocacy, awareness campaigns, protests, and human-rights initiatives. Some militant organizations allegedly attempt to use diaspora networks for publicity, fundraising, recruitment, or diplomatic lobbying. Such prominent groups are Baloch Voice Association based in France, Baloch International Welfare Association (BIWA) based in Finland, Baloch Council of North America (BCNA) based in Washington, Baloch Advocacy and Studies Centre based in London, and international chapters of Baloch National Movement (BNM).

11. Attacks Timeline

Date or period	Group or attribution	Location	Reported attacks and developments
4–14 May	BLA and BLF	Mastung, Washuk, Noshki, Dalbandin, Kech, Gwadar, Panjgur, Khuzdar and other districts	BLA claimed 18 attacks involving IEDs, ambushes, highway blockades and assaults on military installations, reporting 31 Pakistani personnel killed. BLF separately claimed attacks on a military camp, a convoy in Washuk and a military post in Tump. thebalochistanpost+1

Date or period	Group or attribution	Location	Reported attacks and developments
13–19 May	BLF	Mashkay, Awaran and surrounding districts	BLF claimed eight operations against military forces, police infrastructure, mineral-transport vehicles and alleged state collaborators.
15–22 May	BLA	Panjgur, Noshki, Mastung, Turbat, Khuzdar, Kharan and other areas	BLA claimed 25 attacks involving ambushes, IEDs, grenade-launcher attacks, highway blockades and raids on military camps and development projects.
Late May	BLA, BLF and BRG	Multiple areas of Balochistan	The groups continued reporting attacks on military convoys, camps, checkpoints, electricity infrastructure, commercial vehicles and mining-related projects. BRG also claimed attacks on power infrastructure in Naseerabad and Kachhi.
June	BLF and BRG	Naal, Khuzdar, Kech, Panjgur, Bolan, Nushki and other districts	BLF claimed 25 operations during June, including a major assault in Naal, attacks on military and communications infrastructure, and operations in Gwadar, Mand, Buleda, Nushki, Surab, Kalat, Turbat, Barkhan, Tump and Hoshab. BRG cadres reportedly attacked two electricity-transmission towers near Dhadar in Bolan on 9 June.
8 June	BLF	Naal, Khuzdar	BLF claimed a major attack and temporary control of Naal town. The group described the operation as one of its most significant actions of the month.
Late June–early July	BLA	Multiple districts across Balochistan	BLA claimed 23 operations over a ten-day period, targeting security forces, convoys, posts and infrastructure.
4–8 July	BLA and other Baloch militants	Multiple districts in Balochistan	A coordinated wave of insurgent assaults targeted Pakistani security forces. Reporting attributed the campaign to Baloch militants, with Pakistani military accounts also alleging involvement by TTP elements. Reports stated that 42 people were

Date or period	Group or attribution	Location	Reported attacks and developments
			killed, including 38 security personnel and four civilians.
4 July	BRG	Nushman, Kachhi	BRG claimed it established a checkpoint, stopped vehicles and searched travellers.
8 July	BLF	Multiple districts	BLF claimed a sustained June campaign involving 25 armed operations against security forces, defence and economic installations, and communications infrastructure. It reported 58 Army personnel killed, a figure not independently verified.
19 July	BLA	Buleda, Mashkel, Nushki and other areas	BLA claimed targeted operations against people it accused of working for Pakistan's military, intelligence agencies or pro-government armed groups.
25 July	BLF and BRG	Buleda, Karachi, Rajanpur, Pasni, and	BLF claimed attacks on Coast Guard personnel and a security patrol. BRG claimed it destroyed a gas pipeline heading toward Punjab near Rojhan in Rajanpur.
1-8 August	BLA	Mand and other districts	BLA released details of 38 operations, including a remote-controlled IED attack on a Frontier Works Organisation vehicle in Mand.
8-16 August	BLF and BLA	Nushki, Surab, Chagai, Mashkay, Buleda, Tump, Mand, Khuzdar, Kalat and Jhao	BLF claimed 23 operations, while BLA reported 22 attacks. The operations included assaults on security positions, convoys and infrastructure. BLA claimed 26 Pakistani military or government-backed personnel killed.

Date or period	Group or attribution	Location	Reported attacks and developments
8 and 12 August	BLA	Zoomdan, Buleda and rural Turbat	BLA claimed rocket and grenade attacks on military posts.
16-21 August	BLA	Kalat, Chagai and other areas	BLA claimed attacks on commercial truck convoys as part of an alleged economic blockade, reportedly damaging 16 vehicles at 11 locations.
Late August	BRG	Gas-pipeline corridor near the Sui-Karachi route	BRG claimed an attack on a major gas pipeline.
1-7 September	BLA	Multiple Balochistan districts	BLA claimed 28 operations and reported 52 Pakistani military personnel killed. The claim included attacks on military positions, convoys, communications infrastructure and alleged state collaborators.
4 September	BRG	Bagh, Kachhi	BRG claimed a coordinated attack in which militants surrounded a security camp, attacked a city police station and brought down two quadcopters. It claimed five security personnel killed.
9 September	Unidentified Baloch militants	Brabcha, Chagai	Armed men reportedly attacked and took control of a police station and detained police personnel. Attribution to a specific BRAS-linked group was not confirmed.
11 September	BLA	Walpat, Lasbela	BLA reportedly attacked a military convoy and claimed 12 security personnel killed.
13-20 September	BLF and BRG	Kech, Dalbandin, Kharan, Mastung, Khuzdar, Dasht,	BLF claimed nine operations involving convoy attacks, an IED incident, a sniper attack, a communications-tower attack and highway blockades. BRG separately claimed attacks on

Date or period	Group or attribution	Location	Reported attacks and developments
		Awaran, Quetta and Kachhi	security personnel and alleged state-backed armed groups.
14–23 September	BLA	Multiple districts	BLA claimed 25 operations and reported 18 Pakistani military and government-backed personnel killed.
22 September	BLF	Near Turbat	BLF's Karima Armed Assault Division claimed an ambush on a Pakistani military convoy and reported nine military personnel killed. The figure was not independently verified.
Late September	BRG	Bolan and Naseerabad	BRG claimed attacks on a police station, a railway line, military vehicles and a security checkpoint.
1 October	BLF	Multiple districts	BLF released details of 13 operations that it said had occurred during September, including attacks on military posts and convoys, highway blockades and attacks on alleged state collaborators.
Early October	BLF	Mashkel, Washuk	BLF claimed an attack on a Frontier Corps camp and alleged that 18 personnel were killed. The claim was not independently verified.
7 October	Unclear	Mastung	Pakistani authorities reported that five militants were killed in an operation. The available report did not establish whether they belonged to BLA, BLF, BRG, BRA or another group.

12. Indicators and Warnings

Early warning should focus on indicators of coordination, mobilisation, targeting, and operational preparation, rather than on isolated attacks. The following indicators would suggest a possible escalation by BRAS-linked groups:

Strategic indicators:

- Public statements announcing an intensification of armed struggle, road blockades, or campaigns against state and foreign interests.
- Coordinated messaging by BLA, BLF, BRG, or allied media platforms.
- Increased references to CPEC, Chinese nationals, railways, energy infrastructure, or major security installations.
- Factional claims indicating cooperation or a joint operational campaign.
- Growing militant narratives portraying the state as unable to control multiple districts.

Recruitment and mobilization indicators:

- Increased online circulation of martyrdom biographies, recruitment videos, and training footage.
- Sudden emphasis on educated youth, students, women, or technical specialists.
- Movement of known supporters from protest activity or online advocacy toward clandestine facilitation.
- Reports of new training camps, weapons movement, or the arrival of unfamiliar armed cadres.
- Public identification of new specialised units or commanders.

The appearance of female recruits or operatives in propaganda should be treated as both a recruitment indicator and a possible sign of tactical adaptation. It likely indicate attempts to expand the manpower pool, exploit security-screening assumptions, or generate greater publicity.

Operational indicators:

- Simultaneous or near-simultaneous attacks in several districts.
- Temporary road closures, attacks on railway lines, or disruption of communications before a larger operation.
- Increased reconnaissance around police stations, prisons, military posts, banks, airports, ports, and Chinese-linked facilities.
- Theft or movement of vehicles, explosives, fuel, weapons, uniforms, or communications equipment.
- Repeated attacks on isolated checkpoints or patrols, suggesting collection of security-force response patterns.
- Emergence of attacks combining IEDs, suicide operatives, small-arms teams, and temporary occupation of sites.

The coordinated attacks associated with Operation Herof-2 demonstrated why simultaneous incidents across multiple districts should be treated as a possible campaign signal rather than as unrelated local violence.

Technology and communications indicators:

- Establishment or publicization of specialised intelligence, assault, suicide, or drone units.
- Greater use of encrypted communications and disciplined media-release schedules.
- Increased drone-related propaganda, including imagery of reconnaissance or training.
- Testing of communications systems across geographically separated cells.
- Real-time release of operational footage through Hakkal or affiliated channels.
- Online messaging that appears to precede attacks, identify target categories, or prepare audiences for a major operation.

A shift from irregular propaganda releases to coordinated pre-operation, real-time, and post-operation messaging will likely indicate improved command-and-control and a more professionalized information apparatus.

Tactical warning signs:

The following combinations would constitute stronger warnings than any single indicator:

- Threat statements followed by road blockades or attacks on transport infrastructure.
- New martyrdom content followed by reports of missing individuals or suspicious movement.
- Reconnaissance of a target combined with vehicle theft, weapons movement, or communications silence.
- Attacks on security forces occurring alongside disruption of railways, highways, or telecommunications.
- Multiple low-level incidents followed by a sudden reduction in militant communications.
- Claims of an impending operation accompanied by unusual propaganda activity or the appearance of new units.

A temporary decline in attacks should not automatically be interpreted as de-escalation. It can reflect operational security, regrouping, logistical preparation, or the transition from reconnaissance to execution.

Warning Assessment

The most significant warning of escalation would be the convergence of three developments: **cross-faction coordination, increased specialist-unit activity, and synchronised digital messaging**. If these are

accompanied by attacks on transport, communications, or isolated security positions, the probability of a larger multi-site operation will likely rise substantially.

At the strategic level, the key indicators are not simply higher attack numbers but evidence that BRAS-linked groups are improving their ability to select targets, coordinate cells, integrate specialist units, and control the narrative before, during, and after an operation. Such developments would indicate movement from persistent guerrilla activity toward a more structured and campaign-oriented militancy.

13. Risks to Businesses & Governments

Sector-wise Threat Assessment

Sector	Threat level	Likely targets and methods	Main actors	Indicators and warnings	Likely impact
Security forces	Very High	FC, Army, police, Levies, intelligence personnel, checkpoints, camps, patrols, and convoys; ambushes, IEDs, sniper fire, raids, and suicide attacks.	BLA-J, BLF, BLA-A, BRAS-linked cells	Repeated attacks on isolated posts; surveillance of patrol patterns; attacks in several districts; claims naming specific units or personnel.	Personnel casualties, loss of weapons and vehicles, temporary disruption of patrols, reduced freedom of movement, and increased demands for force protection.
CPEC and Chinese interests	Very High	Chinese personnel, convoys, construction teams, port-linked facilities, hotels, camps, and project infrastructure.	BLA-J, BLF, BRAS-linked networks	Threat statements against China; reconnaissance near project sites; attacks on escorts or contractors; propaganda linking projects to resource exploitation.	Project delays, suspension of work, higher security and insurance costs, diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, and possible deterioration in Pakistan-China confidence.

Sector	Threat level	Likely targets and methods	Main actors	Indicators and warnings	Likely impact
Roads and highways	High	CPEC routes, bridges, checkpoints, transport vehicles, construction convoys, and commercial traffic; blockades, IEDs, ambushes, and sabotage.	BLF, BLA-J, local cells	Road closures, attacks on traffic control points, vehicle theft, and warnings against movement on specific routes.	Disruption of trade and military reinforcement, temporary isolation of localities, increased transport costs, and reduced state mobility.
Railways	High	Tracks, bridges, railway stations, signalling systems, and passenger or freight trains; explosives, sabotage, hostage-taking, and armed assaults.	BLA-J and allied cells	Track damage, threats against trains, reconnaissance near stations, and disruption of route communications.	Train cancellations, civilian casualties, hostage crises, disruption of national connectivity, and major psychological impact.
Energy and utilities	High	Gas and oil pipelines, power lines, transmission infrastructure, substations, and energy-sector personnel.	BLA, BLF, local insurgent cells	Sabotage claims, attacks near or pipelines or transmission corridors, and narratives targeting resource extraction.	Power or gas shortages, production losses, costly repairs, disruption of industrial activity, and reduced investor confidence.
Mining and resource projects	High	Mining sites, mineral transport, foreign contractors, extraction	BLA-J, BLF, BRAS-linked groups	Threats against mining companies; attacks on mineral convoys; targeting of	Work stoppages, damage to equipment, loss of foreign personnel, delays in extraction, and increased

Sector	Threat level	Likely targets and methods	Main actors	Indicators and warnings	Likely impact
		equipment, and supply vehicles.		project staff or transport routes.	political opposition to projects.
Ports and maritime facilities	Medium-High	Gwadar Port, port-linked logistics, coastal security posts, maritime contractors, and access roads.	BLA-J, BLF, coastal cells	Threats against Gwadar; attacks near port approaches; surveillance of port traffic and security arrangements.	Temporary closure or restricted operations, disruption of maritime logistics, damage to CPEC credibility, and heightened maritime-security requirements.
Government and law-enforcement institutions	High	Police stations, prisons, district offices, courts, banks, and administrative buildings; raids, arson, IEDs, and temporary occupation.	BLA-J, BLF, local cells	Simultaneous attacks on public buildings; prison-related threats; targeting of officials and informants.	Administrative paralysis, loss of official records and equipment, weakening of state presence, and increased reliance on military forces.
Telecommunications and digital infrastructure	Medium-High	Mobile towers, fibre links, radio systems, surveillance equipment, and communications facilities.	BLA-J, BLF, local cells	Sabotage claims; attacks preceding wider operations; efforts to disrupt state communications.	Loss of connectivity, slower emergency response, reduced command-and-control, and greater uncertainty during coordinated attacks.
Urban centers	Medium-High	Quetta, Turbat, Gwadar, Khuzdar, Nushki, and other district centres;	BLA-J, BLF, covert	Increased urban reconnaissance; attacks outside traditional rural	Public fear, business disruption, intensified security restrictions,

Sector	Threat level	Likely targets and methods	Main actors	Indicators and warnings	Likely impact
		police, government buildings, transport hubs, markets, and political gatherings.	support cells	areas; movement of unfamiliar operatives and vehicles.	displacement from affected areas, and pressure on provincial authorities.
Public transport and civilian movement	High	Passenger trains, buses, commercial vehicles, markets, and major roads; hostage-taking, IEDs, ambushes, and intimidation.	BLA-J, BLF, local cells	Warnings against travel; attacks on transport corridors; threats to non-local workers and commercial operators.	Civilian casualties, reduced travel, commercial losses, disruption of supply chains, and increased communal tension.
Foreign nationals and non-local workers	High	Chinese personnel, contractors, engineers, transport staff, and workers from other provinces.	BLA-J, BLF, BRAS-linked cells	Threats against foreign workers; surveillance of accommodation and travel routines; attacks on guarded convoys.	Evacuation or relocation of personnel, diplomatic friction, suspension of projects, and reduced willingness of foreign firms to operate in Balochistan.
Banking and financial institutions	Medium-High	Banks, cash-transfer points, ATMs, and financial offices; raids, explosives, robbery, and attacks during wider operations.	BLA-J and local cells	Claims of resource seizure; simultaneous attacks on banks and government sites; armed movement near financial centres.	Cash shortages, disruption of salaries and commerce, financial losses, and increased security costs for banks and businesses.

Sector	Threat level	Likely targets and methods	Main actors	Indicators and warnings	Likely impact
Education and health facilities	Medium	Schools, hospitals, vaccination teams, and public-service personnel, especially where associated with the state or security operations.	Local cells and factional elements	Threats against state service providers; attacks accompanying wider campaigns; intimidation of staff.	Closure of schools or clinics, reduced public-service delivery, staff displacement, and deterioration of community resilience.
Political activity and elections	High during election periods	Candidates, polling stations, election staff, rallies, and political offices; intimidation, IEDs, targeted killings, and disruption.	BLA-J, BLF, local cells	Election-boycott statements; threats against participation; attacks on campaign activity or polling logistics.	Lower voter turnout, contested legitimacy, postponement of polling, political intimidation, and increased security deployment.
Media and information environment	Medium-High	Journalists, government narratives, militant media channels, and social-media audiences.	BLA media structures and affiliated channels	Propaganda surges, coordinated messaging, release of attack footage, and claims of territorial control.	Increased fear and polarisation, recruitment gains, reputational damage to the state, and amplification of the psychological effects of attacks. 1

14. Future Outlook

Short term:

In the short term, BRAS-linked Baloch groups are likely to sustain a high level of asymmetric militant activities in Balochistan. The most probable activities include ambushes, IED attacks, targeted killings, sabotage, and attacks on security forces, transport routes, Chinese nationals, and CPEC-linked infrastructure.

Militant factions will also likely to attempt limited coordinated attacks across multiple districts to demonstrate operational reach and stretch Pakistani security resources. Digital propaganda, martyrdom narratives, and claims of responsibility are likely to intensify alongside physical attacks. However, organisational fragmentation, leadership losses, and Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations will also restrict the duration and scale of such campaigns.

Medium term:

Over the medium term, BRAS-linked factions are anticipated to improve coordination and adopt more specialised capabilities. This can include greater use of intelligence units, suicide formations, drones, encrypted communications, and coordinated media operations. The BLA-J and BLF are likely to remain the most operationally capable groups within the broader militancy ecosystem in Balochistan.

Attacks are anticipated to increasingly extend beyond remote areas to railway lines, highways, district centres, ports, mining sites, energy infrastructure, and urban or semi-urban targets. Chinese personnel and CPEC-related projects will remain especially vulnerable because they provide both economic leverage and international visibility.

Despite these developments, the groups are unlikely to hold territory permanently or defeat Pakistani forces in conventional combat. Such is evidenced in the BLA's temporarily seizure of the town of Nushki, during a three-day standoff from January 30 to February 5, 2026. Their more realistic objective will remain the imposition of sustained security, economic, and political costs. The likelihood of temporary tactical cooperation between Baloch factions, and possibly limited interaction with the TTP, may increase, although a fully unified command structure remains unlikely.

Long term

In the long term, BRAS-linked militancy is likely to remain an elevated challenge unless security operations are accompanied by meaningful political, economic, and governance reforms in Balochistan. The movement will likely continue to evolve from loosely coordinated guerrilla activity into a more decentralized and campaign-oriented militancy.

Factional divisions will probably prevent complete organizational unification, but decentralization can also make the movement more resilient. Even if senior commanders are captured or killed, smaller cells are anticipated to continue operating through local support networks, cross-border mobility, criminal financing, and digital propaganda.

In the longer term, a decisive military victory by BRAS over security forces remains unlikely. The more plausible long-term outcome is a sustained cycle of militant attacks, state counteroperations, leadership disruption, and organizational regeneration. The intensity of violence will depend on recruitment, local grievances, regional border dynamics, the security of CPEC projects, and the ability of Pakistani authorities to combine counterterrorism measures with political inclusion and improved local governance. The groups are, therefore, more likely to remain capable of disruption than territorial control.

15. Annexure

Factions of Baloch militant groups:

Acronym	Name	Description
BLA	Baloch Liberation Army	The first modern Baloch separatist faction founded in 1996 by Hyrbyair Marri. Today, the group is divided into its two factions: BLA-A and BLA-J.
BLA-A	Baloch Liberation Army (Azad)	The original BLA, today known as BLA-Azad from the name of its spokesman. After the December 2017 internal split of BLA, BLA-A became the weaker faction but recently displayed growing attack capabilities.
BLA-J	Baloch Liberation Army (Jeeyand)	The BLA faction was founded by commanders Aslam Baloch and Bashir Zaib after their expulsion from BLA in December 2017. The faction came to be known as BLA-Jeeyand from the name of its spokesman. It is the strongest of the two BLA factions. Its leader is Bashir Zaib.
BLF	Balochistan Liberation Front	Believed to have been founded in 2003, BLF is one of the major factions of the Baloch militancy and a close allied of BLA-J. Its leader is Allah Nazar.
BNA	Baloch Nationalist Army	The faction was founded in January 2022 by Gulzar Imam and Sarfaraz Bangulzai. It was crippled by multiple splits and surrenders. Today, the group is divided into two factions.
BNA (Anwar)	Baloch Nationalist Army (Anwar)	One of the two active BNA factions. Set up in April 2023 after the BNA internal split, it is led by Anwar Chakar. The faction is part of BRAS and carries out attacks solely in Pakistan.

Acronym	Name	Description
BNA (Beebagr)	Baloch Nationalist Army (Beebagr)	One of the two active BNA factions. Believed to have been set up between January and September 2024 after the surrender of BNA (Sarfaraz) in December 2023, the faction is not part of BRAS. It has carried out attacks in Pakistan and Iran.
BNA (Sarfaraz)	Baloch Nationalist Army (Sarfaraz)	BNA faction led by Sarfaraz Bangulzai that surrendered in December 2023. The faction was the result of the split with BNA (Anwar) after Gulzar Imam's arrest in April 2023.
BRA	Baloch Republican Army	Emerged in 2006 after the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti and is believed to be linked to Brahmadagh Bugti. BRA has not been active in the conflict since rifts within its ranks in 2016, though it briefly resurfaced in October 2024.
BRA (Beebagr)	Baloch Republican Army (Beebagr)	Splinter faction of BRA. BRA (Beebagr) was founded by Gulzar Imam in October 2018 after frictions emerged between him and the BRA leadership and he was expelled by the organization. BRA (Beebagr) was disbanded after Gulzar Imam formed BNA with Sarfaraz Bangulzai in 2022.
BRG	Baloch Republican Guards	Formed in 2012, BRG was established by Bakhtyar Khan Domki after his wife and daughter were killed in Karachi.
SRA	Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army	Founded around 2010 and headed by Syed Asghar Shah, SRA is a Sindhi separatist militant organization active in the Sindh province that is also part of BRAS.
UBA	United Baloch Army	UBA was established in 2012 after it split from BLA over differences between Hyrbyair and Mehran Marri. A minor faction, it is believed to be linked to Mehran Marri, though the latter has denied his involvement.

Factions of BRAS alliance (current and inactive):

Faction	Joined in
Baloch Liberation Army - Jeeyand (BLA-J)	November 2018 - Present
Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	November 2018 - Present
Baloch Republican Guards (BRG)	November 2018 - Present
Baloch Republican Army - Beebagr (BRA-Beebagr)	May 2019 - January 2022
Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA)	January 2022 - April 2023
Baloch Nationalist Army - Anwar (BNA-Anwar)	April 2023 - Present (Not officially acknowledged)
Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA)	July 2020 - Present

Propaganda & Attacks Posters:



PRESS RELEASE

15-09-2026



BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY

13 مختلف حملوں میں قابض فوج وڈیتھاسکواڈ کے 43 ہلکار ہلاک - بلوچ لبریشن آرمی

بلوچ لبریشن آرمی کے سرچاروں نے رواں ہفتے بلوچستان کے مختلف علاقوں میں قابض پاکستانی فوج اور اس کی سرپرستی میں قائم "وڈیتھاسکواڈ" کو متعدد منظم و مہلک حملوں میں نشانہ بنا کر بھاری جانی و مالی نقصانات سے دوچار کیا۔ ان کارروائیوں کے دوران قابض فوج اور وڈیتھاسکواڈ کے 43 ہلکار ہلاک اور متعدد زخمی ہو گئے، جبکہ مرکزی شاہراہوں پر "معاشری ناکہ بندی" کے تحت سرچاروں کی مضبوط پوزیشن بدستور برقرار ہے۔ حملوں کے دوران پلوں اور دیگر عسکری و انتظامی تنصیبات کو بھی چلہ کیا گیا۔ مختلف محاذوں پر ہونے والی شدید جھڑپوں میں بی ایل اے کے 10 سرچار شہادت کے مرتبے پر فائز ہو گئے۔

7 ستمبر: بسپرہ میں سی پیک روٹ پر سرچاروں نے 5 گھنٹوں تک مکمل ناکہ بندی کر کے اسٹیپ چیلنگ کا عمل جاری رکھا۔ اس دوران قابض پاکستانی فوج کے ساتھ ہونے والی شدید جھڑپوں میں دشمن کے 5 ہلکار ہلاک اور متعدد زخمی ہو گئے، جبکہ بی ایل اے کے 3 سرچار سنگت عزیز احمد سالانی عرف چہاڑیب، سنگت عباد اللہ زہری عرف صاحب اور سنگت عدنان - سالانی عرف سادہ روت جام شہادت نوش کر گئے۔

8 ستمبر: خاران کے علاقے نوروز قلات میں مرکزی شاہراہ پر سرچاروں نے قابض پاکستانی فوج کے ایک قافلے کو کھات لگا کر نشانہ بنایا، جس کے نتیجے میں قابض فوج کے کم از کم 4 ہلکار ہلاک و زخمی ہو گئے۔ دریں اثنا چنگھور کے علاقے پر دم میں سرچاروں نے قابض پاکستانی فوج کو ریسد پہنچانے والی ایک گاڑی کو بندر آتش کر دیا جبکہ دوسری گاڑی جھیل میں لے لی۔ مزید برآں چنگھور کے علاقے چیدی میں مکمل کوز کے مقام پر سرچاروں نے قابض فوج کے نصب کردہ جاسوسی سمروں کو تباہ کر دیا۔

9 ستمبر: چنگھور کے علاقے چیدی میں تھارتی روٹ پر سرچاروں نے 2 گھنٹوں سے زائد وقت تک ناکہ بندی کر کے اسٹیپ چیلنگ کا عمل جاری رکھا۔

10 ستمبر: کوئٹہ جات تھارتی روٹ پر چائی کے علاقے پستہر میں سرچاروں نے ناکہ بندی کر کے 2 تھارتی گاڑیاں تھیل میں لے لی۔ پستہر کے علاقے میں سرچاروں نے ایک ہل کو دھماکے سے تباہ کرنے کے بعد چش قدی کرنے والی قابض فوج کو حملے میں نشانہ بنا کر بھاری نقصان پہنچایا۔ اسی روز تھیل میں سرچاروں نے قابض فوج کے ایک جاسوسی گاڑی کو کاپڑ کو فائرنگ کر کے تباہ کر دیا۔

11 ستمبر: سواب کے علاقے گدڑ میں "لوہو" کے مقام پر سرچاروں نے قابض پاکستانی فوج کے قافلے کو حملے میں نشانہ بنایا۔ قابض فوج کی 2 گاڑیاں رپورٹ سے ملنے کی زد میں آئیں جن میں سے ایک مکمل ناکارہ ہو گیا اور 6 ہلکار موقع پر ہی ہلاک ہو گئے۔ بڑل دشمن اپنے ہلاک ہلکاروں کی لاشیں چھوڑ کر پسا ہونے پر مجبور ہو گیا۔ دریں اثنا، روتہ کی کراس کے مقام پر قابض فوج کو اس وقت ایک اور حملے میں نشانہ بنایا گیا جب وہ علاقے میں چش قدی کی کوشش کر رہی تھی، اس حملے میں قابض فوج کے مزید 3 ہلکار ہلاک اور کم از کم 4 زخمی ہو گئے۔

13 ستمبر: قلعہ عبداللہ کے علاقے سلطان شاہ میں بلوچ لبریشن آرمی کے سرچاروں نے ایک منظم اور مہلک حملے میں "وڈیتھاسکواڈ" کے کارندوں کو نشانہ بنایا۔ اس حملے میں قابض فوج کے زیر سرپرستی میں قائم وڈیتھاسکواڈ کے 25 کارندے موقع پر ہی ہلاک ہو گئے جبکہ متعدد زخمی حالت میں بھاگ نکلے۔ سرچاروں نے ان کا اسلحہ اور ایک گاڑی تھیل میں لے لی۔ بعد ازاں قابض فوج، سی ڈی ڈی اور وڈیتھاسکواڈ کی ایک بڑی نفری نے علاقے میں چش قدی کی کوشش کی جسے سرچاروں نے ایک اور حملے میں نشانہ بنایا۔ آخری بار گھنٹوں تک جاری رہنے والی ان شدید جھڑپوں میں قابض فوج اور وڈیتھاسکواڈ کے متعدد ہلکار ہلاک و زخمی ہو گئے، جبکہ بی ایل اے کے 5 جانبار سرچار سنگت یاسر میٹگل عرف شاہیار، سنگت فاروق پرکاشی عرف آصف، سنگت وقار احمد لہڑی عرف چاکر، سنگت ماسم اور سنگت ٹاکا چاکر مراد وار لڑتے ہوئے شہادت کے مرتبے پر فائز ہو گئے۔

قبل ازیں 19 اگست کو چنگھور کے علاقے پر دم میں پھل آباد کے مقام پر قابض پاکستانی فوج اور بی ایل اے کے سرچاروں کے مابین شدید جھڑپیں ہوئیں، جن میں بی ایل اے کے 2 سرچار سنگت ظاہر بلوچ عرف ڈی اور سنگت اللہ داد بلوچ عرف سادہ شہادت کے مرتبے پر فائز ہو گئے تھے۔


واضح رہے کہ رواں ہفتے ہی بلوچ لبریشن آرمی کے ہر اول دستے "فتح اسکواڈ" نے اسپیلہ میں ایک منظم و مہلک حملے کے دوران قابض فوج کے 9 ہلکاروں کو ہلاک اور 11 سے زائد کوز زخمی کیا تھا، جبکہ نیو میں ایک ایٹلی جس بیڈ آپریشن کے دوران قابض پاکستانی فوج اور ملٹری ایٹلی جس (ایم آئی) کے 4 کارندوں کو ہلاک کیا گیا تھا۔ مزید برآں مکمل میں تنصیم کھلے والے ایک انتظامی پروجیکٹ کی ڈرائنگ سائٹ کا کنٹرول حاصل کر کے مشینری کو تباہ کیا تھا۔ ان تمام حملوں کا تفصیلی بیان کیلئے ہی جاری کیا جا چکا ہے۔

بلوچ لبریشن آرمی اپنے ان تمام 10 عظیم شہداء سنگت عزیز احمد سالانی، سنگت عباد اللہ زہری، سنگت عدنان سالانی، سنگت یاسر میٹگل، سنگت فاروق پرکاشی، سنگت وقار احمد لہڑی، سنگت ماسم، سنگت ٹاکا چاکر، سنگت ظاہر بلوچ اور سنگت اللہ داد بلوچ کے کردار اور ان کی بے مثال قربانیوں کو زبردست خراج عقیدت اور سرخ سلام پیش کرتی ہے۔ ان سر فر دہنوں نے اپنی پاک مٹی کے دفاع، قومی تھاور آزادی کی راہوں میں اپنے کرم بوجھ کر داند دے کر قومی و قاری تاریخ کو رقم کیا ہے۔

بی ایل اے اس عزم کا اعادہ کرتی ہے کہ ہمارے شہداء کا بیٹے والا ایک ایک قہر و خون قوی جد و جہد کو مزید بڑھائے گا اور ان کے مقاصد کی تکمیل تک عسکری محرم ہر محاذ پر جاری رہے گا۔ جب تک قابض پاکستانی فوج کا بلوچ سرزمین سے مکمل انکار اور آزاد و خود مختار بلوچستان کا قیام ممکن نہیں ہو جاتا، ہم اپنے شہداء کے دشمن کی پاسداری پوری قوت اور نظر ثانی چنگھی کے ساتھ کرتے رہیں گے۔


ترجمان بلوچ لبریشن آرمی - جینند بلوچ







“THEY MAY KILL ME,
BUT THEY CANNOT KILL MY IDEAS. THEY CAN CRUSH MY BODY,
BUT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CRUSH MY SPIRIT.”


MAJEED BRIGADE-BLA



BUZGHAR_MEDIA









BALOCH LIBERATION ARMY
MAJEED BRIGADE

OPERATION DARA E BOLAN
MACH 29 JAN - 31 JAN 2024



فدائی جمال عرف قمبر مہروان
Fidayee Jamal Baloch



فدائی عطاء اللہ عرف شیخ گڑک
Fidayee Attah Ullah Baloch



فدائی قاسم عرف تنگی لالا
Fidayee Qasim Baloch



فدائی سلال عرف شے مرید
Fidayee Salal Baloch



فدائی فاروق سید عرف چاکر
Fidayee Farooq Sayyad Baloch



فدائی نظام بلوچ عرف سابل
Fidayee Nizam Baloch



فدائی حافظ زیشان زہری عرف بیبرگ
Fidayee Zeeshan Zehri Baloch



فدائی صدام حسین سیاہ پاد عرف کبھی
Fidayee Saddam Baloch



فدائی حمل مومن عرف کلہیر
Fidayee Hammal Mohmin



فدائی عبدالودود سانکرئی عرف شہک
Fidayee Abdul Wadood



فدائی نادر بنگلڑئی عرف ہالی
Fidayee Nadir Baloch



فدائی زیشان رند عرف آفتاب
Fidayee Zeeshan Rind Baloch



شہید کاشف شاہوانی عرف روکین (فتح اسکواڈ)
Martyr Kashif Shahwani Baloch
(Fateh Squad)

PRESS RELEASE

26-04-2022



BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY

بلوچ لبریشن آرمی کی مجید بریگیڈ کراچی میں چینییوں پر فدائی حملے کی ذمہ داری قبول کرتی ہے۔ فدائی حملہ پہلی بلوچ خاتون فدائی شاری بلوچ عرف برمش نے سرانجام دیکر بلوچ مزاحمت میں ایک نئی تاریخ رقم کر دی۔

ترجمان بلوچ لبریشن آرمی - جینند بلوچ

BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY

B.L.A.

Majeed Brigade of Baloch Liberation Army accepts responsibility of today's self-sacrificing attack on Chinese in Karachi.

The mission was carried out by first female fidayee of the Brigade. Fidayee Shari Baloch alias Bramsh today added a new chapter in Baloch resistance history.

**SPOKESPERSON BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY
JEEYAND BALUCH**

MARCH 25 - 2024

BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY

MAJEED BRIGADE



OPERATION ZIRPAHAZAG - TURBAT



فدائی سنگت ایوب عظیم عرف دودا
Operation Commandar Fidayee Ayoub Azeem



Fidayee Khaleef Baloch
فدائی خلیف عرف اسلم



Fidayee Wajdad Baloch
فدائی وجداد عرف نودان



Fidayee Murad Hasil
فدائی مراد حاصل عرف فریاد



MIAJED BRIGADE

BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY



KAAD

KARIMA ARMED
ASSAULT DIVISION

ARSHO







PRESS RELEASE

12-04-2026



BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY

BLA ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK ON OCCUPYING FORCES IN THE SEA OF JIWANI

In a significant and new strategic advancement, the Sarmachars of the Baloch Liberation Army targeted a patrol boat of the occupying Pakistani forces in the sea of Jiwani, Gwadar, in an armed attack. As a result of this successful naval operation, three personnel on board were killed.

The Baloch Liberation Army accepts responsibility for this attack. Following the operations on land, the commencement of actions against the enemy within maritime boundaries marks a new and critical development in the B.L.A.'s military strategy. The objective of this expansion is to halt the plunder of Baloch resources through sea routes and to inflict losses upon the enemy on every front.

A detailed statement regarding this attack will be released to the media shortly.







BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY



OPERATION HEROF



شہید فدائی رضوان بلوچ عرف حمل
Shaheed Fidayee Rizwan Baloch
alias Hammal



شہید فدائی مابل بلوچ عرف ذلان کرد
Shaheed Fidayeed Mahal Baloch
alias Zilan Kurd

AUGUST 25 - 2024

OPERATION ZIRPAHAZAG

GWADAR - 13 AUGUST 2023



FIDAYEE NAVEED BALUCH ALIAS ASLAM



FIDAYEE MAQBOOL BALUCH ALIAS QAIM



BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY - MAJEED BRIGADE


BALUCH LIBERATION ARMY - MAJEED BRIGADE

SUMAIYA BALUCH

H A K K A L



"We are well-versed in confronting the enemy. For the Baluch nation, the path to national freedom lies through war. No one will liberate us from slavery or pity our condition. Our liberation depends upon our own strength."



"KARIMA ARMED ASSAULT DIVISION" EXPLANATION OF ELEMENTS AND COLORS

The shield represents defense, protection and resilience. The division stands as a barrier against threats.

Laurel Wreath is a classical military symbol which means Victory, Honor, Achievement and Elite Status.

Camouflage, endurance and ground warfare. Indicates field operations and combat readiness.

Prestige, honor and excellence. Marks elite status and achievement.

Sacrifice, bravery and aggression. Represents combat intensity.



Authority, leadership and elite status. It symbolizes guidance and a higher purpose.

Honor, duty, and sacrifice.

Side patterns show Balochi embroidery. Heritage and traditional identity. Red color represents sacrifice, courage and bloodshed in battle.





Abbreviations:

Abbreviation	Meaning
BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
BLA-J	Balochistan Liberation Army–Jeyand faction
BLF	Balochistan Liberation Front
BRA	Baloch Republican Army
BRAS	Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar
BRG	Baloch Republican Guards
CPEC	China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
IED	Improvised explosive device
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
BSO-Azad	Baloch Student Organization–Azad
STOS	Special Tactical Operations Squad
ZIRAB	Zephyr Intelligence, Research, and Analysis Bureau
QAHR	Qazi Aero Hive Rangers
TTP	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
BIWA	Baloch International Welfare Association
BCNA	Baloch Council of North America
BASC	Baloch Advocacy and Studies Centre
BNM	Baloch National Movement

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Hanna Sara Sunny completed her MA in Intelligence and International Security at King's College London (War Studies Department), where she focused on intelligence analysis, geopolitical risk assessment using OSINT methods, and the implications of AI and emerging technologies for security. She currently works as a Junior Geopolitical Risk Analyst at the Sir Syed Center of International Relations & Risk Analysis and led the BRAS threat profile. Before this, she worked as a Business Intelligence Intern with ES Learning and ES Consultancy (IB Group) in Saudi Arabia, supporting investment mandates aligned with Saudi Vision 2030.



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