



Sir Syed Center

of

International Relations & Risk Analysis

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE:

LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA

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SSCIRRA's policy on terminology:

This document refers to the two parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as:

- **Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (IaJK)** – the area currently under India's de facto control (the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh).
- **Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK)**– the area currently under Pakistan's de facto control (commonly known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan).

In India, the Pakistan-administered area is officially and widely called **“Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK)”** and/or **“Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK)”**, reflecting the Government of India's position that the entire former princely state is an integral part of India and that Pakistan's presence is an occupation. Pakistan, on the other hand, does not accept the term “occupied” and uses names such as **“Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir”** and **“Gilgit-Baltistan.”**

The phrases **“Indian-administered”** and **“Pakistan-administered”** are used here only to describe which country currently governs each area on the ground. They are not meant to take a legal position on sovereignty or to endorse either side's official claim. Readers in India should understand that **“Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir” in this text corresponds to what Indian official and media sources call “Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK/PoJK).”**

1. Executive Summary

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), also known as “Army of the Righteous” or “Army of the Pure,” is a Pakistan-based Salafi-jihadist militant organization and one of the most capable and lethal anti-India terrorist groups in operation today.

LeT is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States (US), listed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and proscribed by numerous countries including Australia, India, United Kingdom (UK), and Pakistan. Despite formal bans, the group continues to operate openly through front organizations, charities, and political vehicles, maintaining a vast infrastructure of training camps, schools, medical clinics, and fundraising networks across Pakistan and beyond.

The group is best known for orchestrating the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed 166 people and injured over 300, and remains actively engaged in the insurgency in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (IaJK). Intelligence assessments indicate LeT maintains strong operational ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and continues to receive state sponsorship, making it a critical instrument of Pakistani irregular warfare strategy toward India.


2. Organizational Background

During late 1980s, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi brought together several Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadees followers to fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Around the same time, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, two professors at Lahore Engineering University, founded Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) around 1985. Initially, JuD was a small religious organisation focused on *tabligh* (proselytization) and *dawah* (missionary activities) and aimed to promote the Ahl-e-Hadees interpretation of Islam. Around 1986, Lakhvi's LeT amalgamated with Saeed and Iqbal's JuD to form the Markaz al-Dawah-wal-Irshad (MDI) meaning, the Centre for Religious Learning and Propagation, and also known as the Jamaat al-Dawa. In 1986, MDI established its first militant training camp, *Muaskar-e-Taiba*, in Paktia province in eastern Afghanistan. It later established another camp, *Muaskar-e-Aqsa*, in Kunar province, near Pakistan's Bajaur and Mohmand tribal areas, which were then part of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, MDI reoriented its militant efforts toward Indian-administered Kashmir (IaK.)

MDI focused on three main objectives: jihad, promoting the Ahl-e-Hadees religious tradition, and developing a new generation of Muslims committed to its ideology. LeT was formed in 1989 as the military wing of the MDI. LeT also operated under the alias JuD, which was ostensibly created as a charitable organization by LeT founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed immediately prior to LeT being banned by the Pakistani Government in 2002. JuD functions as a front organization for LeT to mask its activities and solicit funds. LeT and JuD are indistinguishable for the purpose of listing as a terrorist organization.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS



3. Leadership Structure

Hafiz Muhammed Saeed: He is the founder and the chief of the LeT and the JuD. He is a former professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore, and was a founder of the MDI based in Muridke, Punjab Province. He later founded the LeT as a separate terrorist group. He is an internationally recognised terrorist and the US placed a bounty of 10 million US Dollar (USD) on his head for his involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. In 2017, he was put under house arrest for collecting funds for the JuD which violated UN-imposed sanctions, but was released later the same year by the courts due to 'lack of evidence.' He was then arrested in July 2019, and in February 2020, he was sentenced to 10 years and six months in jail by an anti-terrorism court.

Hafiz Talha Saeed: He is the son of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. He was elevated in mid-2026 to lead the organisation operationally after internal succession deliberations; now the public face issuing statements and threats.

Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi: He is one of the co-founders of the LeT and the chief of operations of the outfit. He was instrumental in recruiting a large number of youth from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. He conducted operations in foreign countries like Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq, and was also the primary handler for the *fidayeen* (self-sacrificers) team, which attacked Mumbai on November 26, 2008. In May 2022, Mir was finally sentenced to fifteen-and-a-half years in prison for terrorism financing by a Pakistani anti-terrorism court in Lahore.

Sajid Mir (Saifullah Sajid Jutt) – Senior operative responsible for global operations/recruitment; described in 2025 reporting as the most important figure after Lakhvi in the hierarchy. Sajid Mir is wanted by the US' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for his alleged involvement in the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India.

Zafar Iqbal: He is the co-founder of the LeT and is involved in ideological and training aspects of LeT.

Haji Mohammed Ashraf: He is the outfit's chief of finance and has travelled often to the Middle East to collect funds for the LeT.

Mahmoud Mohammed Ahmed Bahaziq: He is a key Saudi financier for the LeT. He coordinated with NGOs and businessmen based in Saudi Arabia to raise funds for the outfit, while also taking part in propaganda and media operations.

Arif Qasmani: He is the chief coordinator for external dealings, facilitating ties with other terrorist groups like the al-Qaeda.

Yahya Mujahid: He is the head of the LeT's media department and spokesperson, managing the outfit's propaganda and public messaging.

Amir Hamza: He acts as the head of the publication division of the LeT. He also heads the Tehrik Hurmat Rasool, which is a proxy for the LeT. He has written extensively on various themes, including jihad in Kashmir and an overview of the group's training facilities. On 16 April 2026, Hamza survived an assassination in his car by two motorcycle-borne gunmen on PECO road in Kot Lakhpat, Lahore.

LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA (LeT)

KEY LEADERS AND OPERATIVES

A militant organisation responsible for terrorist attacks, with a focus on jihad and regional operations.



HAFIZ MUHAMMED SAEED
FOUNDER & CHIEF (LeT / JuD)



4. Ideology & Objectives

Core Ideology

LeT adheres to a Salafi-jihadist interpretation of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam, closely aligned with Wahhabism and the broader global jihadist movement. The group's ideology is fundamentally anti-Western, anti-Hindu, anti-Israel, and anti-Semitic, viewing jihad as a religious obligation for all Muslims. Notably, the outfit differs from other Pakistan-based Salafi-jihadist organizations, most notably by publicly renouncing sectarian violence against other Islamic sects. LeT leaders also prohibit members from waging war against Muslim-majority Pakistan, arguing that jihadi efforts should be focused on non-Muslims.

Key Ideological Tenets:

- **Global Jihad:** LeT seeks to establish Islam as the dominant way of life worldwide, with the ultimate goal of creating a universal Islamic Caliphate.
- **Kashmir as Focal Point:** IajK is considered the "closest occupied Muslim land" and the primary battlefield for liberating Muslim territory.

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- **Destruction of India, Hinduism, and Judaism:** LeT explicitly articulates the destruction of these three entities as central political and religious objectives.
 - **Anti-Western Stance:** The British Raj is held responsible for the decline of the Mughal Empire; LeT opposes all Western influence in Pakistan and South Asia.
 - **Brahmanic-Talmudic-Crusader" Alliance:** LeT propaganda condemns Hindus, Jews, and Christians as collaborating to undermine the *Ummah* (global Muslim community).
 - **Pan-Islamist Rationale:** LeT construes all lands once ruled by Muslims as inherently Muslim territory that must be "recaptured" through jihad.

5.1 Strategic Objectives

Primary Objectives:

1. **Liberation of Kashmir:** Merge the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan as the first step toward broader regional conquest.
2. **Conquest of India:** Use Kashmir as a base of operations to conquer India and establish Muslim rule across the Indian subcontinent.
3. **Establishment of Caliphate:** Create a universal Islamic Caliphate through sustained global jihad.
4. **Elimination of "Existential Enemies":** India, Israel and the US are designated as existential enemies of Islam.
5. **Dawah and Social Transformation:** Reform Pakistani society through preaching (dawah) and social welfare, transforming it into LeT's interpretation of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam.

Secondary Objectives:

- Destabilize Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir through sustained insurgency.
- Expand operational reach into Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and other South Asian countries.
- Maintain international networks for fundraising, recruitment, and operational planning.
- Build political influence in Pakistan through Milli Muslim League and other front organizations.

5.2 Doctrinal Publications

LeT is one of the most prolific producers of jihadist literature in Pakistan, operating an extensive publishing house (*Dar al-Andalus*) that produces approximately 100 booklets annually in multiple languages.

Key Publications:

- **"Why Are We Waging Jihad?"** – Core doctrinal pamphlet justifying military jihad as religious obligation.

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- **Mujallah al-Dawah** – Urdu monthly magazine, circulation ~100,000 by late 1990s.
 - **Ghazwa** – Urdu weekly magazine, circulation ~20,000.
 - **Voice of Islam** – English monthly publication.
 - **Al-Ribat** – Arabic monthly publication.
 - **Zarb-e-Tayyaba** – Urdu monthly for students.
 - **Tayyabat** – Publication for female students.
 - **Nanhe Mujahid** – Fortnightly magazine for children (banned in 2008).

5. Geographic Footprint

LeT's core operating area remains Pakistan's Punjab province, anchored by its founding headquarters complex, *Markaz-e-Taiba*, at Muridke near Lahore. The group's principal forward base is Pakistan administered Kashmir (PaK), where facilities clustered around Muzaffarabad (including the Shawai Nallah camp and the Bait-ul-Mujahideen complex) have historically served as staging and final-training points for cadre intended for infiltration into India. Additional infrastructure has been reported in Bahawalpur, Manshera, Rawalkot, Sialkot (Sarjal and Mehmoona Joya), and Bhimber/Barnala district of Pakistan-administered Jammu & Kashmir (PaJK), reflecting a dispersed but Punjab/PaK-centered network rather than a single fixed base. Recent reports indicated that Markaz Yarmook in Pattoki, Kasur District of the Punjab province has been emerged as the LeT's new first-stage training center.

LeT's principal area of influence is in IaJK, where LeT and its proxy The Resistance Front (TRF) and United Liberation Council (ULC) conduct or direct attacks against security forces, minority communities, and, increasingly, tourists. Historically concentrated in the Kashmir Valley and, more recently, in the Poonch-Rajouri-Reasi sector and the Pir Panjal range south of the Valley, where terrain and lower troop density are assessed to offer more permissive conditions for militant movement than the heavily secured central Valley. The group's cross-border corridors have traditionally traversed the Line of Control (LoC) with infiltration routes running across Kupwara, Baramulla/Uri, and Poonch-Rajouri sectors, supplemented by movement across the international border in Punjab state of India. Logistics and facilitation networks support movement of LeT fighters, weapons, drugs and funds across these corridors, often relying on local guides, overland trails, and, in some cases, reportedly maritime channels and broader logistical facilitation networks to support longer-range operations. Historically, infiltration activity has followed a seasonal trend, with the period from April to October generally offering more favorable operating conditions due to snowmelt and the resulting increased accessibility of mountain passes.

Nevertheless, infiltration efforts have also been reported during the winter months, despite heavy snowfall impeding accessibility and visibility along certain high-altitude routes. Consequently, security forces typically maintain heightened counter-infiltration vigilance during periods of seasonal transition and ahead of winter.

Following India's May 2025 Operation Sindoor, which targeted nine militant facilities, including camps in Muridke and the Muzaffarabad area, LeT is reported to be restructuring its Pakistan-based infrastructure and adopting a three-command framework spanning Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and PaJK, while retaining its centrally directed Jammu and Kashmir command. This reorganization appears aimed at reducing geographic concentration risk, enhancing operational resilience, and dispersing critical assets, while preserving centralized control over India-focused activities.

LeT's area of influence extends beyond kinetic activity into diaspora communities and support networks across Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and parts of Europe and North America. These networks have historically leveraged charitable and community-based organizations, including entities linked to JuD, to facilitate outreach, fundraising, and logistical support. Heightened international scrutiny following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, reinforced by subsequent UN designations and US sanctions, underscores the importance of these transnational support mechanisms, with JuD and later Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) identified as key front and alias entities within LeT's broader support infrastructure.

6. Organizational Structure

LeT is organized along a quasi-military model comprising a dedicated operational wing supported by an extensive network of missionary, charitable, educational, and political branches. This structure provides operational resilience, fundraising capacity, recruitment pipelines, and public legitimacy, while enabling organizational adaptation through rebranding and successor entities in response to domestic bans and international designations.

The organization maintains a hierarchical command structure characterized by centralized oversight and decentralized operational execution. Hafiz Saeed, as Emir of LeT, remains the ultimate authority within the organization. Directly beneath him are the Supreme Commander and Deputy Supreme Commander, who oversee regional Divisional Commanders and subordinate District Commanders through a layered chain of command. While tactical cells retain limited operational autonomy, strategic direction, major attack planning, resource allocation, and organizational priorities remain centrally controlled.

Historically, LeT has overseen its ideological, financial, educational, and military activities through a hierarchical organizational framework centered on emir and deputy emir roles, supplemented by finance officials, operational trainers, and regional facilitators. The military wing is organized to support infiltration, ambush, and complex attack planning, with regional commands or operational cells focused on sectors in PoJK. This structure enables centralized strategic direction while providing localized operational oversight across key areas of activity.

Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI) established in the mid to late 1980s, served as the parent organization from which LeT emerged. MDI combined Ahl-e-Hadith religious outreach (*dawa*), educational initiatives, social welfare activities, and militant operations within a unified organizational framework. Its principal headquarters was developed at the expansive Muridke complex near Lahore, while LeT functioned as its designated militant wing. Following the bans imposed on LeT in 2001 and 2002, MDI was effectively

dissolved, restructured, or rebranded, with much of its infrastructure, personnel, and operational functions transitioning to successor organizations.

Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) emerged as the principal public-facing and civilian umbrella organization following the post-2001 reorganization. It concentrates on dawa, education (schools and madrassas), media/publications, and social services while providing the ideological and logistical backbone that sustains the military wing. Multiple governments and the UN consider JuD as an alias/front of LeT. It has operated district offices, student and women's wings, and specialized outreach departments.

Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK) functioned as an early humanitarian and relief department or front under the MDI/JuD umbrella. It conducted disaster-relief and welfare activities, including post-tsunami and earthquake responses that simultaneously supported recruitment, fundraising, and local influence. It was designated by the United States as a LeT-linked entity in April 2006.

Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) was established in 2009 as a dedicated charitable and disaster-relief front to continue humanitarian operations after earlier designations affected IKK and JuD. It has conducted large-scale relief during floods, earthquakes, and displacement crises inside Pakistan and has been used for fundraising and public outreach. Following increased international scrutiny following 2008 Mumbai attacks, FIF assumed greater prominence as a charitable platform through which the broader network maintained public outreach and fundraising activities. In November 2010, the US designated FIF as an alias of LeT, citing its role in sustaining the group's financial and logistical support infrastructure and in helping affiliated entities circumvent sanctions and regulatory restrictions.

Al-Anfal Trust functions as a financial and asset management entity associated with the JuD/LeT network, facilitating the administration of funds, properties, and other organizational resources. The trust has been identified in U.S. sanctions designations targeting LeT-linked entities and has also been proscribed by Pakistani authorities due to its association with JuD and the broader LeT support infrastructure.

Tehreek-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awwal (TTQA) emerged as a rebranded platform reportedly adopted by elements of JuD in response to successive bans and mounting international pressure. The organization enabled the continuation of outreach, advocacy, and support activities under an alternative banner, thereby helping preserve organizational continuity despite regulatory restrictions. TTQA has subsequently been identified among entities linked to the broader LeT/JuD network in U.S. sanctions and designation frameworks.

Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool functions as a mobilization and advocacy platform centered on issues of religious sanctity and perceived blasphemy. The organization has been utilized to support public campaigns, grassroots mobilization, recruitment messaging, and network-building with other religious groups and movements. This US sanctions and designation frameworks have identified Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool among entities associated with the broader LeT-linked ecosystem.

Milli Muslim League (MML) was established in 2017 as a political platform intended to contest elections and expand the influence of the broader JuD/LeT network within Pakistan's formal political sphere. The party is widely assessed as an effort to mainstream and legitimize elements of the network through participation in electoral politics. The US has designated MML as an alias and front organization of LeT.

Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML) is widely assessed by the US, India, and multiple independent monitors as a political front for the LeT. The US Department of State explicitly stated that PMML and its earlier incarnation, MNL, function as political fronts for LeT, and in April 2018 designated MML and related entities as aliases of LeT. PMML's leadership is closely tied to LeT's founding network: its president is Talha Saeed, son of LeT founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, and other party officials have been identified in US terrorism designations as LeT-linked individuals.

The Resistance Front (TRF) emerged in 2019 in the following the revocation of Article 370 in IaK and is widely assessed as an operational proxy of LeT focused on militancy in IaJK. By adopting secular and locally resonant branding centered on the concept of "resistance," TRF has sought to project an indigenous Kashmiri identity while remaining linked to LeT's cadre base, training infrastructure, logistical networks, funding mechanisms, and command structures. Reflecting these assessed linkages, Indian authorities designated TRF under India's Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in 2023, while the US designated it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity in 2025, explicitly identifying it as a front and proxy of LeT.

United Liberation Council (ULC) is a recently emerged, online-facing front organization linked to the LeT. Indian intelligence and media reports describe ULC as a "shadow" or proxy outfit, similar to LeT's earlier front The Resistance Front (TRF), created to project attacks and intimidation in Jammu and Kashmir as locally driven rather than externally directed. Since mid-2026, ULC has issued multiple threat letters and "hit lists" targeting Kashmiri Pandit government employees, local police, and security personnel, often publishing personal details such as phone numbers and addresses to amplify fear. The group is also used by LeT operatives to publicly claim responsibility for specific attacks, including an Anantnag incident in July 2026, after US sanctions on TRF pushed LeT to adopt new front names.

7. Operational Capabilities

Personnel: Open-source and governmental assessments have placed active fighters and trained cadres in the low thousands at peak periods, with support personnel, including logistics, facilitation, propaganda, charitable staff adding several thousand more through associated fronts. The number of fighters actively deployed inside India at any given time is assessed to be substantially smaller, likely in the low hundreds, consistent with a model in which a large support, training, and facilitation base in Pakistan sustains a much smaller forward-deployed insurgent presence. The group also relies on veteran cadre from earlier Kashmir campaigns and the Afghan theatre for training, guidance, and attack planning. This veteran network helps preserve organizational expertise and institutional memory, enabling continuity even when frontline cells are disrupted.

The group is better characterized as a Pakistan-based organization with a Kashmir-centric recruitment base and an external support diaspora rather than a truly international foreign-fighter movement. Recruitment profile typically favours young males from Punjab and other Pakistani regions, often with madrassa or limited formal education backgrounds, motivated by religious-nationalist narratives centered on Kashmir. Ideologically, members adhere to Salafi/Ahl-i-Hadith teachings and are indoctrinated with LeT's anti-

India/Kashmir jihad narrative. The Resistance Front (TRF), a LeT front, reportedly recruits from among Kashmiri youth and Pakistani nationals for strikes in IaJK.

Weapons: LeT has demonstrated access to small arms (AK-pattern rifles and variants), light machine guns, sniper systems, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars suitable for mountain and ambush warfare. Explosives and improvised explosive device (IED) capability are established, including vehicle-borne and person-borne devices used in complex attacks. Designated marksman/sniper weapons and commercial bolt action rifles have been reported in some attacks on security forces. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) have not been a confirmed hallmark of LeT operations in open sources. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and precision-guided capabilities remain assessed as low to nascent; any use would likely be improvised rather than systematic. There remains nascent credible open-source reporting of LeT maintaining inventory of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), guided missiles, or other precision-strike systems. Limited reporting suggests an interest in maritime and waterborne training. However, the group's operational effectiveness continues to be rooted in small unit infiltration, close-quarters combat, and guerrilla style tactics rather than long range or stand-off precision engagements. Reporting since 2023 further indicates the experimental use of commercial UAVs for cross border delivery of weapons and narcotics into India's Punjab. While notable, these drones enabled activities appear to remain opportunistic in nature at a sustained small-scale stage rather than a demonstrated systemic delivery mechanism.


Training: LeT maintains a structured, multi-stage training curriculum historically centered on Markaz-e-Taiba in Muridke, supplemented by camps across Muridke, Muzaffarabad, Mansehra, Kotli, the Bahawalpur region, and, since 2025, a newly established facility in Lower Dir in KP. The group also appears to have used winter training cycles and recurring camps to maintain continuity, suggesting an institutionalized training pipeline rather than ad hoc instruction. Its tiered training system combines ideological indoctrination, combat instruction, and infiltration preparation through progressive courses, include an initial religious and ideological orientation course (*Daura-e-Sufa*, roughly three weeks), a basic combat course (*Daura-e-Aam*, roughly three weeks), and an advanced combat course (*Daura-e-Khaas*, roughly three months). Instruction reportedly covers weapons handling, reconnaissance, explosives, urban warfare, physical conditioning, and infiltration techniques, supported by recurring seasonal training cycles.

LeT also reportedly maintains a maritime training program, sometimes referred to as a "Water Force," reportedly training cadre in scuba and swimmer infiltration, small-boat handling, and underwater movement at sites including the Neelum River near Muzaffarabad, the Mangla and Tarbela dam reservoirs, and coastal areas near Karachi. This capability underpinned the seaborne approach used in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and is assessed to be receiving renewed emphasis as land infiltration routes have hardened. Some reporting also references paragliding instruction at PaK camps, though this is less consistently corroborated than the group's core combat and maritime programs. Indian strikes during Operation Sindoor in May 2025 reportedly damaged or destroyed several of these facilities, including Markaz-e-Taiba itself, the group has publicly stated intent to rebuild.

Combat Experience: LeT cadres have decades of combat experience. The group's fighters first saw action in the Soviet-Afghan War in 1980s. Since the 1990s LeT has extensive combat experience in IaJK and has participated in numerous cross-border infiltration, ambushes on security forces, urban assaults, and attacks on soft targets. Its experience includes both sustained insurgent activity in IaJK and large-scale coordinated terrorism in Indian urban centers. The group's most significant combat record includes the 2001 Indian

Parliament attack, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, the 2008 Mumbai Attack, and later attacks in Uri and Pahalgam in 2025. This history indicates proficiency in reconnaissance, multi-team coordination, target selection, and media exploitation rather than sustained conventional warfare. In Afghanistan, LeT operatives fought with Taliban/Haqqani network against US-NATO forces and Afghan troops, notably in Kunar in 2014. LeT-linked networks have also conducted at least one confirmed cross-border operation outside South Asia (the 2014 assault on the Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan), though the group's operational experience remains overwhelmingly concentrated in the India-Pakistan/J&K theatre.

Cyber Capability: LeT's cyber capability is best assessed as moderate and support oriented rather than technically sophisticated. Hacking, destructive cyber operations, or attacks against critical infrastructure are not confirmed core capabilities, and no publicly confirmed offensive cyber operation demonstrates a mature cyber offensive capacity. Instead, the group's strengths lie in information operations, propaganda, and digital mobilization. Since the 1990s and 2000s, LeT has maintained print, radio, and online propaganda networks and has sustained a presence on encrypted platforms such as Telegram, particularly after restrictions on mainstream social media. These platforms are used primarily for recruitment, messaging, and dissemination. Encryption and other digital communications measures support operational security in line with contemporary militant practices but do not indicate advanced persistent threat-level expertise. Recent reporting suggests that LeT is exploring expanded training under a "hybrid warfare" framework, including the use of digital tools and, reportedly, generative artificial intelligence applications for content creation, translation, and online messaging. However, no confirmed offensive cyber-attack has been publicly attributed to LeT's mature cyber-offensive capability.



8. Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)

KEY TECHNIQUES USED BY MILITANT GROUPS	
RECRUITMENT FINANCING INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	
 Recruitment	Primarily through madrassas, mosques, charitable fronts, family/community networks, and online messaging. Focuses on young Pakistani males, with religious motivation centered on Kashmir.
 Financing	Charitable donations, diaspora remittances, welfare fronts, extortion, kidnapping, smuggling, hawala, and alleged state or quasi-state facilitation.
 Intelligence Collection	Uses local facilitators, open-source monitoring, surveillance, and reconnaissance prior to infiltration or attacks. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks reflected mature pre-operational surveillance capabilities.
 Communications	Uses couriers, satellite/mobile phones, VoIP and encrypted messaging platforms (Telegram, Signal, Threema, Element, Dust). Also uses Chinese-made “Ultra Set” radio communication devices, safe-house networks, and UAV-enabled ISR channels. Operational security is enhanced through compartmentalized human networks, anonymized online communications, and increasingly, drone-supported surveillance and reporting.
 Attack Methods	Ambushes, small-arms assaults, complex assaults, bombings, suicide or fedayeen-style attacks, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and hostage-taking.
 Weapons	Assault rifles, SMGs, small arms, LMGs, hand grenades, RPGs, under-barrel grenade launchers, designated marksman rifles, commercial bolt-action rifles, and, on a limited scale, heavier support weapon systems.
 Logistics	Pakistan-based rear-area logistics support facilitates the movement of personnel, weapons, and funds. Support networks leverage transit camps, safe houses, transportation assets, charitable fronts, and trust-based financial channels to sustain operations. Limited use of drones for sustaining logistics has also been reported.
 Propaganda	Extensive use of statements, videos, publications through associated media outlets, and printed publications. Welfare branding is used to reinforce Kashmir-centric and anti-India narratives.
 Cyber Activity	Uses social media and messaging platforms for propaganda and recruitment, with limited evidence of advanced cyber operations. Confidence in sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities remains low.

9. Funding & Logistics

LeT runs one of the most institutionally sophisticated financing operations among South Asian militant groups - a hybrid model combining state sponsorship, a legally-structured charity front, and illicit revenue (narcotics and counterfeit currency). LeT/JuD's model is unusual for a designated terror group in that a large share of its funding infrastructure is institutionally embedded and socially normalized, rather than purely covert channels.

State Funding:

- Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) allegedly provided comprehensive logistical, financial, and operational backing, including safe houses, travel documents, weapons, training facilities, intelligence sharing, and operational coordination (such as complicity in the 2008 Mumbai attacks via operatives like David Headley).
- Beyond covert financing, state support enabled LeT and its political front, JUD, to build extensive missionary infrastructure (mosques, madrassas, and hospitals) to expand Ahl-e-Hadith Islam. For instance, the Punjab provincial government allocated roughly 940,000 to 1 million USD to JuD-linked welfare projects in the 2010s, continuing state allocations even after UN terrorist designations.
- Despite domestic bans and international pressure, LeT/JuD maintains enduring operational facilities - including training camps, schools, and medical clinics - protected by systemic state shielding from meaningful legal consequences.

Foreign Sponsors:

- LeT initially faced funding constraints during the late Cold War due to limited direct ISI backing, prompting founders Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal to leverage academic trips to the Arab world to secure wealthy Saudi donors, while figures like Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden provided critical transnational support.
- Through commander Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi's Saudi brother-in-law (Abu Abdur Rehman Sareehi), Al-Qaeda channeled approximately 10 million rupees to finance the construction of LeT's primary Muridke headquarters in 1988 alongside early training facilities in Afghanistan.
- Saudi organizations and various Middle Eastern Islamic charities have consistently acted as significant financial sponsors, matching LeT and JuD's 'Ahl-e-Hadith' / Salafi doctrinal alignment. Kuwait-based networks, such as the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), have also historically functioned as umbrella organizations channeling funds to both Al-Qaeda and LeT.
- Beyond the Middle East, foreign sponsors span Western nations, specifically the US, Canada, Britain, and Australia. This includes expatriate networks and front entities (such as the UK fundraising operations that netted millions or the North American "Virginia Jihad Network" connections) that covertly funnel diaspora donations back to the core leadership in Pakistan.

Donations:

LeT's funding model relies on three primary revenue streams: domestic Pakistani donors, Middle Eastern Islamic charities (particularly Saudi organizations), and its own institutional charitable arms, including JuD and the FIF.

- JuD built its public standing through visible, credible disaster response by providing humanitarian relief after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the 2010 Pakistan floods - alongside a permanent network of schools, hospitals, and clinics. The combined effect is that most ordinary Pakistanis genuinely perceive JuD as a legitimate social-welfare organization rather than a militant front.
- Collection from common citizens remains a perennial funding source. Despite brief bans following President Pervez Musharraf's crackdown in 2002 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, domestic fundraising has continued unabated.
- It has historically accumulated massive capital from Saudi Arabian Wahhabi donors and countries like the UK. During the October 2005 Kashmir earthquake, millions of pounds were funneled into Pakistan for relief under charities like the Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK), of which less than half went to actual relief, with large portions siphoned off to fund terrorist operations.
- Religious seminaries (madrassas) amplify the network's financial campaigns by acting as propaganda channels that drive recruitment and coordinate messaging alongside active international appeals (such as campaigns exploiting crises in Gaza).

Drug trafficking:

- LeT leverages the Golden Crescent narcotics trade to generate autonomous funds that reduce reliance on ISI.
- Capitalizing on Afghanistan producing 92% of the world's illicit opium and its porous border with Pakistan, LeT utilizes transit routes through Jammu, Rajasthan, and Gujarat to smuggle both drugs and weapons into India. For instance, David Headley disclosed meeting key LeT operative Niyhmat Shah in January 2006 to smuggle weapons and drugs.
- The criminal network of Indian fugitive underworld leader Dawood Ibrahim, sheltered by the ISI in Pakistan and India, has provided financial and logistical aid to LeT.

Hawala:

LeT uses trust-based hawala networks, cash couriers, and diaspora remittance conduits across the Gulf, the United Kingdom, and North America to obscure the origin of overseas donations and channel operational funds. These funds often arrive through formal banking systems disguised as charitable giving before being funneled via informal channels, with some foreign exchange dealers and Pakistani banks facilitating transactions without proper due diligence or scrutiny.

Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) & Economic Warfare:

- Forensic investigations allege that these sophisticated notes are printed in major government-operated presses in Pakistan (including Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore) before being trafficked into India through transit nodes like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Dubai.

-
- Overseen by Dawood Ibrahim's syndicate under ISI protection, this counterfeit pipeline is deployed as a form of "economic jihad" to raise inflation and erode confidence in India's currency, while simultaneously paying for LeT logistics and operations.

Case Study: Financing of the 2008 Mumbai Attack

- The 2008 Mumbai attack utilized front organizations, hawala networks, and formal banking systems to fund training, reconnaissance, travel, and equipment.
- US and Indian investigations revealed that Pakistani American operative David Headley (alias Daood Gilani), working under LeT and ISI instructions, used his US citizenship and business front (First World Immigration Services) for free movement and Western cover that Pakistan-based operatives lack.
- Headley conducted scouting trips to Mumbai from 2006 to 2008 under a business cover identity, funded by his handler - an alleged ISI officer known as 'Major Iqbal' with 2,50,000 INR in FICN and 25,000 USD in cash linked to LeT's FICN stream.
- Training expenses in PaJK and Punjab, covering housing, food, weapons training, and communications, were financed by JuD and LeT's financial wing using funds masked as *zakat* or disaster relief.
- Operational communications utilized prepaid SIM cards, anonymous cyber cafes, and VoIP services funded via European shell payments to minimize traceability.

Extortion: Arrested operatives have disclosed running protection and extortion rackets targeting private business associations, such as cross-border merchants in the Indo-Pak Traders' Association. In 2021, LeT suspects attacked apple traders and drivers in Kashmir, severely disrupting the horticulture sector, evidently to compel ransom/protection payments. However, LeT's primary financial models rely much more heavily on state backing, formal/informal charitable fronts, and narco-trafficking.

Kidnapping, Illegal mining and Human trafficking: For LeT specifically, they are not documented as a core or primary pillar of their regular financial architecture; their funding relies primarily on state sponsorship, Gulf donors, charitable networks, and drug smuggling.

10. Recruitment & Propaganda

LeT's recruitment base is concentrated in Pakistan's Punjab province, which has historically constituted the group's demographic and organizational core. Although recruitment is distributed across northern, central, and southern Punjab, the highest concentrations of LeT cadres have reportedly originated from districts including Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Lahore, Sheikhupura, Kasur, Sialkot, Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Khanewal, and Multan. Secondary recruitment pools have historically been identified in PaJK and, to a lesser extent, KP. Although foreign recruitment remains limited but LeT historically attracted Arab, Uyghur and Central Asian jihadist militants to its Afghan and Pakistani camps. Recruits are typically young men in their late teens to twenties, often drawn from lower-to-middle-income rural and small-town backgrounds, though the group's Punjab-centric recruitment base has historically given it a somewhat more educated and

urbanized cadre profile than some Deobandi-jihadist rivals drawing more heavily on madrassa populations in KP and the former tribal areas.

A smaller cohort of more educated, urban, or diaspora-linked recruits has historically been selected for external operations requiring greater operational sophistication, as seen in the Mumbai attack planning network. LeT has preferentially recruits from Sunni Ahl-e-Hadith constituencies, reflecting the group's ideological foundations, while also attracting individuals from other Sunni traditions, including Deobandi and Salafi backgrounds. In contrast, TRF's recruitment in IJK appears to draw more broadly from the local Sunni Muslim population, with less emphasis on sectarian affiliation and greater focus on perceived regional and political grievances against the Indian government. Recruits who are not already adherents of the Ahl-e-Hadith interpretation of Islam are reported to be converted during the initial Daura-e-Sufa orientation course, indicating that religious affiliation is treated as a formative rather than strictly prerequisite condition for entry.

Recruitment is primarily driven by Ahl-e-Hadith ideological narratives that emphasize jihad as a religious obligation, alongside the Kashmir issue, broader anti-India sentiment, and the influence of familial, social, and community networks. The organization also leverages experienced cadres for training, mentorship, and leadership functions, helping to sustain institutional knowledge and operational continuity. Among Kashmiri Muslims, LeT has sought to broaden its recruitment base by appealing to a combination of religious and local grievance-based narratives, while also seeking to absorb or co-opt members of indigenous militant networks.

Mosques and madrassas remain a core recruitment channel, alongside the group's own annual winter congregation at Muridke, historically a significant recruitment event drawing attendees from across Pakistan's Punjab and KP. Family and community networks are assessed to be an increasingly important channel, with reporting noting that some families reportedly commit children to the organization from an early age. Propaganda is disseminated through a combination of print publications historically associated with JuD, mosque-based outreach, and an expanding presence on social media and encrypted messaging platforms. In recent years, encrypted communication channels and social media platforms, particularly Telegram, have assumed a growing role in recruitment, mobilization, and radicalization efforts, particularly as Pakistani authorities have increased restrictions on the physical infrastructure and public activities of JuD and FIF since 2019. Messaging is produced primarily in Urdu and locally in Kashmiri/Hindi-language content for domestic Indian audiences, with English-language material used for international donor and diaspora outreach. Target audiences include prospective Pakistani recruits, Kashmiri sympathizers, and diaspora donor communities in the Gulf and Europe.

TRF's online presence has been used both to claim responsibility for attacks and to promote a narrative of indigenous resistance, aimed at obscuring the group's Pakistan-based links while resonating with local Kashmiri grievances. This messaging has frequently emphasized concerns surrounding demographic change and perceived political disenfranchisement following the 2019 revocation of J&K's special constitutional status. LeT reportedly seeks to capitalize on battlefield casualties and, in some accounts, Indian prisoners of war as part of its martyrdom narrative. High-profile incidents, including armed encounters and the dissemination of martyrdom-related propaganda, are leveraged to reinforce the group's messaging, glorify sacrifice, and encourage recruitment.

To distribute and sustain its online presence, TRF has relied on a diverse digital ecosystem spanning major social media and messaging platforms. Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and X (formerly Twitter) have been used to maintain audience reach and circulate organizational content, despite periodic account removals and regional internet restrictions. TikTok has also featured within the broader Kashmir militant messaging environment as a channel for socially native content, although TRF- and LeT-specific use remains less extensively documented in open-source reporting than activity on Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp. TRF-linked content has additionally appeared on secondary and niche platforms, including WordPress, Discord, TamTam, and Hoop, reflecting a deliberate multi-platform redundancy strategy intended to preserve distribution capabilities, audience access, and communications resilience in the face of platform enforcement actions.

Open-source reporting provides limited evidence of systematic university-based or refugee-camp recruitment by LeT, in contrast to certain other regional militant organizations. Instead, charities and welfare organizations associated with the JuD/FIF network appear to function primarily as legitimacy-building, fundraising, and community-engagement mechanisms, indirectly facilitating recruitment by sustaining the group's social reach, public visibility, and support base.

LeT has maintained a substantial and sophisticated propaganda apparatus since the 1990s, predating the social-media-driven propaganda models later associated with groups such as the Islamic State (IS). Its flagship Urdu-language publication, *Al-Dawa*, has been reported to have a circulation in the range of 140,000 and carries religious content alongside reporting on Kashmir operations and profiles of militants killed in action. Additional publications have included Ghazwa Times (subsequently rebranded *Jarrar*), a women's magazine (Taibaat, later *Al-Saffat*), a children's publication (Nanhe Mujahid, later *Rozatul Atfal*), an Arabic-language publication (*Al-Ribat*, later *Al-Anfal*), and, historically, an English-language publication (Voice of Islam, now discontinued). Core narrative themes centre on the "liberation" of Kashmir, a broader eschatological framing referred to in the movement's own materials as Ghazwa-e-Hind, and a victimhood narrative positioning the group as a defender of Muslims against India and, secondarily, against the West and Israel. The visual propaganda frequently incorporates LeT-associated branding, religious symbolism such as green flags and Quranic verses, and imagery of fallen militants framed as martyrs. Content is produced primarily in Urdu and Kashmiri, while selected messaging is disseminated in Arabic and English to engage audiences beyond the immediate operational theatre, including international supporters and diaspora communities.

Following Pakistan's 2019 crackdown on JuD and FIF, which resulted in the proscription of both organizations and significant restrictions on their physical infrastructure, LeT's propaganda and outreach apparatus is assessed to have become increasingly decentralized and digitally oriented. The group's digital communications ecosystem has demonstrated considerable resilience in the face of platform bans, account removals, and content takedowns, with supporters frequently reconstituting networks through replacement channels, mirror sites, and alternative social media platforms. Recent reporting also suggests experimentation with generative AI tools to support content production, translation, and dissemination, reflecting a broader pattern of leveraging commercially available technologies to enhance information operations. Alongside its digital activities, LeT and affiliated entities have continued to derive reputational benefits from charitable and welfare initiatives that reinforce community engagement and legitimacy

narratives. Collectively, these approaches enable the organization to sustain its ideological influence, support networks, and recruitment ecosystem despite legal restrictions and organizational disruption.

11. External Relationships

Possible support from-

- **State Support:** Multiple credible sources **confirmed** state support for LeT comes from Pakistan, primarily via its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Multiple Indian and Western intelligence assessments, National Investigation Agency (NIA) chargesheets, and UN sanctions listings document ISI's operational direction, training infrastructure access, and logistical support to LeT. LeT founder Hafiz Saeed was charge sheeted by India's NIA in 2026 for his role in the Pahalgam attack, with the agency describing LeT/TRF operations as Pakistan-sponsored. **Likely** support extends to the broader Pakistan Army establishment: LeT recruitment patterns overlap with Pakistani army/ISI communities; camps have been reported near military bases; and retired military personnel are involved in training. Post-2025 operational restructuring placed ISI brigadiers and colonels in direct supervisory roles over LeT infiltration decisions. There is **no confirmed** evidence of direct state sponsorship beyond Pakistan; some reports allege tactical coordination with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) operatives in Balochistan, but this appears opportunistic rather than state directed.
- **Intelligence agencies:** **Confirmed** intelligence agency links involve Pakistan's ISI. NIA investigations into the 2025 Pahalgam attack detail ISI-provided technical infrastructure for digital radicalisation, propaganda, and encrypted communications. ISI handlers allegedly participated in LeT control rooms during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, per David Headley's US court testimony. **Likely** links include an ISI-linked unified command structure: a common operating command in Pakistan reportedly coordinates LeT/TRF, Babbar Khalsa International, and other proxies for J&K and Punjab operations. Post-Operation Sindoor (2025), ISI tightened direct oversight of LeT operational decisions. There is **no verified** evidence linking non-Pakistani intelligence agencies to LeT; claims of Hamas-LeT tactical exchanges remain at the level of intelligence inputs about ISI efforts to adapt Gaza-style methods, not direct Hamas support.
- **Criminal organizations:** **Confirmed** criminal links involve Pakistani heroin-smuggling networks. NIA's 2026 narco-terror case documents a transnational drug network whose proceeds financed LeT activities: a 500-kg heroin consignment smuggled from Pakistan by sea was traced to LeT funding via Indian intermediaries, overseas coordinators, and real-estate laundering. **Likely** links extend to hawala and informal finance operators: LeT systematically uses hawala channels to move funds from charitable fronts and diaspora donors, avoiding formal banking scrutiny. There is **no direct** evidence tying LeT to non-drug criminal organizations (e.g., arms trafficking, human smuggling) beyond the narco-terror nexus already documented.

12. Significant Attacks Timeline

MAJOR TERROR ATTACKS IN INDIA LINKED TO LeT AND AFFILIATES						
ATTACKS BY	YEAR	MONTH / DATE	PROVINCE	TARGET TYPE	TARGET CATEGORY	CASUALTIES
TRF - LeT	2025	April 22	Jammu & Kashmir	Tourist Place	Civilians, Foreign nationals	26 killed, 20+ injured
LeT	2016	September 18	Jammu & Kashmir	Indian Army Brigade HQ, Uri	Security forces	17 killed, 19 injured
LeT	2015	July 27	Punjab	Police station and public area in Gurdaspur	Security forces, Civilians	7 killed, 17 injured
LeT al-Almi	2010	February 13	Maharashtra	German Bakery	Civilians	17 killed, 56 injured
LeT	2008	November 26-29	Maharashtra	Civilian Infrastructure	Civilians, Foreign nationals	164 killed, 308 injured
LeT-SIMI	2006	July 11	Maharashtra	Civilian Infrastructure	Civilians	209 killed, 700+ injured
Islamic Inquilab Mahaz - LeT	2005	October 29	Delhi	Civilian Infrastructure	Civilians	66 dead, 220 injured
LeT	2003	August 25	Maharashtra	Civilian Infrastructure	Civilians	52 killed, 182 injured
LeT, JeM	2002	September 24	Gujarat	Akshardham Temple	Civilians	31 killed, 71 injured
LeT, JeM	2002	May 14	Jammu & Kashmir	Kaluchak Army Camp, Jammu	Security forces, Civilians	33 killed, 15 injured
LeT	2001	December 13	Delhi	Parliament	Security forces, Civilians	9 killed, 16 injured
LeT	2000	December 22	Delhi	Red Fort	Security forces, Civilians	3 killed
LeT	1993	March 12	Jammu & Kashmir	Ganderbal Village	Civilians	23 killed

13. Indicators and Warnings

Analysts should monitor a combination of **intent, capability, mobilisation, and operational activity indicators** to identify potential changes in the threat environment involving LeT. No single indicator should be treated as conclusive; rather, a significant change in several indicators occurring simultaneously may suggest increased operational intent or capability.

Key Indicators to Monitor

- **Increased propaganda and messaging:** A rise in the frequency, intensity, or geographic focus of propaganda, particularly content glorifying attacks, identifying new targets, issuing threats, or encouraging supporters to undertake violence. Changes in the language or themes used by affiliated media channels will also indicate shifts in LeT's organisational priorities.
- **Recruitment surge:** Increased recruitment activity through online platforms, religious networks, community contacts, or front organisations. Analysts should monitor changes in recruitment narratives, target demographics, geographic concentration, and attempts to attract individuals with specific technical or operational skills.
- **Movement into new provinces or areas:** Evidence that operatives, facilitators, or affiliated networks are becoming active outside established areas of operation. New activity in previously unaffected provinces can indicate efforts to establish logistical networks, recruitment pipelines, safe houses, or potential attack infrastructure.
- **Cross-border infiltration:** Reports of attempted or successful infiltration across the India–Pakistan international border and/or LoC, particularly when accompanied by unusual militant movement, communications activity, or security-force encounters. Increased infiltration attempts may indicate preparations to reinforce existing networks or initiate operations.
- **Weapons and explosives seizures:** Seizures of small arms, explosives, ammunition, communication equipment, or other operational matériel can provide indications of network activity. Analysts should assess the **quantity, type, origin, and location** of recovered equipment and whether multiple seizures form a broader geographic pattern.
- **Leadership statements:** Public statements, speeches, interviews, communiques, or messages from senior leaders and affiliated organisations should be monitored for changes in rhetoric, target selection, geographic references, or operational priorities. Explicit references to retaliation, specific locations, or emerging political developments may warrant increased scrutiny.
- **Target reconnaissance and surveillance:** Reports of suspicious surveillance, photography, mapping, or information-gathering around government facilities, security installations, transportation infrastructure, energy assets, religious sites, or other symbolic targets may indicate movement from ideological mobilisation toward operational preparation.

- **Changes in financing and logistics:** Unusual financial transfers, charitable-front activity, procurement patterns, or movement of personnel and matériel can indicate attempts to support an expanding network or prepare for operations.
- **Inter-group coordination:** Evidence of increased communication or cooperation between LeT-linked networks, TRF/ULC-linked actors, facilitators, or other militant organisations should be monitored for indications of resource sharing, recruitment, training, or operational coordination.

14. Risks to Businesses & Governments

Sector-wise Threat Assessment

Sector	Threat Level*	Key Risk Vectors & Precedents	Likely Impact Profile
Energy	Medium–High	Attacks on construction sites and civilian infrastructure in IaJK; historical targeting of “vital installations” in military installation; potential for IED/small-arms attacks on peripheral energy assets in conflict zones.	Localised disruption (power lines, fuel depots, construction crews); reputational and insurance cost escalation for projects in IaJK/north India.
Mining	Medium	LeT has attacked civilian work sites (e.g., 7 civilians killed at a construction site in Ganderbal); mining operations in or near IaJK could be hit as “economic” or “state-linked” targets.	Workforce casualties; project delays; heightened security costs in contested areas.
Aviation	Medium (elevated in India/South Asia)	Post-2025 Pahalgam attack, intelligence alerts claimed LeT operatives on commercial flights (Chennai–Colombo) and possible airport explosive plots; airports treated as high-value symbolic targets.	Flight disruptions, security scares, temporary airport closures; long-term cost increases for screening and perimeter security.
Shipping / Ports	Medium–High (maritime access)	26/11 attackers used sea route from Karachi, hijacked a fishing vessel, and infiltrated Mumbai undetected; maritime domain is a proven access corridor for LeT to strike commercial infrastructure.	Port security breaches; coastal city attacks via sea; insurance premium spikes for vessels calling at western Indian ports.
NGOs	Medium	LeT/TRF/ULC proxy campaigns target groups perceived as “state-aligned” in IaJK, NGOs working on governance, livelihoods, or human rights may be branded hostile.	Staff intimidation, access restrictions in Kashmir, kidnapping/extortion risk in high-risk districts.
Journalists	High (in J&K)	Issuance of online death threats against Kashmiri journalists, calling them “traitors” by LeT and its proxies; multiple journalists resigned/went into hiding after 2022 TRF/LeT threat lists.	Chilling effect on reporting; targeted killings/kidnappings in conflict zones; need for remote reporting and enhanced protective measures.

Sector	Threat Level*	Key Risk Vectors & Precedents	Likely Impact Profile
Foreign Workers	Medium–High	2008 Mumbai attacks intentionally targeted Westerners; 2025 Pahalgam attack killed 25 tourists (including a Nepalese national) and was claimed by TRF/LeT; foreigners are high-value propaganda targets.	Kidnapping/assassination risk in IaJK and major Indian cities; travel advisories; evacuation planning requirements for companies with expat staff.
Diplomatic Missions	Medium–High	LeT’s strategic logic favours high-profile symbolic strikes; India’s 2025 embassy drawdown in Islamabad followed the Pahalgam attack, underscoring diplomatic fallout from LeT-linked violence.	Attacks on consulates/embassies (direct or via proxies); heightened security posture; potential for retaliatory diplomatic expulsions and border closures.
Telecommunications	Medium	LeT/TRF use online platforms for threat campaigns; telecom towers and fibre nodes in J&K could be attacked as “state infrastructure”; communications are also critical for coordinating complex attacks.	Localised outages; targeted attacks on towers in conflict districts; increased regulatory/security scrutiny on telecom operators.

* Threat levels are indicative and reflect the risk profile described in the supplied material.

15. Future Outlook

LeT is expected to remain a resilient and be primarily focused in IaJK. Despite the disruption of major facilities during Operation Sindoor (May 2025), leadership arrests, financial sanctions, and sustained counter-terrorism pressure, LeT’s layered structure—spanning militant, charitable, educational, political, financial, and propaganda wings—provides sufficient institutional depth to preserve operational continuity through rebranding, decentralization, and proxy entities.

Near-Term (12–24 Months)

LeT is likely to prioritise **reconstitution over high-profile attacks**. The most probable pattern involves:

- Small infiltration teams and locally recruited cells in IaJK.
- Low- to medium-intensity attacks (IEDs, ambushes, targeted assassinations).
- Continued use of TRF/ULC and to project an indigenous Kashmiri identity while retaining Pakistan-based command and logistics.
- Digital fundraising, encrypted communications, and propaganda via platforms such as Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp.

A large-scale, centrally coordinated attack on the scale of the 2008 Mumbai operations remains possible but less likely in the immediate term due to heightened surveillance across India, the risk of severe military retaliation by Indian armed forces, and the disruption of fixed training infrastructure.

Medium-Term Adaptation

LeT is likely to evolve toward a **dispersed, hybrid operating model**, characterised by:

- Smaller, mobile training and safe-house networks across Punjab, PaJK, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and potentially Balochistan.
- Locally recruited or semi-autonomous cells in IaJK.
- Incremental use of commercial drones for cross-border delivery of drugs, weapons, narcotics, or communications equipment.
- Continued reliance on narco-financing, hawala networks, and diaspora donations.
- Front organizations and informal welfare networks to preserve community access and legitimacy.

Technological adaptation (e.g., AI-assisted content, encrypted platforms) is expected to remain support-oriented rather than indicative of advanced cyber or precision-strike capability.

Relationship with Pakistan

LeT's future remains closely tied to Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment. The group's capacity to rebuild depends on access to territory, training areas, financial channels, and protection from sustained domestic prosecution. Recent reporting continues to identify LeT among India-focused groups operating from Pakistani territory, suggesting that international pressure has not resulted in the complete dismantling of the relevant ecosystem.

The most likely pattern is **managed deniability**: LeT operates through TRF and other successor labels, enabling Pakistan to deny direct involvement while retaining influence over the operational network. Partial or episodic crackdowns may encourage further decentralization and rebranding rather than organizational collapse.

Escalation and Crisis Risk

The most serious strategic risk is that a LeT-linked operation could trigger a wider India–Pakistan military conflict. A mass-casualty attack against civilians, tourists, religious communities, diplomatic personnel, or major urban targets could generate intense domestic pressure in India for punitive action against Pakistan based militant groups. Given the precedent of cross-border responses and the stated linkages between TRF, LeT, and the 2025 Pahalgam attack, a future attack will likely produce a rapid escalation cycle involving air strikes, diplomatic retaliation, border closures, cyber activity, and heightened military alertness.

The risk of escalation will be greatest if an attack displays one or more of the following characteristics:

- High civilian casualties.
- Clear evidence of Pakistan-based planning or facilitation.
- Targeting of foreign nationals, religious pilgrims, tourists, or diplomatic personnel.
- Use of a novel infiltration route (maritime access, drones).

-
- Public claims by TRF or another proxy followed by evidence linking it to LeT.

Longer-Term Assessment

Over the longer term, LeT is unlikely to disappear unless there is a sustained transformation in Pakistan's policy toward India-focused militant groups. The organization can lose personnel, fixed infrastructure, and senior commanders, but its broader ecosystem can survive through successor entities, dispersed cadres, community networks, charitable fronts, and digitally mediated recruitment.

The most likely long-term outcome is a smaller but more adaptive LeT, operating as a networked system composed of:

- A central strategic leadership in Pakistan.
- Regional commanders and facilitation networks.
- LeT-linked proxies in IaJK.
- Local overground workers and recruited cells.
- Charitable and religious support structures.
- Digital propaganda and fundraising channels.
- Criminal and narco-financial facilitators.

This structure would make the group harder to dismantle but potentially less capable of mounting very large, centrally coordinated attacks. Its operational tempo may fluctuate according to the level of Indian counter-infiltration pressure, Pakistan's strategic calculations, the availability of recruits, and the broader India-Pakistan political environment.


Overall Assessment

LeT's future threat should be assessed as **high and persistent**, with the greatest risk concentrated in IaJK, northern India, and selected transport, maritime, diplomatic, tourism, religious, and economic sectors. The group's ability to conduct a repeat of the 2008 Mumbai attacks cannot be assumed to be imminent, but its demonstrated experience, support infrastructure, proxy relationships, and capacity for regeneration mean that a lower-signature attack campaign remains highly plausible.

The most probable outlook is:

- **High probability:** Organizational rebuilding, dispersed training, digital propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, and continued attempts at infiltration.
- **High probability:** Low- to medium-scale attacks in Jammu and Kashmir using small arms, IEDs, ambushes, assassinations, and locally supported cells.
- **Moderate probability:** Renewed attacks against tourists, minorities, economic assets, security forces, or symbolic civilian targets.

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- **Moderate probability:** Expanded use of drones, narco-financing, encrypted communications, and proxy organizations.
 - **Lower but severe-impact probability:** A complex, high-casualty attack outside Jammu and Kashmir, including a maritime, aviation, diplomatic, or major urban target.
 - **Low probability under current conditions:** The complete dismantling of LeT's organizational ecosystem without sustained Pakistani action against its leadership, support networks, front entities, and financial infrastructure.



LeT Operational Activity Heat Map

From the mountains of J&K to global networks — a persistent and adaptive threat.

KEY INSIGHTS



J&K – PRIMARY THEATRE

Highest operational activity and sustained focus, driven by infiltration, local networks and hybrid tactics.



PUNJAB – SECONDARY THEATRE

Used for recruitment, logistics and sleeper cells; periodic attacks and arrests reported.



MAJOR INDIAN CITIES

Targets include security forces, critical infrastructure and soft targets (tourists, civilians).




AFGHANISTAN

Training, facilitation and safe haven; links with other militant groups.



GLOBAL REACH

Support networks, fundraising and propaganda through diaspora and online platforms.



OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY LEVEL



KEY THEATRES



HIGH RISK ZONES

J&K, Punjab, major Indian cities, and cross-border areas remain the most active operational theatres.



EXPANDING REACH

Increasing use of proxy networks, online platforms and overseas support structures.



EVOLVING TACTICS

Adoption of hybrid warfare, cyber-enabled propaganda and emerging drone capabilities (early stage).



ONGOING THREAT


Continued state support, strong organisational resilience and adaptive strategies sustain the threat.

Note: Pinpoint locations, international boundaries, Line of Control and Line of Actual Control shown in this infographic are approximate and may differ slightly from their actual geographic positions. This map is intended for visual and illustrative purposes only and should not be considered an authoritative geographic or territorial representation.

Propaganda Posters of Let and its proxies:



” No political stooge/collaborator who stands alongside the occupational regime will be spared. Ajay Pandita Sarpanch was one of these political leeches who tarnish the image of JK. These are the main reason of occupational regimes stay on our land The JK. No one will be spared who is hand in glove with occupational regime and strengthen their illegal occupation. Innocents won't be touched so don't drag this with religion.






MIGRANT PANDITHS, THE SNAKES TO BE CRUSHED

06th August 2026

I have already warned about the sinister plans of these Migrant Pandiths. Those advocating their return to the valley must have tasted the poison these Migrant Pandiths are trying to inject. If they have not understood the sinister plans yet, they live in fools' land. This filthy scum Rakesh Jyotshi and others like him are snakes revealing their true colours now. We already knew how these morally corrupt Migrant Pandiths are, and we won't back down from targeting them wherever we find them. Our bullets will pierce their bodies no matter what, but it is also the responsibility of the local people to make their lives hell in the valley. Burn down their houses, destroy their crops—paddy or whatever their fields yield, provide their inputs wherever they are spotted. Whoever shields them will also be deemed as their accomplice and will be dealt with accordingly. We already have enough information about their whereabouts, so the execution plan will be launched at the right time soon.





Assalamu'Alaikum,

August 23rd, 2026

We have already warned Kashmiri Pandiths not to become scapegoats or act as pawns for this illegal regime, or else face the consequences. We also want to clarify that we are not against those Kashmiri Pandiths who stayed in the valley and did not fall for the false promises of the then Governor Jaghmohan. Those Pandiths are safe and nobody opposes them. However, all those Pandiths who migrated from the valley are hypocrites and traitors. They are targeted not because of their religion but because of their traitorous actions and conduct. Even now, they are playing into the hands of this illegal regime. These Migrant Pandiths are the white-collar terrorists working for their masters in Delhi. As already warned, wherever you are and wherever you go, we are watching your every move. We gave you time to reform, and this warning extends to those trying to implement the RSS agenda in IIOJK. Believe me, calamity doesn't visit suddenly, but strikes when it must, so be cautious and prepared.

- ***Sushant. Dina Nagar. Bantalab***
- ***Rohit. Bhawani Nagar***
- ***Sahil. L 7, Anand Nagar Talab Tallo***
- ***Sawan. Dina Nagar***
- ***Shikha H. No 166, Muthi***
- ***Ashwani. H. No 35. Bhoru Veh. No. JK02 CG 5168 Silver Color***

Soldier of Resistance

Media Coordinator

Ahmad Bilal



ULC



Assalamu'Alaikum,

September 5th, 2026

This is what we have been saying all along. These non-locals entered IIOJK as beggars, and now they are staging this drama. Is the proxy administration part of this protest drama just to accommodate them as residents of IIOJK? It is up to all IIOJK residents to eject these outsiders from IIOJK, otherwise their sinister plans to become residents will succeed.

These government-backed protests by these non-locals are nothing but a farce. Our position is clear against these outsiders who attempt to seize what does not belong to them. They will be targeted regardless of their gender or status. Don't start shedding crocodile tears when anyone among these filthy thieves gets shot. Local Kashmiris are deprived of their daily routines, especially vendors and daily wagers, but this illegal Indian proxy administration is determined to accommodate these outsiders. These protesting outsiders and their handlers won't escape the consequences of our bullets if they continue acting as Delhi's pawns. Their body bags will be sent to their native places.

Soldier of Resistance

Media Coordinator

Ahmad Bilal



ULC



Assalamu'Alaikum,

September 10th, 2026

Separate settlements for these white-collar terrorist Migrant Pandits are nothing but a premeditated plan to create a state within a state. It is an eye-wash scheme that the Indian hypocrite regime wants to project to the world and the Hindu majority of India, suggesting that Hindus in IIOJK aren't safe while living among ordinary Kashmiris, so separate settlements are necessary. But in reality, Indian mercenary security agencies will feel free to harass and brutalise ordinary Kashmiris without harming Hindus. This Israeli model of settlement scheme is merely the beginning of a sinister plan to settle non-locals illegally in such separate colonies. It's a long-standing, yet established, strategy to alter the demographic balance of IIOJK through population ratio and to issue domicile to non-locals under the guise of the Migrant Pandiths settlement scheme. Remember these MHA-backed protesters, Migrant Pandiths, who attempt to garner sympathy by acting as oppressed and fearful; they are, in fact, hypocrites who since 1990 have cleverly and silently damaged IIOJK and are directly involved in helping to brutalise innocent Kashmiris. They are the black sheep, using the victim card. Their time is up, and such acts won't safeguard them or serve as an excuse. As already mentioned, we possess their details, whereabouts, family connections, and daily activities. We can strike at them at will. We wish to give them some time to reflect and apologise to the IIOJK residents; otherwise, the MHA/Delhi won't be able to protect them. Even a crematorium would be turned upside down. Consider what is best for you, not what this hypocritical and aggressive Indian Delhi regime desires.

Soldier of Resistance

Media Coordinator

Ahmad Bilal



ULC



Assalamu'Alaikum,


September 11th, 2026

The so-called Israeli-style settlements have been handed over to 'White Collar Informers/Nabdis'. We have previously warned about such settlements, as they are in fact intended for anti-Kashmir activities. We are closely monitoring this situation and, in the coming days, will be exposing all these efforts to demonise IIOJK residents, especially Kashmiris. The victim card rhetoric has become outdated and is merely a tool used to fool human rights organisations. As already mentioned, these Migrant Pandits are being used as scapegoats, and they thrive on this role. Now you are caught between two stones, and it is up to you how you wish to escape. Our stance is crystal clear: no traitor who attempts to demonise IIOJK residents for petty gains will be spared. Bullets will find their mark on all such traitors, regardless of when that happens. We have detailed information, including residential and family details, down to the last minute. So celebrate while you still can, until the moment of mourning suddenly begins. When that happens, your so-called mentors will be powerless to protect you, even within your settlements.



Soldier of Resistance

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International Sanctions:

Jurisdiction or institution	Status	Relevant details
Australia	Listed terrorist organization	LeT is listed under Australia's counterterrorism laws.
Canada	Listed terrorist entity	LeT and associated names are subject to Canadian counterterrorism restrictions.
India	Proscribed terrorist organization	LeT is included in India's counterterrorism and anti-terror legal framework. LeT and TRF was designated under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
Israel	Proscribed terrorist organization	Listed as a terrorist organization under The Counter-Terrorism Law, 5776-2016 in November 2023.
Japan	Listed terrorist entity	Included in Japan's terrorist-asset-freezing and sanctions framework.
Pakistan	Banned or proscribed organization	LeT and associated entities have been subject to domestic bans and administrative restrictions, although implementation and enforcement have varied over time.
Russia	Proscribed terrorist organization	Listed as terrorist organization by Supreme Court in 2003.
Saudi Arabia	Terrorist Fundraising and Support Network	Law of Terrorism Crimes and Financing and the Royal Decree A/44
United Kingdom	Proscribed organization	LeT was proscribed in March 2001. Jama'at-ud-Dawa is treated as another name for the organization. In July 2026, the United Kingdom also treated TRF as another name for LeT.
United Nations Security Council	Listed entity	LeT is listed as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba under permanent reference QDe.118 in the

		ISIL/Al-Qaida sanctions framework. The measures include an assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo.
United States	Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist	LeT was designated as an FTO in 2001. US designations also cover relevant aliases and associated financial facilitators.


Abbreviations:

Abbreviation	Meaning
Al-Qaida	The Base
Ahl-e-Hadith	Salafi-oriented Islamic religious tradition
FICN	Fake Indian Currency Notes
FIF	Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
IKK	Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq
IS	Islamic State
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
IaJK	Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Dawa
LeT	Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
LoC	Line of Control
MDI	Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad
MML	Milli Muslim League
NIA	National Investigation Agency
PaK	Pakistan-administered Kashmir
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade
SDGT	Specially Designated Global Terrorist
TRF	The Resistance Front
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UAPA	Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
ULC	United Liberation Council

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