



Sir Syed Center

of
International Relations & Risk Analysis

THREAT ACTOR PROFILE: AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM FRONT

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1. Executive Summary

The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) is an armed resistance group formed in 2022 after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. It is led by General Yasin Zia, a former chief of the Afghan military, and has become one of the most active anti-Taliban groups, alongside the National Resistance Front (NRF). The AFF says it supports a representative government, equal rights and human dignity, and opposes the Taliban's system of rule. In its early years, the group mainly carried out smaller attacks against Taliban forces, particularly in Kabul and northern Afghanistan.

The group is structured on decentralized guerrilla cells that operate independently. This structure strengthens operational security and mobility but restricts AFF's working span in conventional military areas. It has limited manpower that conducts recurring attacks against Taliban security forces. The UN secretary has generally described AFF as 'the most active group' that primarily recruits former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). They rely on weapons that are suited for irregular combat. Training is carried out through training camps that are often dispersed and small rather than being fixed facilities. However, their actual revenue streams remain opaque to the public. But reports suggest that they rely on private financial support ranging from sympathizers to external donations.

2. Quick Facts

- Full Name - Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF)
- Leader – General Yasin Zia
- Primary Objective – Anti Taliban Resistance, overthrow Taliban rule and establish a political system free from extremism
- Areas of Operation – Panjshir, Baghlan, Kunduz, Badakhshan
- Recruitment Base - Former members of ANDSF, former army personnel, commandos, police officers, and intelligence officials.
- Weapons- Assault rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles launchers (group's own claims)
- Primary Targets – Taliban controlled checkpoints, military convoys, security installations
- Tactics – Guerilla warfare, hit-and-run operations, ambushes
- Media Presence - AFF maintains an active online presence, official website, X, Instagram, public statements, videos of attacks on Taliban forces.

3. Organizational Background

The AFF announced its formation on 11 March 2022, positioning itself as an armed opposition movement against Taliban rule. At the time of its establishment, the organization stated that its objective was to secure the “freedom of the country from the occupation” and oppose what it characterized as the “oppressive, illegitimate and tyrannical rule of the Taliban.”

The AFF is led by General Yasin Zia, a former senior official of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Since January 2024, the AFF has claimed responsibility for 78 operations, reporting 239 Taliban fatalities, including four commanders, and 147 wounded. These figures are based on the organization's own reporting and should therefore be treated as claims rather than independently verified casualty data. In 2024, the AFF also published its formal [political manifesto](#), representing an effort to expand its political positioning beyond that of a primarily reactive armed opposition group. The manifesto presents the AFF as a “progressive military-political organization” and emphasizes democratic governance, civil liberties, gender equality, and other values associated with a Western-oriented political framework. This political repositioning appears intended, in part, to strengthen the organization's domestic and international legitimacy.

According to the [UNICRI report](#), the AFF has conducted operations against the Taliban primarily in the provinces of Andarab, Takhar, Kunduz, and Badakhshan. A significant development in the organization's trajectory occurred during 2024–2025, as the AFF increasingly developed political and operational linkages with the NRF, while retaining its separate organizational identity. The National Mobilization Front, a smaller anti-Taliban resistance group that began operations in October 2023, recently called on its fighters to work closely with the AFF. In April 2024, the leaderships of the AFF and NRF convened their first joint meeting, marking a notable expansion of political coordination between the two opposition formations. The engagement indicated growing convergence among anti-Taliban actors while, at least formally, preserving the organizational autonomy of both groups.

3. Leadership Structure

The AFF is led by **General Yasin Zia**, a former senior Afghan military official who serves as the organisation's principal leader. Zia held several positions within the former Afghan government, including Chief of General Staff of the Afghan Armed Forces, and previously served within the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghanistan's former intelligence agency. The organization's personnel base consists predominantly of former members of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), providing the group with access to personnel possessing prior military, intelligence, and operational experience. Zia was also appointed Governor of Takhar following the Taliban's brief capture of Kunduz City in 2015.

Dawood Naji heads the AFF Political Committee, which is responsible for the organisation's political and external engagement functions.

A **military wing** composed of former ANDSF personnel organized into clandestine cells and commando-style units operating inside Afghanistan, particularly in urban centers and key provinces.

The AFF's broader leadership is organised through a **leadership council** comprising approximately 50 figures. Members of the council reportedly oversee a range of specialised committees covering political, diplomatic, cultural, and religious affairs.

4. Ideology & Objectives

AFF's ideological profile is set out most clearly in its 2024 manifesto, which articulates the movement around three pillars: resistance (against discrimination, extremism, and terrorism), struggle (for freedom and equality), and faith in the “freedom” of Afghanistan from what it alleges the Taliban's “dark and usurping rule.” Core principles include:

- i. Adherence to a moderate, tolerant interpretation of Islam and peaceful religious coexistence.
- ii. Commitment to overthrowing the Taliban Emirate and eliminating its presence from Afghan territory.
- iii. Establishment of a new social contract reflecting the aspirations of all ethnic groups and social strata, with emphasis on freedom, equality, and human dignity.

The manifesto promises future detailed documents on peace and reconciliation, state structure, economy and development, society and culture, transition arrangements, and foreign policy, but as of 2026 these have not been fully released. It also commits AFF to cooperate with all anti-Taliban movements without specifying a unified command, leaving room for tactical coordination with groups like the NRF while preserving organizational autonomy.

5. Geographic Footprint

The AFF reportedly maintains a nationwide, cell-based operational footprint, with its strongest and most sustained presence concentrated in northeastern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan province, while also conducting regular attacks in the east, north, and central regions, including the capital. Since 2024, Badakhshan has emerged as AFF's primary theatre of operations: the group has repeatedly targeted Taliban bases, border units, and security posts in districts such as Zebak (Zibak) and Faizabad, claiming large-scale clashes in July–August 2026 that killed dozens of Taliban fighters and temporarily overrun or pressured multiple outposts. AFF statements and independent reporting in 2026 describe Zebak as a front-line district where its commando units hold positions, repel Taliban assaults, and launch coordinated attacks using heavy weapons and rockets. During the July–September 2026 clashes in Zebak, AFF claimed not only ground attacks but also the downing of at least two Taliban drones, indicating access to and proficiency with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) or equivalent anti-drone capabilities, as well as some degree of logistical depth to sustain weeks-long fighting. These operations have at times temporarily overrun Taliban outposts and forced the movement to commit significant reinforcements, suggesting that in localized areas AFF can shift from hit-and-run raids to semi-conventional, positional warfare.

Beyond Badakhshan, AFF claims and media monitoring show operations across at least eight provinces in a single month (e.g., August 2026), including Baghlan, Kunduz, Panjshir, Nuristan, Kabul, Faryab, and Nangarhar, reflecting an effort to sustain pressure on multiple fronts rather than concentrate solely in the northeast. In the east, AFF has reported attacks in Nuristan (Waygal District) and Kunar, while in the north it has cited operations in Baghlan, Kunduz, and Faryab. In the central and southern belt, AFF has claimed attacks in Kabul (including missile strikes on the military airport and assaults on checkpoints and convoys), Kapisa, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Zabul, though these are generally smaller-scale guerrilla actions compared to its Badakhshan campaign. This pattern—intense, semi-conventional fighting in parts of Badakhshan combined with sporadic urban and rural attacks across the country—underscores AFF's strategy of a

decentralized, nationwide insurgency aimed at stretching Taliban security forces and demonstrating that anti-Taliban resistance remains active well beyond traditional strongholds like Panjshir.

6. Operational Capabilities

Personnel: Open-source reporting and AFF's own statements suggest a force structure built around a relatively small core of active fighters sustained by a wider network of facilitators, sympathizers, and political cadres. By early 2025, AFF claimed to have conducted operations in 31 provinces over three years, with 330 total operations resulting in over 800 Taliban killed and only 13 AFF fighters lost, implying a lean, selective deployment model rather than mass mobilization. Independent conflict trackers record AFF as responsible for dozens of incidents annually (e.g., 76 incidents in 2025), consistent with a force of low hundreds of active combatants inside Afghanistan at any given time, backed by a larger pool of trained ex-ANDSF personnel, logisticians, and political organizers operating from inside and outside the country. The group's human capital is distinctive: its cadre are predominantly veteran officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and commandos from the former ANDSF, many with combat experience against the Taliban, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and other insurgents between 2001 and 2021. This veteran network preserves institutional memory on intelligence, small-unit tactics, and urban operations, enabling AFF to regenerate cells even when individual networks are disrupted. Recruitment appears to favor young to middle-aged Afghan males, often with prior military or security service, motivated by nationalist and rights-based narratives rather than transnational jihadist ideology. There is no credible evidence that AFF relies on foreign fighters.

Weapons: AFF's arsenal is typical of a post-2021 Afghan insurgency: predominantly small arms and light weapons looted, purchased, or captured from Taliban depots and local markets. Reported and visually attested systems include AK-pattern rifles (AK-47/AKM/AK-74 variants), PKM and RPK machine guns, Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) -7 rocket launchers, mortars, and sniper rifles (including Dragunov-type SVDs), alongside pistols and light explosives for IEDs and ambushes. AFF has demonstrated the ability to employ rockets and mortars in attacks on fixed sites, including Taliban bases and, in 2026, Kabul's military airport, indicating access to indirect-fire munitions and basic fire-control skills. There is no confirmed open-source evidence that AFF possesses MANPADS, guided missiles, or other precision stand-off systems; its lethality derives mainly from small-unit infiltration, close-range ambushes, and targeted assassinations rather than long-range or high-technology strikes. Some AFF statements claim to have shot down Taliban drones in Badakhshan, suggesting at least limited access to small arms capable of engaging low-altitude UAVs, though this remains an incidental rather than systematic air-defense capability.

Training: AFF does not appear to operate large, fixed training camps comparable to conventional jihadist organizations. Instead, it relies on decentralized, cell-based instruction leveraging the professional background of its cadre. Training is best understood as on-the-job and mentorship-driven, with veteran officers and NCOs providing tactical coaching in weapons handling, reconnaissance, explosives, urban operations, and infiltration techniques within clandestine cells. The group's 2024 manifesto and public messaging emphasize ideological commitment to a "freedom" narrative and multi-ethnic inclusivity, but do not disclose formal curricula or camp locations, consistent with a security-conscious, dispersed model. Given

the Taliban's pressure on AFF, the latter likely conducts short, rotational training cycles in remote or mountainous areas (notably in the northeast) rather than maintaining permanent, large-scale facilities.

Combat experience: AFF's fighters bring substantial conventional and counter-insurgency experience from the 2001–2021 period, having served in the Afghan Army, Special Security Forces, NDS, and police in roles ranging from frontline combat to intelligence and special operations. This background underpins AFF's proficiency in reconnaissance, target selection, small-unit coordination, and media exploitation, as seen in repeated attacks on Taliban checkpoints, intelligence offices, convoys, and bases across multiple provinces. Since 2022, AFF has claimed hundreds of operations, including complex assaults in Kabul, sustained fighting in Badakhshan's Zebak District in 2026 (with claims of dozens of Taliban killed and multiple outposts seized), and periodic high-profile incidents such as rocket strikes on Kabul's military airport. While AFF has not executed mass-casualty urban offensive on the large scale, its operational record reflects a transition from conventional military service to guerrilla and asymmetric warfare, with growing confidence in coordinating multi-province attacks and holding ground temporarily in contested districts.

Cyber and information capability: AFF's cyber capability is best assessed as basic to moderate and primarily support-oriented, focused on information operations, propaganda, and digital mobilization rather than offensive cyber operations. The group maintains an active presence on platforms such as X (Twitter) and other social media, issuing statements, operational claims, and ideological content in multiple languages, particularly English, Dari, and Pashto, to sustain morale, attract recruits, and shape international perceptions. There is no public evidence of AFF conducting destructive cyberattacks, hacking critical infrastructure, or running sophisticated covert influence campaigns; its digital activities align with contemporary militant practices of using encrypted messaging and social media for recruitment, coordination, and narrative control, but do not indicate advanced persistent threat-level expertise.

7. Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES (TTPs) OF THE AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM FRONT (AFF)	
CORE TACTICS	
 Ambushes and Targeted Attacks	- Roadside and convoy ambushes against Taliban patrols, reinforcement columns and logistics movements (Badakhshan, Kunduz, Nangarhar and other provinces). - Use of choke points on mountain roads/valley approaches (e.g., routes into Zebak). - Small, well-armed teams with AK-pattern rifles, machine guns and RPGs; withdraw to pre-planned fallback positions. - Targeting of foreign Taliban fighters or commanders for psychological impact.
 Assaults on Fixed Positions	- Coordinated, multi-axis attacks on Taliban bases, border battalions and checkpoints (e.g., Zebak). - Reconnaissance of target layouts, guard routines and reinforcement routes. - Simultaneous or near-simultaneous assaults to split fire and complicate command and control. - Use of mortars and indirect fire, followed by close-quarters fighting. - Capture of weapons, ammunition, radios and supplies; hold temporarily or withdraw to defensible high ground.
 Defensive and Counter-Attack Operations	- Digging in on hilltops and ridgelines with interlocking fields of fire. - Localized counter-attacks from two or more directions after blunting Taliban advances. - Pre-emptive mortar and small-arms strikes when intelligence indicates imminent Taliban offensives.
 Urban and Near-Urban Operations	- Night attacks on checkpoints, intelligence offices and small bases (small arms, rockets or mortars). - Targeted killings of Taliban personnel (intelligence, security, local administrators) using pistols, rifles or IEDs; rapid dispersal into civilian populations. - Rocket and mortar strikes on symbolic/strategic sites (e.g., Kabul airport) to project capability and undermine Taliban claims.
TECHNIQUES AND ENABLING METHODS	
 Cell-based Structure and Operational Security	- Small, compartmentalized cells to limit exposure if a network is penetrated. - Limited cross-cell knowledge; most know only their immediate team and handler. - Use of safe houses, rural hideouts and mountain bases for staging, rest and storage. - Reliance on local sympathizers for logistics, intelligence and early warning.
 Use of Terrain	- Positioning in high ground overlooking roads and district centers. - Using seasonal mountain routes and passes (Tajik and Pakistani borders). - Operating in remote districts where Taliban reinforcement and air support are limited.
 Weapons Employment	- Small-arms fire discipline with high volume of fire at close range. - RPG and mortar use against buildings, vehicles and fortified positions. - Sniper and designated marksman fire on commanders, radio operators and drivers. - IEDs and improvised explosives for targeted killings and area denial (no large-scale suicide operations).
 Information Operations and Media Exploitation	- Rapidly publishing claims (photos/videos) on social media to claim responsibility, detail casualties and portray successes. - Framing attacks (e.g., in Zebak) as evidence of a “new phase” of open confrontation. - Use of multi-ethnic resistance and national liberation narratives to broaden appeal.
PROCEDURAL PATTERNS	
 Operational Cycle	- Target selection and reconnaissance – focus on checkpoints, bases, convoys or intel offices; repeated observation to map routines and vulnerabilities. - Planning and rehearsal – team briefings on roles, routes, signals and fallback plans; emphasis on surprise and speed. - Execution – coordinated assault or ambush using small arms, RPGs and sometimes mortars/rockets; maximize casualties and capture materiel. - Exploitation and withdrawal – seize weapons and documents; consolidate on captured terrain (Badakhshan) or withdraw along pre-planned routes. - Media follow-up – issue statements and visual material to claim responsibility and reinforce narrative.

8. Funding & Logistics

AFF is likely sustained through a combination of private contributions from supporters, personal resources of former officials and military personnel, and ad hoc assistance from anti-Taliban networks in Afghanistan and abroad. Its leadership's connections among former Afghan political, military, and diaspora circles may facilitate fundraising, media outreach, accommodation, and other non-combat support, but no credible open-source reporting establishes a formal, centralized diaspora-financing system run by AFF.

Afghan diaspora organizations more generally use donations, grants, membership fees, personal funds, sponsorship, loans, and fundraising campaigns for transnational engagement; such channels illustrate possible funding mechanisms available to Afghan networks but should not be treated as proof that AFF receives funds through each of them. Similarly, hawala networks, formal transfers, mobile-payment platforms, and crowdfunding mechanisms are widely used to move humanitarian diaspora contributions into Afghanistan, but direct AFF use of these systems has not been independently confirmed.

Besides, no credible reporting indicates that AFF finances its activities through illegal mining, control of mineral resources, drug trafficking, extortion, hawala, foreign sponsors, human trafficking, and kidnapping.

AFF's logistics model relies on small-unit self-sufficiency, local facilitation, concealment, and opportunistic resupply. The group is mainly composed of former ANDSF personnel and former officials, giving it access to professional networks familiar with Afghan military supply practices, local terrain, and security-force routines. These networks likely help AFF move personnel discreetly, identify safe houses, store weapons, acquire food and fuel, and obtain intelligence on Taliban deployments.

The movement's weapon and ammunition supply is assessed to depend on a mix of:

- Weapons retained by former security personnel after the fall of the republic.
- Arms and ammunition captured from Taliban units and outposts during attacks.
- Purchases through Afghanistan's extensive informal arms markets and local intermediaries.
- Small, dispersed caches concealed near operational areas.

This assessment is consistent with AFF's reported seizure of Taliban equipment—including weapons and communications devices—and its ability to field small arms, RPGs, mortars, and rockets during attacks. However, detailed supply chains, stockpile locations, suppliers, and cross-border procurement routes remain unverified in public reporting.

9. Recruitment & Propaganda

Recruitment

AFF's most important recruitment reservoir is likely the large pool of former ANDSF personnel—including former army officers, commandos, police personnel, and intelligence-linked cadres—who lost their positions after the Taliban takeover in August 2021. Its leadership under former Afghan army chief Yasin Zia, as well as its claimed reliance on professionalized former-security-force networks, gives the AFF access to recruits with pre-existing weapons familiarity, intelligence experience, local contacts, and combat exposure. AFF and the NRF assessed by the UK government to comprise former ANDSF members and ex-officials, operating principally in northeastern Afghanistan.

Recruitment is also likely facilitated through personal trust networks: former unit relationships, village-level contacts, kinship ties, former government employees, and local intermediaries. This is particularly important under Taliban surveillance, where open enlistment, public training sites, and large recruitment gatherings would create immediate security risks. AFF therefore appears to prioritize recruits who are known to existing members, can operate discreetly, and possess either prior military experience or reliable local knowledge.

The group's public recruitment appeal is directed more broadly at Afghans disaffected by Taliban governance, especially those motivated by political exclusion, restrictions on women and civic freedoms, economic hardship, ethnic discrimination, or anger over Taliban security practices. In April 2024, Zia publicly urged Afghans to rally behind the resistance and argued that potential supporters should join sooner rather than later; he portrayed armed resistance as the only viable course against the Taliban. AFF has also framed recruitment as part of a broader national effort, calling on anti-Taliban groups to overcome factional differences and unite around ending Taliban rule, restoring popular sovereignty, protecting territorial integrity, and safeguarding the rights of women and all communities.

Unlike jihadist organizations, AFF does not appear to recruit around religious extremism, global jihad, or foreign-fighter mobilization. Its declared ideological appeal is instead Afghan nationalist, republican, multi-ethnic, and rights-based, portraying the movement as a vehicle for restoring a representative political order. The group's 2024 manifesto identifies AFF as a "progressive military-political organization" and calls for a new social contract based on freedom, equality, and human dignity. There is no credible public evidence of a significant foreign-recruitment pipeline or systematic recruitment of foreign fighters.

Propaganda and Strategic messaging

AFF's propaganda serves four interrelated objectives: to claim operational success, counter Taliban narratives of nationwide security and control, encourage recruitment and local support, and promote unity among disparate anti-Taliban political and armed actors. The group uses statements, speeches, social-media posts, videos, photographs, casualty claims, commemorative events, and media interviews to publicize attacks and construct a narrative of a resilient nationwide resistance. Its communications commonly emphasize that Taliban claims of stability are false and that organized opposition remains active inside Afghanistan.

Operational messaging is particularly important following attacks or clashes. AFF publicizes engagements in places such as Badakhshan and Kabul to portray tactical incidents as evidence of broader strategic momentum. In August 2026, Zia used fighting in Zebak District to argue that armed resistance remained organized and operational despite Taliban assertions of complete control. Such messaging has a psychological purpose: it aims to reassure supporters, signal capability to prospective recruits, raise the perceived costs of Taliban rule, and encourage other anti-Taliban elements to coordinate.

The group also uses commemorative propaganda to reinforce cohesion and institutional memory. In April 2024, AFF convened a virtual event marking the deaths of commanders and fighters killed in a Taliban raid in Salang in 2023. Zia used the event to honour sacrifices, validate continued armed struggle, and call for solidarity among all forces opposed to the Taliban. This combines martyr commemoration with political mobilization, although AFF's framing is nationalist and anti-authoritarian rather than based on a transnational jihadist doctrine.

AFF's political narrative deliberately highlights multi-ethnic unity, human rights, women's rights, democracy, and national sovereignty. In 2026, the organization stated that it was prepared to cooperate with political parties, civil-society organizations, women's groups, and democratic movements that support freedom and human rights. Its leaders have also supported the formation of a common anti-Taliban platform linking armed, political, and civil actors. This broad coalition messaging is intended to prevent the resistance from appearing as a narrow regional, ethnic, or military project.

The AFF maintains an active online presence through its official website and social media platforms, which it uses as key channels for strategic communication and information dissemination. The group regularly publishes statements, photographs, and video footage purportedly documenting clashes with Taliban forces, often providing details regarding the location and province in which alleged operations occurred. These platforms are also used to claim responsibility for attacks and publicise the group's operational activities, thereby supporting its broader messaging and outreach efforts. AFF maintains a presence on [X \(formerly Twitter\)](#), [Instagram](#), and its [dedicated website](#), providing a centralised platform for disseminating its statements and media content.

10. External Relationships

AFF's most consequential external relationship is with the **National Resistance Front (NRF)**, led by Ahmad Massoud. Both groups oppose Taliban rule, draw in part on former republican-era military and political networks, and have publicly promoted greater coordination among armed, political, and civil opponents of the Taliban. They remain organizationally separate: AFF is led by Yasin Zia and has a distinct political-military identity, while NRF retains its own leadership, external-relations apparatus, and historical association with the Massoud network. There is no verified evidence of a unified AFF-NRF command structure, merged armed wing, or integrated national military headquarters.

Their relationship has nevertheless become more visibly cooperative. In April 2024, Yasin Zia and Ahmad Massoud jointly highlighted unity and continued resistance against the Taliban, while Zia urged broader anti-Taliban coordination. Both leaders also attended the February 2025 Vienna conference, alongside Afghan political leaders, women's-rights activists, and civil-society representatives, indicating a shared interest in building a broader opposition platform rather than limiting the resistance to armed activity alone. In September 2026, AFF and NRF again called for a common platform encompassing political, civil, and armed groups opposed to Taliban rule.

The AFF has operational relevance in northeastern Afghanistan, including Badakhshan, near Tajikistan and Pakistan, but proximity to a border does not establish external sponsorship or cross-border logistical access. Tajikistan has historically been more critical of the Taliban than several other Central Asian governments and has offered shelter to anti-Taliban Afghan figures, partly because of its political and ethnic links with Afghan Tajiks. Separately, Taliban has sheltered and even reportedly embedded members of Jammāt Ansarullah, a Tajik Islamist militant group opposed to Dushanbe, in its ranks. Weeks after seizing power, the Taliban deployed Ansarullah fighters to the Tajik border. Further, some Tajik militants residing in Afghanistan are allegedly members of the ISKP, a rival of the Taliban that recently claimed to have launched a rocket attack from Hojagor District of Takhar province towards Panj district in Tajikistan in May 2022. This hostile environment between Dushanbe and Kabul likely provide Afghan resistance figures political space and potential informal networks, but there is no reliable public evidence that Dushanbe directly arms, trains, or operationally directs AFF.

11. Attacks Timeline¹

Year	Month/Date	Province	Target Type	Target Category	Causalities
2026	September 16	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Officials	2 killed, 2 injured
2026	September 12	Ghor	Provincial police headquarters	Taliban security police commanders and religious police	3 killed, 3 injured
2026	September 9	Kapisa	Taliban outpost	Taliban officials	3 killed, 2 injured
2026	September 8	Kunar	Former Afghan National Army battalion base	Taliban forces	1 killed, 1 injured
2026	August 28	Ghazni	Taliban commander of Ghazni province	Mullah Omar Sediq, deputy commander of Unit 06	1 killed

¹ The attacks listed above are those claimed by the AFF and could not be independently verified. The inclusion of these incidents does not constitute confirmation of the claims.

2026	August 28	Badakhshan	Taliban positions	Taliban forces	Exact number unknown; killed and injured reported
2026	August 26	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban forces, foreign militants	3 killed, 2 injured
2026	August 26	Kunar	Highway Checkpoint	Taliban forces	1 killed, 2 injured
2026	August 25	Badakhshan	AFF stronghold	Taliban reinforcement units	10 killed, 6 injured
2026	August 21	Nangarhar	Ambush	Taliban local commanders	1 killed, 2 injured
2026	August 20	Baghlan	Patrol	Taliban forces	Heavy casualties, number unknown
2026	August 19	Badakhshan	Governor's office and security post	Taliban forces	4 killed, 5 injured
2026	August 16	Badakhshan	Taliban positions	Taliban forces	6 killed, 8 injured
2026	August 15	Badakhshan	Ranger vehicle	Taliban forces	Unknown
2026	August 14	Badakhshan	Taliban positions	Taliban forces	Heavy casualties, number unknown
2026	August 11	Panjshir	Ranger vehicle	Taliban forces	1 killed, 2 injured
2026	August 8	Nuristan	Taliban outpost	Taliban forces	2 killed, 4 injured
2026	August 7	Faryab	Taliban intelligence officers	Taliban intelligence personnel	2 killed
2026	August 6	Nangarhar	PD6 Intelligence Headquarters	Taliban intelligence personnel	2 killed, 1 injured
2026	August 6	Kabul	Military airfield / facilities	Taliban forces	Unknown
2026	August 5	Kunduz	Kunduz Airfield	Taliban reinforcement units	Unknown

2026	August 4	Badakhshan	Route to Zebak District	Foreign fighters allied with Taliban	2 killed, 3 injured
2026	July 30	Kunduz	Military airport	Taliban forces	Unknown; significant casualties reported
2026	July 25	Baghlan	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban forces	Unknown, casualties reported
2026	July 25	Baghlan	Taliban Convoy	Taliban reinforcements	7 killed, 6 injured
2026	July 23	Badakhshan	Taliban bases, units	Taliban forces	At least 21 killed, 37 injured. 1 AFF fighter killed
2026	June 28	Takhar	District Police Headquarters	Taliban forces	3 killed
2026	June 28	Badakhshan	District Headquarters	Taliban forces	Unknown, casualties reported
2026	June 24	Nangarhar	Highway Checkpoint	Taliban forces	3 killed, 2 injured
2026	June 24	Laghman	Taliban base	Taliban fighters	Unknown, casualties reported
2026	June 23	Nuristan	District Headquarters	Taliban forces	Unknown; significant casualties reported
2026	June 12	Herat	Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice headquarters	Taliban forces	3 killed, 2 injured
2026	May 20	Kabul	Military airfield / facilities	Taliban forces	Unknown
2026	May 1	Logar	Provincial headquarters	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2026	April 19	Logar	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured

2026	April 12	Baghlan	Checkpoint near district administration building	Taliban Forces	4 killed, 2 injured
2026	April 11	Kabul	Ranger Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2026	April 1	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	3 killed, 2 injured
2026	March 26	Badakhshan	Taliban Watchtower	Taliban Forces	4 killed, 3 injured
2026	March 26	Kunduz	Ranger Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 Injured
2026	February 16	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed 2 injured
2026	February 15	Kunduz	Taliban Convoy	Taliban forces	2 killed 1 injured
2026	February 13	Badakhshan	Taliban Brigade	Taliban forces	2 killed 1 injured
2026	February 11	Takhar	Taliban gathering	Taliban forces	2 killed 2 injured
2026	February 5	Parwan	Taliban recruitment centre	Taliban forces	2 killed 2 injured
2026	February 5	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban forces	2 killed 3 injured
2026	January 26	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed 2 wounded
2026	January 7	Kabul	Police Headquarters	Taliban forces	2 killed
2026	January 1	Faryab	Court building	Taliban forces	4 killed 2 injured
2025	December 23	Kabul	Taliban Vehicle	Taliban Intelligence Officials	3 killed 1 injured
2025	December 17	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban forces	2 killed 1 injured
2025	December 16	Faryab province	Taliban base	Taliban forces	2 killed 1 injured
2025	December 13	Badakhshan	Reserve unit	Taliban forces	3 killed 1 injured
2025	December 12	Kunduz	Taliban recruitment centre	Taliban forces	3 killed 3 injured
2025	November 30	Faryab Province	Taliban department	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	November 29	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Officials	2 killed 1 injured

2025	November 29	Badakhshan	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Officials	3 killed 2 injured
2025	October 23	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	1 killed, 1 injured
2025	October 22	Kandahar	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	October 20	Kabul	Taliban Vehicle	Taliban Forces	3 killed
2025	October 18	Kabul	Taliban Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	October 16	Kabul	Taliban Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	October 15	Kunduz	Taliban Commander	Qari Khalid	1 killed
2025	October 12	Kunduz	Taliban Group	Taliban Forces	1 killed, 1 injured
2025	October 8	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	September 25	Takhar	Taliban Compound	Taliban Forces	2 killed
2025	September 14	Takhar	Taliban intelligence office	Taliban Forces	2 injured
2025	September 7	Takhar	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed
2025	August 29	Kunduz	Taliban Base	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	August 27	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	August 23	Takhar	Taliban Outpost	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	August 15	Takhar	Taliban Headquarters	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	August 4	Takhar	Border Commander's outpost	Taliban Forces	1 killed, 1 injured
2025	July 31	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoints	Taliban forces	3 killed, 2 injured
2025	July 25	Takhar	Headquarters of Mullah Mahmood	Taliban Forces	1 killed, 1 injured
2025	July 21	Kunduz	Headquarters of Mullah Najib Ghafouri, the head of the Taliban's Department for the (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice)	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	July 16	Faryab	Taliban Ranger Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured

2025	July 16	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	June 14	Takhar	Taliban Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed
2025	May 30	Kabul	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	3 Killed, 2 Injured
2025	May 13	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	May 9	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 Killed, 1 injured
2025	April 30	Faryab	Taliban Outpost	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	April 24	Takhar	Department of Counter Criminal	Taliban Forces	1 Killed, 2 injured
2025	April 23	Baghlan	Taliban Outpost	Taliban Forces	3 killed, 2 injured
2025	April 23	Baghlan	Taliban Ranger Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	April 22	Kunduz	Taliban Ranger Vehicle	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	April 9	Takhar	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed 2, injured
2025	April 9	Balkh	Religious Shrine	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 3 injured
2025	April 7	Balkh	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 1 injured
2025	April 6	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	1 Killed, 3 injured
2025	February 27	Kunduz	Taliban Convoy	Taliban Special Forces	4 Killed, 2 Injured
2025	February 22	Bagram	Taliban Base	Taliban Forces	3 killed, 2 injured
2025	February 19	Balkh	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 2 injured
2025	February 18	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	3 Killed, 2 Injured
2025	July 9	Baghlan	Taliban Military Centre	Taliban Forces	3 killed, 2 injured
2025	February 17	Takhar	Head of Intelligence Operations	Qari Rahimulla	1 Killed, 1 Injured
2025	February 17	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 killed, 3 injured
2025	February 15	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 Killed, 2 injured
2025	February 15	Takhar	PD1 Headquarters	Taliban Forces	4 killed, 2 injured

2025	June 13	Kunduz	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban forces	2 killed 2 injured
2025	February 14	Badghis	District Headquarters	Taliban Members	3 Killed, 2 Injured
2025	February 8	Herat	Taliban checkpoint	Taliban Forces	2 Killed, 2 Injured
2025	February 8	Takhar	Taliban Convoy	Taliban Intelligence Officials	3 killed, 2 injured
2025	February 1	Takhar	Police Headquarters	Taliban Forces	5 Killed, 3 Injured
2025	January 29	Pol-e-Sayad	Military Base	Taliban Forces	3 Killed, 3 Injured
2025	January 29	Kunduz	Police District (PD) 1 Headquarters	Talian Forces	4 Killed, 3 injured
2025	January 22	Herat	Taliban Checkpoint	Taliban Forces	3 killed, 2 Injured
2025	January 18	Baghlan	Taliban Convoy	Taliban Intelligence Officials	4 killed, 2 Injured
2025	January 5	Herat	Taliban Convoy	Taliban Officials	3 killed, 2 injured

12. Indicators and Warnings

Analysts should monitor a combination of intent, force generation, geographic expansion, logistical resilience, and operational activity to identify material changes in the threat environment associated with the AFF. No single indicator should be treated as conclusive: AFF's public claims are often difficult to independently verify, and the group's decentralized structure can produce episodic spikes in activity. A sustained change across several indicators—such as increased recruitment, more frequent multi-province attacks, weapons captures, improved inter-group coordination, and persistent activity in a new area—would provide a stronger indication of growing operational capability or strategic intent. Recent reporting already points to an elevated operating tempo: a UN report cited 88 anti-Taliban attacks across 21 provinces, while AFF claimed 21 operations across eight provinces between 23 July and 22 August 2026.

Key indicators to monitor:

Increased propaganda and strategic messaging: Monitor increases in the volume, sophistication, and geographic specificity of AFF statements, videos, casualty claims, communiques, speeches, and social-media activity. Particular attention should be given to messaging that shifts from general resistance rhetoric toward explicit threats, naming of Taliban officials or facilities, claims of imminent retaliation, declarations of a “new phase” in the war, or calls for civilians and former security personnel to support operations. Messaging that

systematically features newly active provinces may indicate an effort to establish local recruitment, facilitation, or attack networks. AFF has used public communications to portray fighting in Badakhshan as evidence of a widening armed resistance.

Recruitment and mobilization surge: Watch for signs that AFF is expanding beyond its core base of former ANDSF personnel, including increased outreach to former police, intelligence, and commando personnel, local armed networks, youth, and communities affected by Taliban repression. Useful signals include reports of ex-security personnel disappearing from Taliban-monitored areas, increased movement toward remote districts, new local commanders appearing in AFF media, or growth in the group's ability to rotate fighters during sustained clashes. In Badakhshan, Taliban arrests have reportedly focused heavily on former republic-era security personnel, suggesting that the authorities perceive this demographic as a significant resistance recruitment and support pool.

Expansion into new provinces or districts: Track AFF activity outside its established northeastern operating areas, especially the emergence of repeated incidents in provinces where the group has previously had little or no verified presence. A single claim is insufficient; more significant signals would include a pattern of attacks, local propaganda dissemination, weapons seizures, arrests of alleged facilitators, or reports of safe-house networks in the same district. AFF's claimed activity across Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Faryab, Nuristan, and Panjshir during July–August 2026 should be assessed for repetition and independent corroboration. Its reported first guerrilla operation in Ghazni in August 2026 is also a potential marker of geographic expansion, if followed by additional incidents, local recruitment, or sustained AFF messaging in the province.

Shift from hit-and-run attacks to positional combat: Monitor evidence that AFF is moving from short-duration ambushes and checkpoint attacks toward more sustained operations against district centers, border battalions, bases, or reinforcement routes. Indicators include simultaneous attacks from several directions, mortar or rocket preparation fires, temporary seizure of outposts, defensive holding of ridgelines, repeated counterattacks, or attempts to interdict Taliban access routes. In Zebak District, AFF claimed to have attacked Taliban positions, captured weapons and equipment, and engaged in extended clashes; a recurrence of such operations would indicate improved local coordination, ammunition availability, and command-and-control capacity.

Weapons, ammunition, and equipment capture: Seizures of rifles, machine guns, RPGs, mortars, ammunition, radios, vehicles, drones, night-vision equipment, or other material should be assessed for quantity, technical sophistication, location, and recurrence. Repeated captures from Taliban outposts can create a self-reinforcing capability cycle: successful attacks generate weapons and ammunition that enable further operations. Reports from Zebak indicated that AFF fighters captured ammunition, light and heavy weapons, and other military equipment from Taliban positions. Analysts should distinguish between isolated battlefield captures and evidence that AFF is establishing durable stockpiles, repair capacity, or distribution networks.

Taliban countermeasures and security posture: Changes in Taliban deployments can provide indirect warning of AFF growth. Relevant indicators include reinforcement of district centers, new checkpoints, increased patrols, road closures, expanded intelligence operations, collective punishments, communications restrictions, curfews, or the transfer of specialized units to contested areas. In September, sources reported

that the Taliban had established a drone operations centre near Faizabad amid rising opposition attacks and armed clashes in Badakhshan. Such measures likely indicate that Taliban administration assess AFF activity as persistent enough to require enhanced surveillance and targeting capabilities.

Leadership statements and command visibility: Monitor statements by General Yasin Zia, Daoud Naji, local commanders, and AFF political representatives for changes in strategic language, target prioritization, and geographic emphasis. Explicit references to retaliation, the capture or defense of specific locations, attacks against intelligence organs, or calls for coordinated national action warrant closer scrutiny. Increased appearances of local commanders, the announcement of new units, publication of organizational directives, or claims of coordination with other armed groups can signal a more developed command structure and greater confidence in operational security.

Local intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activity: Reports of individuals observing Taliban bases, photographing checkpoints, mapping roads, tracking convoy timings, seeking information about commanders, or monitoring patrol patterns can indicate early-stage AFF operational preparation. In urban settings, this may appear as suspicious activity around intelligence offices, police installations, military airfields, transport nodes, or Taliban administrative sites. In remote terrain, warning signs can include scouting of mountain passes, movement along valley approaches, establishment of observation positions, and renewed activity near routes used to reinforce isolated outposts.

Logistics and facilitation indicators: Monitor movements of small arms, ammunition, fuel, medical supplies, food, communications equipment, and personnel between sympathetic communities and contested districts. Other indicators include new safe houses, concealed weapons caches, procurement of motorcycles or four-wheel-drive vehicles, unusual travel by ex-security personnel, temporary displacement of families connected to suspected fighters, or heightened use of informal remittance channels. Because AFF appears to depend heavily on localized, low-signature support, dispersed small indicators may be more informative than a single large shipment.

Inter-group coordination: Watch for evidence of formal or informal coordination between AFF, the NRF, United Front of Afghanistan (UFA), Sepah-e Mihan Front and other anti-Taliban armed or political formations. Relevant indicators include joint statements, shared commemorations, common political platforms, synchronized attacks, cross-endorsed commanders, resource sharing, mutual logistics, or coordinated messaging tied to a common campaign. Although unity efforts and occasional joint rhetoric have increased, reporting indicates that a unified operational command remains absent. The establishment of a joint planning body, shared intelligence channels, coordinated regional tasking, or joint control of terrain would represent a more consequential escalation than rhetorical unity alone.

13. Risks to Businesses & Governments

Sector-wise Threat Assessment

Sector	Threat Level*	Key Risk Vectors & Precedents	Likely Impact Profile
Energy	Low–Medium	AFF has primarily targeted Taliban checkpoints, convoys, bases, and military equipment rather than energy facilities. However, power infrastructure, fuel stores, generators, or construction projects near Taliban facilities could be exposed to collateral effects from ambushes, rocket fire, or security sweeps. UN reporting has verified sporadic rocket, grenade, and shooting attacks on de facto authority checkpoints and convoys.	Localized project delays; route closures; damage risk to peripheral assets near security targets; increased guard, insurance, and contingency costs in contested districts.
Mining	Medium in Badakhshan; Low elsewhere	Mining operations in Badakhshan is anticipated to face elevated indirect risk because the province has experienced recurrent AFF–Taliban clashes and heightened Taliban security measures. Assets or contractors perceived as supporting Taliban authorities, local commanders, or Taliban-linked commercial interests could face greater scrutiny or disruption, although direct AFF targeting of mines is not publicly established.	Suspension of field work; restricted access to sites; staff movement constraints; local-community tensions; heightened security expenditure and supply-chain disruption.
Aviation	Medium for military-linked facilities; Low for civil aviation	AFF has reportedly claimed rocket and missile attacks on the military section of Kabul airport and other Taliban-controlled military airfield facilities, reflecting its interest in symbolic and military aviation targets. Available reporting does not show an AFF campaign against civilian aircraft, passengers, or commercial airport terminals.	Short-duration airspace or airport-security disruption; perimeter alerts; delays or temporary restrictions at facilities sharing space with military infrastructure; heightened screening and force-protection measures.
Transport and logistics	Medium	Taliban convoys, checkpoints, and reinforcement routes are central AFF targets. Commercial road traffic is most exposed when operating near such targets, particularly on routes through Badakhshan or areas experiencing raids, ambushes, counterattacks, and Taliban cordon-and-search operations.	Delays, detours, road closures, cargo interruption, vehicle damage from collateral fire, driver exposure, and higher reliance on flexible routing and real-time security reporting.
NGOs	Medium in contested locations	AFF has not established a pattern of deliberately attacking NGOs or aid personnel. Nevertheless, humanitarian operations can be disrupted by clashes, Taliban suspicion of local staff, road insecurity, and the risk that neutral organizations are perceived—rightly or wrongly—as connected	Access restrictions; delayed aid delivery; staff questioning or detention; evacuation or hibernation measures; need for strict neutrality messaging and location-specific security protocols.

Sector	Threat Level*	Key Risk Vectors & Precedents	Likely Impact Profile
		to Taliban authorities, foreign governments, or rival networks. The broad rise in security incidents across Afghanistan increases contextual risk.	
Journalists	Medium	AFF uses public claims, videos, and operational statements to shape perceptions, so journalists reporting on its activities may face competing pressure from the Taliban, resistance actors, and local communities. The principal risk is less likely to be direct AFF targeting than coercion, surveillance, restricted access, or retaliation by Taliban authorities following reporting on resistance activity.	Reduced reporting access; source-protection challenges; harassment or detention risks; need for remote verification, digital security, and strong editorial safety procedures.
Foreign Workers	Low–Medium	AFF has not demonstrated a pattern of targeting foreign workers, expatriates, or Western nationals. However, foreign personnel near Taliban military sites, airfields, official compounds, or infrastructure projects can be exposed to collateral harm, misidentification, movement constraints, or heightened political sensitivity after attacks.	Travel restrictions; project suspension; increased demand for secure accommodation and movement protocols; crisis-management and medical-evacuation planning requirements.
Diplomatic Missions	Medium	AFF's demonstrated target set is principally Taliban security and state structures, and it has shown willingness to strike symbolic military facilities in Kabul. Diplomatic premises are not established AFF targets, but embassies, UN facilities, and international compounds could face elevated precautionary measures or collateral exposure during increased urban attack activity.	Enhanced perimeter security; movement limits for diplomatic staff; security alerts and temporary closure of public-facing services; increased evacuation and contingency planning.
Telecommunications	Low–Medium	Telecommunications towers, fibre routes, and communications facilities are not confirmed AFF priority targets. The main exposure comes from proximity to Taliban security sites and from state-imposed communications restrictions, surveillance activity, or localized outages during counterinsurgency operations. AFF's own communications activity depends primarily on messaging and social-media dissemination, not infrastructure sabotage.	Localized service disruption; increased official scrutiny of telecommunications providers; requests for data access; disruption to business continuity and field-team communications.
Taliban institutions	High	This is AFF's core target category. Verified and claimed incidents include shootings, hand-grenade attacks, ambushes, rocket fire, and assaults against Taliban checkpoints, convoys, intelligence facilities, bases, defensive positions, and military airfields.	Personnel casualties; loss or temporary seizure of outposts and equipment; diversion of security resources; intensified detention campaigns and counterinsurgency operations; reputational damage to Taliban claims of nationwide control.

Sector	Threat Level*	Key Risk Vectors & Precedents	Likely Impact Profile
Government contractors and Taliban-linked businesses	Medium	Contractors supplying Taliban forces, constructing facilities for Taliban administration, providing transport to security units, or operating near military infrastructure face higher exposure than ordinary commercial entities. AFF's attacks on convoys, posts, and military facilities can also create an incentive to target visible enablers if its campaign intensifies, though this is not yet a demonstrated systematic pattern.	Contract disruption; asset seizure or damage; reputational and compliance exposure; higher security costs; elevated risk during delivery, construction, and site-access phases.

* Threat levels are indicative and reflect the risk profile described in the supplied material.

For commercial businesses, the appropriate posture is risk mitigation rather than AFF-specific threat alarm. Priority measures include route and site mapping against Taliban security infrastructure, avoidance of travel during reinforcement movements or post-attack security sweeps, robust communications redundancy, local-context monitoring; workforce accountability protocols, and contingency arrangements for temporary evacuation.

14. Future Outlook

AFF is likely to remain a resilient but militarily constrained anti-Taliban militant group, with its most credible operational presence in northeastern Afghanistan—especially Badakhshan—and a continuing ability to conduct smaller attacks in Kabul and selected northern, eastern, and central provinces. Its former ANDSF cadre, cell-based organization, access to local facilitators, and political links to the Afghan diaspora give it meaningful regenerative capacity. However, AFF lacks verified external state sponsorship, secure rear-area infrastructure, heavy weapons, major territorial control, or a unified national opposition command. These limitations make it unlikely to pose an immediate existential challenge to Taliban control of Afghanistan. The UN's recent assessments similarly conclude that anti-Taliban groups remain fragmented and do not significantly challenge Taliban territorial control, despite a rising tempo of attacks.¹

Near-term: 12–24 months

AFF is most likely to prioritize survival, localized force consolidation, recruitment of former security personnel, and sustained guerrilla visibility rather than attempt a nationwide conventional offensive. The probable operational pattern includes:

- Small, compartmentalized guerrilla cells operating in Badakhshan, Panjshir, Parwan, Kabul, and other areas where former republican networks and local support exist.
- Low- to medium-intensity attacks against Taliban checkpoints, patrols, convoys, intelligence personnel, administrative facilities, and isolated military positions.

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- Continued use of ambushes, shootings, grenade or rocket attacks, raids, and brief attacks on outposts, with withdrawal before Taliban reinforcements can concentrate.
 - Persistent efforts to capture arms, ammunition, communications equipment, and supplies from Taliban positions in order to offset constrained external resupply.
 - Greater emphasis on Badakhshan—particularly remote border and mountain districts such as Zebak—where terrain can support concealment, localized positional combat, and temporary disruption of Taliban control. AFF claimed 21 attacks across eight provinces between July 23 and 22 August 22, but identified Zebak as its principal focus.
 - Continued online operational claims, videos, political messaging, and appeals for anti-Taliban unity in order to preserve morale and demonstrate that Taliban administration remains contested.

A sustained, nationwide uprising or successful campaign to seize and govern provincial centers remains unlikely in the near term. AFF will likely periodically overrun checkpoints or briefly hold isolated facilities, but it is unlikely to retain them against concentrated Taliban countermeasures. UN reporting in 2026 recorded attacks by armed opposition groups across many provinces, but claimed that such activity had not materially eroded Taliban control of national territory.

Medium-term adaptation

Over the medium term, AFF is likely to develop a more dispersed hybrid insurgent-political model, combining armed cells inside Afghanistan with external political engagement and diaspora-based messaging. This adaptation is likely to include:

- More flexible, mobile operational cells rather than fixed camps or large permanent formations.
- Localized recruitment from former ANDSF personnel, former government employees, disaffected Taliban members, and communities affected by abusive security operations or local political grievances.
- Increased use of safe houses, temporary weapons caches, local guides, mountain routes, and informal logistics networks in the northeast.
- Selective use of rockets, mortars, RPGs, sniper fire, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), although there is no indication that AFF will acquire a mature precision-strike, air-defense, or drone warfare capability in the foreseeable future.
- Greater reliance on encrypted communications, open-source intelligence, online propaganda, and rapid publication of claims and videos after attacks.
- Expanded political outreach to Afghan diaspora communities, women's-rights activists, civil-society groups, and anti-Taliban political platforms abroad.
- Continued efforts to frame itself as a national, multi-ethnic alternative to Taliban rule rather than a narrowly regional or ethnic armed faction.

The most meaningful adaptation would be an ability to transform temporary battlefield coordination into permanent local command-and-logistics structures. Its 2026 activity indicates some progress in this direction: AFF conducted both guerrilla and front-line operations in multiple provinces, while its primary focus in Badakhshan included more sustained clashes than its earlier hit-and-run pattern. Nonetheless, tactical adaptation alone will not overcome the strategic imbalance created by Taliban control of state institutions, weapons stocks, main transport corridors, and major population centers.

Relations and escalation risk

AFF's future effectiveness will depend significantly on whether it can convert rhetorical unity with the NRF and other anti-Taliban groups into tangible coordination. AFF and NRF have separately reiterated their commitment to continued armed struggle, but there is still no established, publicly verifiable unified command, common operational headquarters, or integrated national logistics network. The most likely pattern is continued political coordination and occasional tactical deconfliction, rather than a rapid merger of armed structures.

The principal escalation risk is not a direct AFF threat to neighbouring states, but a cycle in which rising attacks prompt Taliban pushback, arrests, collective punishment, and heavier security deployments in contested regions. Such responses can disrupt AFF cells in the short term but will also deepen local resentment and create new recruitment opportunities for AFF. This risk is particularly acute in Badakhshan, where local grievances, difficult terrain, border sensitivities, and overlapping armed resistance activity have made Taliban control more fragile.

A more serious escalation scenario would involve several developments occurring together:

- Sustained AFF or allied resistance control over remote terrain or a district center.
- Major Taliban defections, especially among local commanders or armed units.
- Large-scale weapons captures enabling repeated positional fighting.
- Operational coordination between AFF, NRF, and additional anti-Taliban groups.
- Cross-border sanctuary, financing, or arms support from a regional actor—none of which is publicly established at present.
- A severe economic, legitimacy, or internal leadership crisis within the Taliban administration that reduces its ability to redeploy forces rapidly.

Absent these conditions, the Taliban is likely to retain the ability to contain AFF through intelligence-led arrests, targeted raids, reinforcement of vulnerable districts, and exploitation of divisions among opposition groups.

Longer-term assessment

AFF is unlikely to disappear entirely so long as former ANDSF networks, anti-Taliban grievances, and diaspora-based political support remain available. It can lose individual commanders, fighters, safe houses, and weapons caches while preserving a degree of continuity through dispersed cells, veteran

personnel, local facilitators, and external political messaging. Its longer-term trajectory is therefore likely to be that of a smaller, adaptive, networked insurgent organization, rather than a force capable of replicating the large territorial campaigns of Afghanistan's past civil wars.

The most likely longer-term AFF configuration is:

- A strategic leadership and political representation operating partly outside Afghanistan.
- Small, autonomous or semi-autonomous fighting cells inside the country.
- Former ANDSF officers and veterans serving as trainers, planners, intelligence coordinators, and local commanders.
- Community-level facilitators providing shelter, reconnaissance, food, transport, and limited funding.
- Periodic tactical cooperation with NRF and other anti-Taliban groups.
- Social-media and diaspora channels used for legitimacy-building, recruitment messaging, fundraising appeals, and operational propaganda.
- A geographic core in the northeast, alongside intermittent attacks in Kabul and other provinces.

This model would make AFF difficult to eradicate completely but would also leave it vulnerable to Taliban intelligence penetration, local support loss, ammunition shortages, leadership targeting, and fragmentation.

Overall assessment


AFF's future threat profile should be assessed **as moderate, persistent, and geographically uneven**. It is most likely to remain capable of disrupting Taliban security forces, challenging perceptions of nationwide control, and generating localized instability—especially in Badakhshan and selected northern or urban areas—but not of overthrowing the Taliban independently in the next one to two years. Anti-Taliban groups claimed 88 incidents in 21 provinces between May and July, of which the UN verified 55; this reflects a broader increase in opposition activity, but not the emergence of a force capable of contesting Afghanistan nationwide.

The most probable outlook is:

- **High probability:** Continued cell-based attacks, ambushes, raids, and checkpoint assaults against Taliban forces.
- **High probability:** Continued AFF focus on Badakhshan, coupled with intermittent attacks in Kabul, Panjshir, Parwan, and other provinces.
- **High probability:** Expanded propaganda, diaspora engagement, recruitment among former security-force personnel, and calls for opposition unity.
- **Moderate probability:** Temporary seizure of small outposts, weapons captures, and short-duration positional fighting in remote mountainous districts.

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- **Moderate probability:** More visible tactical coordination with NRF or other fronts, without full organizational merger.
 - **Lower but higher-impact probability:** A localized anti-Taliban escalation involving sustained district-level fighting, Taliban defections, or temporary loss of control over a remote district center.
 - **Low probability under present conditions:** AFF independently achieving nationwide territorial control, capturing a major city, or toppling the Taliban government.

The central assessment is that AFF is likely to remain an enduring insurgency-management problem for the Taliban, rather than a near-term replacement for Taliban rule. Its significance will rise if Taliban internal cohesion weakens, local uprisings spread, regional actors provide material backing, or AFF succeeds in converting political coalition-building into unified operational command.



15. Annexure

Propaganda & Attacks Posters of AFF:





Statement

February 6, 2026

The Afghanistan Freedom Front condemns the suicide attack on a Shiite mosque in Islamabad, the capital city of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and considers such attacks inhumane and criminal acts.

Attacks on public places especially mosques and places of worship constitute crimes against humanity and are attempts to inflame sectarian and religious tensions across the region.

From the perspective of the Afghanistan Freedom Front, such crimes which over the past two decades were carried out as one of the Taliban's wartime tactics against the people and the former ANDSF are now being employed by the group's allies against neighboring countries.

Countries in the region, including Pakistan, considering the bitter experience of the collapse of a constitutional, law-based order in Afghanistan, must adjust and strengthen their defense and security strategies to confront terrorism practiced in the Taliban's customary manner and by their allied and like-minded terrorist groups.

The Afghanistan Freedom Front unequivocally condemns any terrorist act that targets civilian citizens and civilian sites. AFF considers such terroristic and anti-human actions part of a broader process of the spread of terrorism and the destabilization of countries in the region.

Afghanistan Freedom Front





Statement of the Afghanistan Freedom Front

January 5, 2026

The Taliban group, through the use of live ammunition and extreme violence, has brutally suppressed public gatherings and protests opposing the reckless, unlawful, and exploitative extraction of mineral resources by Taliban-affiliated contracting companies in the provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan. As a result of this savage crackdown, several protesting civilians have been killed and wounded. Simultaneously, in Nahrin District of Baghlan Province, Taliban forces committed a deeply offensive and inhumane act by desecrating the body of a fallen martyr of the National Resistance, in blatant violation of human dignity and moral principles.

At a time when the criminal Taliban Emirate is facing strong and meaningful public resistance against the laundering and plundering of the natural resources and wealth of northern Afghanistan—and when the scandals of these merchants of death have reached the point of public disgrace—the group's bloodthirsty militias, by violently suppressing protesters and insulting the body of a fallen freedom fighter, have laid bare the height of their humiliation, moral collapse, total loss of legitimacy, and the failure of their usurping rule in the northern regions of the country.

The fighters of the Afghanistan Freedom Front consider the cowardly, inhumane, and barbaric act of firing upon the pure body of one of their comrades in Baghlan Province to be a clear manifestation of the Taliban militias' weakness, desperation, and rage in the face of the growing wave of public awakening and the escalating dissatisfaction of the people with their illegitimate, authoritarian, and imposed rule in northern Afghanistan.

We regard bringing these criminals to justice for their heinous and abhorrent acts as our national, religious, and human duty. The mobilized militias and plunderers of our people's material and moral wealth should prepare for a firm and decisive response; they will pay a heavy price for their crimes.

The honeymoon period of the cowardly and usurping Taliban militias and the merchants of death in northern Afghanistan has come to an end.

The Afghanistan Freedom Front extends its sincere condolences on the martyrdom of Commander Zafar and the victims of the recent protests in the northeastern region of the country to their honorable families, fellow freedom fighters, and the proud people of Afghanistan





Statement by the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) On the Report “The Human Rights Situation of Ismaili Shias in Afghanistan”

December 26, 2025

The Afghanistan Freedom Front welcomes the publication of the comprehensive report by the Rawadari organisation titled “The Human Rights Situation of Ismaili Shias in Afghanistan” and considers it one of the most significant human rights documents addressing the condition of religious minorities in Afghanistan since the Taliban's return to illegitimate power.

The report clearly demonstrates that Ismaili Shias in Afghanistan have, for more than four years, been subjected to targeted, organized, and systematic discrimination and religious persecution. Its findings show that these violations are not isolated incidents, but rather part of a broader, deliberate policy of exclusion, repression, and religious oppression that, in certain respects, may reach the threshold of crimes against humanity.

According to the report, Ismaili Shias have been entirely excluded from political, administrative, and social participation. They have been removed from decision-making structures and denied access to government institutions, security bodies, and the judiciary, solely on the basis of their religious identity, even in areas where they constitute a significant or majority population.

The report further establishes that freedom of religion and belief for Ismailis has been effectively eliminated. Fear of harassment, intimidation, public denunciation, detention, and violence has forced many individuals to conceal their religious identity or to comply with religious practices imposed upon them. This constitutes a grave violation of the fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

One of the most alarming findings of the report is the systematic promotion of hate speech and religious takfir against Ismaili Shias by Taliban-affiliated institutions, clerics, and official educational structures. The normalization of religious defamation and dehumanizing language has severely undermined the safety, dignity, and social inclusion of the Ismaili community, the while fostering an environment conducive to further abuse and violence.

The report also documents cases of forced religious conversion, coercive religious education of Ismaili children, and severe reprisals against families who resist these practices, including threats, fines, torture, forced displacement, and destruction of property. Such actions constitute serious violations of the rights of the child and the absolute prohibition of forced conversion under international human rights law.

Additionally, the report highlights widespread social, economic, and familial discrimination, including bans on marriage and kinship ties, forced annulment of marriages, economic marginalization, confiscation of property, denial of access to justice, and systematic social ostracism, all of which amount to profound violations of human dignity and equality.

The Afghanistan Freedom Front considers the treatment of Ismaili Shias in Afghanistan to constitute serious, ongoing, and targeted violations of international human rights law. These abuses threaten not only the survival of the Ismaili community, but also the fundamental principles of religious diversity, peaceful coexistence, and human dignity in Afghanistan.

Discriminatory actions based on religion, ethnicity, language, and geography are part of the Taliban's political culture and are a growing source of concern for us regarding the collapse of society and the disintegration of the foundations of peaceful coexistence among the human communities living in Afghanistan.

We call upon the United Nations, the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and all states and institutions committed to human rights to take urgent, coordinated, and effective action to protect Ismaili Shias, to halt these violations, and to ensure accountability for those responsible.

Silence in the face of systematic religious persecution is not neutrality. It is complicity.

Afghanistan Freedom Front





Statement of the Afghanistan Freedom Front

1 December 2025

Dear Countrymen,

In these difficult days, our nation needs unity and solidarity more than ever before. Our shared homeland has been engulfed by the forces of extremism and terrorism. Over the past four years, nearly ten million Afghans have been forced to flee the country, facing endless hardship and displacement. Meanwhile, millions more inside Afghanistan have been deprived of their most basic human rights under the oppressive rule of the Taliban. Poverty, unemployment, and despair are rampant, while authoritarianism grows deeper with each passing day.

The Taliban's tyrannical regime sustains itself through repression, discrimination, deceit, and conspiracy. In the current climate, fueling ethnic, linguistic, or sectarian divisions only prolongs Taliban rule and the suffering of our people.

The Afghanistan Freedom Front has closely monitored recent developments related to our country and wishes to underscore the following points:


1. Afghanistan under Taliban rule has become a vast prison for our people and a safe haven for global extremists and terrorists. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences are undeniable realities of our society. Under these circumstances, the struggle for freedom and the restoration of the people's ownership over their land and destiny is the most urgent priority and collective responsibility. Destructive and unnecessary disputes on social media only strengthen the Taliban's propaganda and divisive agenda. Only after liberating the country from Taliban domination can we reach a new social agreement one that recognizes cultural and religious diversity and defines us as a unified nation seeking progress and prosperity. Therefore, any debate that distracts from exposing Taliban crimes serves only the Taliban's interests.

2. The presence of the international community during the 20 years of the Republic brought significant opportunities for Afghanistan, and countless heroes sacrificed their lives to protect the nation's values and dignity. Members of the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces are the true sons and daughters of the country, whose sacrifices demonstrated their deep loyalty to Afghanistan. The attack on members of the United States National Guard is an unjustifiable crime. However, extending the actions of individuals to an entire institution, or attributing crime to a group's ethnicity or previous duty station, is wrong and misleading.

The Afghanistan Freedom Front calls upon all fronts, organizations, political groups, civil movements, public figures, and social media activists opposing the Taliban to unite in solidarity and collective action against this oppressive and illegitimate regime. We remain committed to our struggle until the day of victory, when freedom, equality, and the dignity and pride of the Afghan people are restored.



مجموع عملیات جبهه آزادی افغانستان علیه گروه طالبان در یک سال





NO:61

Date: 30 April 2024

Afghanistan Freedom Front's Statement on the Heinous Attack on Worshipers in Herat

Attack on Worshipers in Herat: The ongoing act of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity.

It is with profound sorrow and indignation that we address the recent despicable attack on worshipers in Herat. Once again, our compatriots were ruthlessly targeted while performing prayers at the Imam Zamān Mosque in Andisheh Town, Herat Province. This cowardly act of terrorism resulted in the tragic martyrdom and injury of several individuals, including four women and one child.

This appalling incident is just one in a series of brutal attacks orchestrated by terrorist groups with the backing of the Taliban. These attacks aim to stoke sectarian divisions and sow discord among the diverse ethnic communities of Afghanistan, particularly targeting the Hazara citizens, Shiites, and other vulnerable groups.

In the past, terrorist networks employed more intricate methods like suicide bombings, planting mines, and remote detonations, targeting both military and civilian entities. However, with direct financial and logistical backing from the Taliban regime, they now boldly unleash terror on civilians, causing mass casualties among innocent and defenceless individuals. They carry out these attacks without apprehension of consequences, often retreating to Taliban safe houses and gatherings without facing any form of accountability.

AFF unequivocally condemns this barbaric attack and all similar acts of violence. We stand in solidarity with the victims and their families, and we mourn the senseless loss of life.

AFF also calls upon the international community and regional stakeholders to acknowledge the grim reality that Afghanistan has become a haven for terrorists under Taliban rule. AFF urges them to refrain from engaging with or appeasing the terrorist regime and to instead work towards holding these perpetrators accountable for their crimes against humanity.

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Date : 8 March 2024

Number : 57

Statement of the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) on International Women's Day, 8th of March 2024

This year, on the Eighth of March, International Women's Day, we commemorate under circumstances where the women of Afghanistan are enduring the most difficult days of their lives under the oppressive and barbaric rule of the Taliban regime. This day stands as a poignant reminder of women's formidable resurgence and their global battle to dismantle oppressive laws, norms, beliefs, and misogynistic attitudes, all in pursuit of a world defined by peace, justice, and gender equality. Throughout our recent history, women of Afghanistan have been steadfast participants in this sweeping global movement, tirelessly advocating for their human rights.

After the Republic fell and the Taliban unlawfully seized power in Afghanistan, this group has amplified its history of crimes, human rights violations, discrimination, and violence by imposing constraints on women's lives, work, education, and social activities. They have gained the reputation as the most disgraceful and extreme political-religious regime in the modern world, exhibiting profound hostility towards women.

Over the past year, the women's protest movement, both domestically and internationally, has emerged as a powerful symbol of deliberate resistance and unwavering defiance within Afghan society against the oppressive and archaic rule of the Taliban. This has drawn global attention to the ever more delicate and vigilant situation in Afghanistan, particularly concerning governments' interactions with the repressive and violent Taliban regime.

AFF pledges its unwavering support for the tireless efforts of women and girls of Afghanistan against the oppressive Taliban regime. It recognizes the women's protest movement as the forefront of the civil and social struggle for freedom in the homeland, standing as steadfast allies to the courageous fighters of the Freedom Front. AFF commits to continue its fight until the nation achieves freedom and the rights of women and men are fully realized.

AFF extends its granittes to all human rights organizations, civil society groups, champions of gender equality, and defenders of women's rights across the globe for their support and solidarity. AFF urges the international community to acknowledge the gender-based oppression imposed by the Taliban regime as a crime in Afghanistan and to refrain from any interaction or appeasement with the most misogynistic political-ideological regime in today's Afghanistan.

Gender equality stands as a fundamental and invaluable human aspiration in Afghanistan, marking an unyielding journey driven by the consciousness and fervour of the emerging generation, especially the empowered women and girls of our nation. This endeavour will endure along the challenging road to freedom, aiming to halt the oppressive and violent rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Long live freedom and equality.



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جبهه آزادی افغانستان
AFF

Dawaltshah / Laghman



Attack target

5 Taliban militants were killed and injured in Dawlat Shah district Laghman province by Freedom Fighters (AFF)

Date : 18/19 December 2023

The Afghanistan Freedom Front Statement on the UN Security Council Resolution and Doha Meeting

The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), a pro-democracy and human rights politicalmilitary movement, welcomes any attempt by the UN and the international community to condemn the Taliban's criminal regime. The AFF has assessed the recent UN Security Council Resolution 2681 (2023) and believes it is necessary to share the following points:

1. The United Nations was founded to maintain peace and security among the nations of the world. Engaging with the Taliban, a terrorist group with ties to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups is against the principles of the UN Charter. The Taliban's harboring of Ayman al-Zawahiri at heart of Kabul and welcoming and protecting Haji Bashar Noorzai, a terrorist and narcotics mastermind and financier, proves

that they are a threat to global peace and security.

2. Given the Taliban's widespread and systematic human rights abuses against the people of Afghanistan, the United Nations and its agencies, must hold the group accountable by standing by its Charter, particularly Article 1, Paragraph 3, which states that the UN shall promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

3. The United Nations and its agencies must ensure the monitoring and respect for all human rights in Afghanistan in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which Afghanistan is a state party.

4. Human rights are universal, interdependent, interrelated, and indivisible according to legally binding documents adopted by the United Nations and the international <https://freedom-front.com> info@freedom-front.com law. Selective approaches violate these provisions, create negative experiences

and lead to widespread violations of human rights by governments and groups. Such approaches also undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations and its relevant organs. Thus, pick-and-choose treatment of human rights in Afghanistan, such as banning UN employees or women's education, is counterproductive and harms human rights and the UN's reputation.

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Abbreviations:

Abbreviation	Meaning
AFF	Afghanistan Freedom Front
NRF	National Resistance Front
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
NDS	National Directorate of Security
MANPADS	Man Portable Air Defense Systems
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
RPK	Ruchnoy Pulemyot Kalashnikova
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UFA	United Front of Afghanistan
IED	Improvised Explosive Device

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